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I. INTRODUCTION
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided a considerable number of
insurance-related controversies between June 2007 and May 2008. Arguably,
the most important, comprehensive decisions are discussed-nineteen
insurance cases that originate in just five federal district courts.' Generally, the
1. Three cases originated in the Eastern District of Louisiana. See Stanleyv. Trinchard, 500 F.3d411
(5th Cir. Sept. 2007); House v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007), cert. denied,
128 S. Ct. 1309 (2008); Arias-Benn v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 495 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. Aug. 2007).
One other case originated in the Northern District of Mississippi. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co. v.
Found. Health Servs. Inc., 524 F.3d 588 (5th Ci. Apr. 2008). Another two came from Mississippi's
Southern District. See Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. Apr. 2008);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lake Caroline, Inc., 515 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. Jan. 2008). Five more cases
originated in the Northern District of Texas. See Advocare Int'l, LP v. Horizon Labs., Inc., 524 F.3d 679 (5th
Cir. Apr. 2008); Citibank Tex., N.A. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 522 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. Mar. 2008); TIG
Ins. Co. V. Aon Re, Inc., 521 F.3d 351 (5th Cir. Mar. 2008); Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbot, 495 F.3d 151 (5th
Cir. Aug. 2007); Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Knox Park Constr. Inc., 488 F.3d 680 (5th Cir. June. 2007). Finally,
the most cases (eight) were appealed from Texas's Southern District. See Mufiloz v. State Farm Lloyds of
Tex. (5th Cir. Mar. 2008); Carrizales v. State Farm Lloyds, 518 F.3d 343 (5th Cir. Feb. 2008) (per curiam);
Shearer v. Sw. Serv. Live Ins. Co., 516 F.3d 276 (5th Cir. Jan. 2008); Henry v. Mutual of Omaha Ins. Co.,
503 F.3d 425 (5th Cir. Oct. 2007) (per curiam); Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. De La Luz Garcia, 501 F.3d 436
(5th Ci. Sept. 2007); Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co., 500 F.3d 390 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007); United Nat'l Ins. Co. v.
2009] 1015
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW [Vol. 41:1013
Fifth Circuit decided familiar questions of law and fact. More specifically, the
following types of procedural and substantive conflicts appear in the nineteen
insurance decisions: (1) one case involving the constitutionality of a Texas
insurance statute;2 (2) two federal preemption and removal controversies
involving the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA); 3 (3) two
disagreements requiring the court of appeals to make "Erie guesses";4 (4) eight
duty-to-indemnify conflicts; 5 (5) three duty-to-defend disputes; 6 (6) three cases
surrounding whether insurers have a duty to pay proceeds in the wake of
Tropical Storm Allison and Hurricane Katrina;7 (7) one dispute involving a
putative class action;8 and (8) one case of first impression.9
Hydro Tank, Inc., 497 F.3d 445 (5th Cir. Aug. 2007); Gasch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278
(5th Cir. June 2007).
2. See discussion infra Part IV.
3. 29 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1461 (2000).
4. See infra Part II.C.3; see e.g., Wentwood Woodside I, LP v. GMAC Commercial Mortg. Corp., 419
F.3d 310, 323 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Neither the Texas Supreme Court, nor indeed any of the courts of Texas, has
ever considered whether a plaintiff like Wentwood belongs to the class that section 4012a protects. We must,
therefore, make an Erie "guess" about how the Texas Supreme Court would answer this question."); Howe ex
rel. Howe v. Scottsdale Ins. Co., 204 F.3d 624, 627 (5th Cit. 2000) ("To determine Louisiana law... this
[c]ourt should first look to final decisions of the Louisiana Supreme Court. If the Louisiana Supreme Court
has not ruled on this issue, then this [c]ourt must make an 'Erie guess' and 'determine as best it can' what the
Louisiana Supreme Court would decide." (quoting Krieser v. Hobbs, 166 F.3d 736, 738 (5th Cir. 1999))).
5. See infra Part lII.A.3-4, B.1-3.
6. See infra Part Ill.A.2, B.1-3.
7. See infra Part Il.C.I-3; see, e.g., John Tedesco, Tropical Storm Makes Waves, SAN ANTONIO
EXPRESS-NEWS, June 6, 2001, at IA, available at 2001 WLNR 11972334 ("The first tropical storm of the
season was churning off the coast of Texas and Louisiana late Tuesday, packing heavy rain and wind gusts
clocked at more than 60 mph. Tropical Storm Allison ... prompt[ed] forecasters to warn of flash floods....
A tropical storm is a cyclone with sustained winds of 39 to 73 mph and is capable of becoming a full-fledged
hurricane. Allison formed over a large swath of the Gulf of Mexico."); Chad Terhune, Katrina Begins March,
Florida Braces, WALL ST. J., Aug. 26, 2005, at A2 ("A weak Hurricane Katrina drenched densely populated
South Florida .... Flooding was a major worry .... Sam Miller, executive vice president of the Florida
Insurance Council, an industry trade group, said insurers are expecting a 'two-punch hit' from Katrina, with
the more-severe blow coming if the storm comes ashore again in the state's Panhandle region. Four
hurricanes last year caused about $23 billion in insured losses, and Hurricane Dennis inflicted additional
losses of nearly $1 billion last month, according to Insurance Services Office Inc., an insurance-consulting
firm. In response, several small insurers left Florida this year, and some of the largest carriers are dropping
policyholders or no longer issuing new policies. Floridians also are facing double-digit percentage increases
on homeowners' policies, and some mobile-home owners have been unable to find coverage in the private
market.").
8. See infra Part II.C.2.
9. See infra Part III.A.5.
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II. FIRST-PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS-STATE COMMON LAW CLAIMS
& DECISIONS
A. Disability & Health Insurance
1. Procedural Question: Whether a Law Firm's Long-Term, Group
Disability Insurance Contract Is an ERISA Employee-Benefits Plan That
Preempts an Attorney from Receiving Long-Term Disability Benefits
To be sure, the increasing population of aging Baby Boomers includes
members of the legal profession; therefore, the procedural and substantive
questions in House v. American United Life Insurance Co. are extremely
timely. 1 Even though the Fifth Circuit presented an intelligent analysis and
reached the correct decision in House, the same questions are likely to reappear
repeatedly in the foreseeable future.
In 1999, Walter House worked as a trial attorney for a firm where he was
the founding partner and earned approximately $350,000 per year." In
October of that year, House suffered a nonfatal heart attack at the age of forty-
nine.12 During that same month, House's law firm sought competitive
proposals from several insurers. 13 The firm wanted to make life and disability
insurance more affordable for the entire firm-including attorneys and staff.'4
Thus, the firm purchased a "group life and disability" plan from American
United Life Insurance Company (AUL).15
Although the plan was a "group policy," it provided insurance coverage
for four distinct classes of persons in the firm, and a life insurance provision
covered every person in the firm. 16 There were, however, three classes of
disability insurance. 17 Classes I, II, and Ill-respectively---covered partners,
associate attorneys, and non-lawyers.' 8 Significantly, the definition of "total
disability" for lawyers and non-lawyers differed slightly. 19 Regarding partners
and associates, AUL promised to pay total disability income if injury or
sickness prevents the attorney from performing "the material and substantial
duties of his regular occupation.,, 20 Under the contract, AUL also promised to
pay up to $10,000 of an attorney's pre-disability monthly income if the
10. See House v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1309 (2008).









20. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
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attorney became totally disabled.2' On the other hand, AUL promised to pay
total disability income to non-lawyer employees if an individual could not
"perform the material and substantial duties of any gainful occupation for
which the Person is reasonably fitted by training, education, or experience. 22
House returned to his trial practice a few weeks after his October 1999
heart attack. 21 A year later, however, he had quadruple-bypass surgery.24 He
left the firm in November 2000 after returning briefly to wind up his trial
practice and reassign his clients.s In October 2001, House became the
executive counsel for the Louisiana Department of Economic Development.
26
That position paid $100,000 per year, and it did not require House to litigate
cases.
27
When House left the law firm in November 2000, he submitted a claim to
AUL stating that he was totally disabled. 28 For nine months, AUL sent total-
disability payments to House, apparently while thoroughly evaluating his
claim. 29 Ultimately, AUL denied the claim after reviewing House's post-
operative activities and his new employment.3° It concluded that House was
"capable of performing the sedentary occupation of an Attorney as it is
normally performed in the national economy.
31
House filed a lawsuit against AUL in the United States District Court for
the Eastern District of Louisiana, citing Louisiana law and asserting that the
disability insurer acted in bad faith and misrepresented the terms of total-
disability coverage.32 The parties then filed a series of summary judgment
motions. 33 In particular, AUL argued that federal preemption law prevented
House's recovery under the policy because the disability-insurance contract
was an ERISA employee-benefits plan. 34 The district court judge disagreed
and concluded, among other things, the following: (1) the insurance contract
was not an ERISA plan; therefore, House's state law claims were not
preempted; (2) although House was still able to make substantial earnings as a
lawyer, the policy language deemed him totally disabled; (3) House qualified
for partial-disability income under the policy language; and (4) AUL had to
21. Id.
22. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).









32. Id. at 446-47.
33. Id. at 447.
34. Id. at 448; see also 29 U.S.C.A. § 1144(a) (2000) ("[ERISA's provisions] supersede any and all
State laws insofar as they may... relate to any employee benefit plan .... ").
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pay disability income after weighing a number of other factors. 35 Neither party
was fully satisfied with the district court's conclusions and both appealed.36
Before the Fifth Circuit, AUL argued that ERISA governed AUL's
disability policy; therefore, federal law preempted the adjudication of House's
state-law causes of action.37 AUL also challenged the district court's finding
that House qualified for both total and partial-disability income under the
policy. 3s  In opposition, House argued that the district court should have
awarded more disability benefits and damages for the insurer's bad faith and
misrepresentation. 39 Although the appeals contained a number of issues, the
court of appeals fashioned the central question this way: whether House's
disability-income policy was an ERISA employee-benefit plan.4°
Briefly put, various employees, beneficiaries, employers, and
administrators are associated with an employee-benefits plan.4' Therefore,
ERISA outlines the parties' rights and obligations under the plan.42 In
35. House, 499 F.3d at 447-48.
36. Id. at 448.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. See id. at 447-48.
40. Id. at 448.
41. See id. at 450-52. Congress enacted the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA) to
protect the rights of employees and their beneficiaries in employee-benefit plans. See id. at 452 n.7; see also
Robertson v. Alexander Grant & Co., 798 F.2d 868, 870 (5th Cir. 1986) (stressing that Congress enacted
ERISA to correct abuses occurring in the administration of private retirement plans (citing S. Rep. No. 93-127
(1973), reprinted in 1974 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4838, 4838-44)). ERISA preempts the application of state law
remedies when an employee seeks redress under an employee benefit plan. See 29 U.S.C. § 1144 (2000),
which reads:
(a) Supersedure; effective date
Except as provided in subsection (b) of this section, the provisions of this subchapter and
subchapter Ill of this chapter shall supersede any and all State laws insofar as they may now or
hereafter relate to any employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title and not
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title. This section shall take effect on January 1, 1975.
(b) Construction and application
(2)(A) Except as provided in subparagraph (B), nothing in this subehapter shall be construed to
exempt or relieve any person from any law of any State which regulates insurance, banking, or
securities.
(B) Neither an employee benefit plan described in section 1003(a) of this title, which is not
exempt under section 1003(b) of this title (other than a plan established primarily for the purpose
of providing death benefits), nor any trust established under such a plan, shall be deemed to be an
insurance company or other insurer, bank, trust company, or investment company or to be
engaged in the business of insurance or banking for purposes of any law of any State purporting
to regulate insurance companies, insurance contracts, banks, trust companies, or investment
companies.
42. See § 1144. ERISA complainants may commence a number of contract- and tort-based actions in a
court of law to secure various remedies. For an excellent review of various actions sounding in contract law,
see George Lee Flint Jr., ERJSA: Reformulating the Federal Common Law for Plan Interpretation, 32 SAN
DiGo L. REV. 955, 956-57 (1995) ("Under state contract law, litigants developed four recovery theories.
Under contract laws gratuity theory, courts treated the employer's promise to pay benefits as a future gift ....
Second, under the bilateral contract theory, the participant's continued employment constituted
consideration for the employer's promise to pay the benefit .... Third, under the unilateral contract theory,
the participant's benefit constituted deferred compensation, retention of which would result in unjust
TEXAS TECH LAW REVIEW
addition, Congress amended ERISA under the Consolidated Omnibus Budget
Reconciliation Act of 1985 (COBRA).43 COBRA was a congressional
response to "reports of the growing number of Americans without any health
insurance coverage and the decreasing willingness of... hospitals to provide
care to those who cannot afford to pay."44 COBRA, therefore, attempts to
prevent the loss of insurance coverage that could accompany any changes in
employment and "to preserve employee's medical insurance as they move
from job to job. 45
Relying on an earlier Fifth Circuit decision, the district court decided that
ERISA did not preempt House's state law claims.46 The lower court held that
the disability coverage for partners in House's law firm was a separate plan
because employees generally could not receive Class I benefits.47 The Fifth
Circuit, however, reached a different conclusion. Citing the three-pronged test
outlined in Meredith v. Time Insurance Co., to determine whether ERISA
governed the plan, the court asked (1) whether a plan exists, (2) whether the
plan falls within the Department of Labor's safe harbor rule, and (3) whether
the employer intentionally established or maintained a plan for its employees'
benefit.48
The court of appeals held that the law firm established and maintained an
employee benefits plan.49 But to be exempt from ERISA, a plan must meet all
four criteria under the Department of Labor's safe harbor exclusion.5 °
Specifically, a group or group-type insurance program is not an ERISA plan if
(1) the employer or employee does not contribute to the plan, (2) the employee
contribution is completely voluntary, (3) the employer's role consists only of
collecting premiums and remitting them to an insurer, and (4) the employer
enrichment of the employer .... Fourth, under the estoppel theory, the court held that the participant's right
to a plan benefit arose because of his reliance on the promise of benefits in continuing his work with that
employer.").
43. Consolidated Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1985, Pub. L. No. 99-272, § 10002, 100 Stat.
82 (1986) (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.).
44. Brock v. Primedica, Inc., 904 F.2d 295, 296 (5th Cir. 1990) (quoting H.R. Rep. No. 99-241,
reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 579, 622).
45. Teweleit v. Hartford Life & Acc. Ins. Co., 43 F.3d 1005, 1006, 1008 (5th Cir. 1995); accord Rettig
v. Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 744 F.2d 133, 155 n.54 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Smith v. CMTA-IAM Pension
Trust, 746 F.2d 587,589 (9th Cir. 1984); see also McGee v. Funderburg, 17 F.3d 1122, 1124 (8th Cir. 1994)
("ERISA, as amended by COBRA, is remedial legislation which should be liberally construed to effectuate
Congressional intent to protect employee participants in employee benefit plans.").
46. House v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 443,448 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007), cert. denied, 128 S. Ct.
1309 (2008); see House v. Am. United Life Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 02-1342, 2004 WL 856671, at *7-8 (E.D.
La. Apr. 20, 2004), rev'd, 499 F.3d 443 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007); see also Robertson v. Alexander Grant & Co.,
798 F.2d 868, 872 (5th Cir. 1986) (holding that the ERISA is not applicable to a separate retirement plan that
only benefits partners).
47. House, 499 F.3d at448; House, No. Civ. A. 02-1342,2004 WL 856671, at *9.
48. House, 499 F.3d at 448.
49. Id. at 451-52; see also 29 U.S.C. §1002(3) (2000) (defining the term "employee benefit plan"); id.
§ 1002(1) (defining "employee welfare benefit plan").
50. House, 499 F.3d at 449.
1020 [Vol. 41:1013
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receives no profit from the plan. 51 Applying this rule, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that the firm's life and disability plan was not excluded under the
safe harbor exclusion.52 Participation was mandatory for all classes of
employees, and the law firm paid 100% of the employees' premiums.
53
But there is more. Even if a plan does not qualify for safe harbor, the
insurance contract still might not be an ERISA plan.54 Again, a plan that falls
outside of the safe harbor exception will not fall under ERISA jurisdiction
unless the plan satisfies Meredith's third prong: an employer must intentionally
establish or maintain a plan for the employees' benefit.55 In light of
incontrovertible facts, the Fifth Circuit concluded that House's state law claims
were preempted because the disability policy was an ERISA plan.
56
2. Procedural Question: Whether an Employer's Health Insurance
Contract Is an ERISA Employee-Benefits Plan That Preempts a Texas Court
from Hearing a Multiple-Claims Lawsuit
ERISA was also the source of the controversy in Shearer v. Southwest
Service Life Insurance Co.,57 but the procedural question and facts differ from
those appearing in House. In Shearer, the plaintiff-appellant, Lance Shearer,
owned 50% of Intercontinental Materials Management, Inc. (IMM), where he
was also an employee.58 His mother, Christal Shearer, owned the other 50%.59
In June 2004, Lance contacted Southwest Service Life Insurance Company
(SWSL) to apply for health insurance, which IMM paid for.6° Lance and
members of his family were covered under the health insurance contract.6'
During the policy period, Lance's son was injured, and the child required
hospitalization and surgery, so Lance submitted claims to SWSL.6 2 Initially,
SWSL paid some of the claim, but it refused to pay all medical expenses.63
Lance thus filed a multiple-claims, first-party lawsuit against SWSL and its
agent, Richard Sanders, in a Texas state court. 64 Shortly thereafter, SWSL and
Sanders removed the case to the United States District Court for the Southern
51. Id.; 29 C.F.R. § 2510.3-1(j)(1)-(4) (2007).
52. House, 499 F.3d at 450.
53. Id. at 449.
54. See supra text accompanying note 50.
55. See supra text accompanying note 48.
56. House, 499 F.3d at 452-53.
57. Shearer v. Sw. Serv. Life Ins. Co., 516 F.3d 276, 278 (5th Cir. Jan. 2008).





63. Id. at 277-78.
64. Id. at 278. The state law claims were "misrepresentation, breach of contract, unfair and deceptive
trade practices, and unfair claim settlement practices." Id.
2009] 1021
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District of Texas pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331.65 To justify removal, SWSL
claimed that the health-insurance contract was an ERISA plan, and so the
federal preemption doctrine gave the district court subject matter jurisdiction.66
Lance then filed a motion to remand the case, arguing that the insurance
contract was not an ERISA plan.67 The federal district court denied the motion
without comment.68 In addition, the district court granted SWSL's motion for
summary judgment, ruling that ERISA prevented Lance from securing relief.69
Lance appealed the summary judgment ruling to the Fifth Circuit and argued
that the federal district court lacked jurisdiction because the health insurance
contract was not an ERISA plan.70
To determine whether IMM's health policy was an ERISA plan, the Fifth
Circuit followed the methodology that it applied in Meredith and House.7 1
Applying Meredith's three-pronged test, the court of appeals asked again
(1) whether the policy was a plan; (2) if so, whether the plan falls within the
safe harbor rule; and (3) whether the employer intentionally established or
maintained a plan for the employees' benefit.72 To help the Fifth Circuit reach
a swift and correct decision, Lance conceded that the health insurance contract
was a plan that did not fall within the safe harbor provisions.73 Lance insisted,
however, that 1MM did not establish or maintain the health insurance
agreement for the employees' benefit.74 Citing MDPhysicians & Associates,
Inc. v. State Board of Insurance, Lance argued that a plan is not an ERISA
plan simply because the plan exists.75
The Fifth Circuit agreed and highlighted three important facts: (1) 1MM
paid the premiums outlined in the health insurance contract on behalf of Lance
and his family; (2) IMM paid the premiums for Lance's mother, who was
insured under a different insurer's contract; and (3) IMM did not pay any
insurance premiums for the benefit of IMM's other employees.76 In light of
those outstanding facts, the Fifth Circuit concluded that IMM did not intend to
establish or maintain an ERISA plan.77 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit vacated
the district court's judgment and remanded the case to the state court,









71. See id. at 279.
72. Id. (citing Meredith v. Time Ins. Co., 980 F.2d 352, 355 (5th Cir. 1993)).
73. See id.
74. Id.
75. See id. (citing MDPhysicians & Assocs. v. State Bd. of Ins., 957 F.2d 178, 183 (5th Cir. 1992)).
76. Id. at 279-80.




3. Substantive Question: Whether a Health Insurer's Refusal To Pay for a
Suicidal Victim's Medical Treatment Is Bad Faith Under Texas's Common
Law and Deceptive Trade Practices Statute
Without a doubt, the facts in Henry v. Mutual of Omaha Insurance Co.
are exhaustive and clearly stated.7 9 In addition, the various substantive
questions are familiar and easy to comprehend.80 The quality of the analysis in
the opinion, however, is mixed. On the one hand, the discussions of "bad
faith" and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealings are sound. On
the other hand, the discussions of a wrongful death claim and causation are
difficult to comprehend because both discussions are rather cryptic. Perhaps
after reviewing the relevant facts and court's analysis, these initial conclusions
will become more apparent.
Undeniably, the injury that fostered this controversy is tragic. Bradley
Henry (Brad) purchased a health insurance policy from Mutual of Omaha
Insurance Company (MOIC). 81 Under the contract, the insurer promised to
pay benefits when Brad purchased services and supplies to treat a "medically
necessary" injury or sickness. 82 But to qualify as "a medically necessary
service or supply[,]" either or both "(a) [must be] appropriate and consistent
with the diagnosis [according to] accepted standards of community practice;
(b) [cannot be] experimental or investigative; (c) [cannot be] omitted without
adversely affecting the insured person's condition or quality of medical care;
and (d) [must be] delivered at the lowest and most appropriate level of care and
,,83not primarily for the sake of convenience.
In December 2002, Dr. Michael Bullen examined Brad and concluded
that he had a hypogammaglobulinemia-immunological deficiency. 84 The
physician recommended intravenous immunoglobulin (WIG) replacement
therapy each month for one year.85 A second opinion, from Dr. Glenn Bugay,
confirmed Dr. Bullen's diagnosis and endorsed the IVIG treatment.86 Later
that month, Dr. Bullen began Brad's IVIG treatment and contacted MOIC
immediately to verify that Brad's health insurance contract would cover the
79. See Henry v. Mut. of Omaha Ins. Co., 503 F.3d 425, 426-27 (5th Cir. Oct. 2007) (per curiam).
80. See id. at 427-30.
81. See id. at 426.
82. Id.
83. Id.
84. See id.; see also Dr. Saul Greenberg, Hypogammaglobulinemia, http://www.utoronto.ca/kids/
Hypogam.htm (last visited Nov. 10, 2008) ("Hypogammaglobulinemia is a disorder that is caused by a lack of
B-lymphocytes and a resulting low level of immunoglobulins (antibodies) in the blood. lmmunoglobulins
play a dual role in the immune response by recognizing foreign antigens and triggering a biological response
that culminates in the elimination of the antigen. Antibody deficiency is associated with recurrent infections
with specific types of bacteria.... There are 5 major types of immunoglobulins: immunoglobulin G,
immunoglobulin M (IgM), immunoglobuin A (IgA), immunoglobulin D (IgD), and immunoglobulin E
(IgE).").
85. Henry, 503 F.3d at 426.
86. Id.
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IVIG treatment.87 Because the cost of the therapy each month varied from
$10,000 to $16,000, MOIC's initial oral response was non-committal. 88
Ultimately, based on its in-house physician and independent
immunologist's opinions, MOIC concluded that Brad's IVIG therapy was not
medically necessary.89 Shortly thereafter, MOIC contacted Dr. Bullen and
disclosed that Brad's policy did not cover the IVIG treatments. 90 Despite
MOIC's two official rejections of the claim, however, Dr. Bullen continued to
administer monthly IVIG treatments and requested reimbursements from the
health insurer. 91 MOIC mistakenly paid for four months of treatment, but the
company informed Dr. Bullen that those were erroneous payments and that the
company would not pay for any additional IVIG treatments.92
Still believing that the treatment was a medical necessity, Brad visited the
Allergy and Immunology Clinic at Houston's Texas Children's Hospital.93
One of the Clinic's specialists, Dr. Howard Rosenblatt, performed a thorough
physical examination and ordered numerous tests.94 Unlike Drs. Bugay and
Bullen, however, Dr. Rosenblatt did not conclude unequivocally that the VIG
treatment was medically necessary.95 But he did recommend IVIG therapy for
Brad.96 Brad then received his fifth IVIG treatment on May 1, 2003.97 He also
sent a copy of Dr. Rosenblatt's evaluation to MOIC, which stated that it needed
a couple of weeks to review the information.98 At that point, Brad threatened to
sue MOIC if the health insurer continued to reject his claim.99 Four days later
and five days before his wedding, however, Brad committed suicide. l°
Citing their rights under the Texas Survival Statute, 1 1 Brad's parents,
Marion and Janet Henry (the Henrys), sued MOIC in a Texas state court. 10 2
Their complaint listed several causes of action: wrongful death, breach of
contract, and violations of the Texas Insurance Code and the Texas Deceptive















101. See TEX. Civ. PRAc. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.021 (Vernon 2008).
102. Henry, 503 F.3d at 427-28; see § 71.021.
103. Henry, 503 F.3d at 427-28; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.46, 17.50 (Vernon 2002)
(listing deceptive acts and consumers remedies, respectively); TEx. INS. CODE ANN. §§ 541.060(a), 542.003
(Vernon 2008) (formerly art. 21.21, § 4(10)). Under § 542.003(a)(4), prohibited conduct includes "not
attempting in good faith to effect a prompt, fair, and equitable settlement of a claim submitted in which
liability has become reasonably clear." § 542.003(a)(4).
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asserted breach of good faith and fair dealing, alleging that MOIC acted in "bad
faith."' 1 4 MOIC removed the case to the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Texas, where the court granted MOIC's motion for
summary judgment. 105
On appeal, two summary judgment questions were before the Fifth
Circuit: (1) whether genuine issues of material fact existed regarding MOIC's
alleged "bad faith" in violation of the DTPA, Texas Insurance Code, and the
Texas common law duty of good faith and fair dealing,' °6 and (2) whether any
104. Henry, 503 F.3d at 428. Therefore, the Henrys sought damages for Brad's physical pain and mental
anguish; damages for their own pecuniary loss, mental anguish, and loss of companionship and society; and
punitive damages. Id.
105. Id.
106. See id. at 428. The Fifth Circuit stated that
[t]he Henrys have advanced three discrete claims grounded in breach of the duty of good faith and
fair dealing. Two of these claims are statutory, arising respectively under the DTPA and the
Insurance Code; the third claim is based on the common law....
The reasonable-basis test applies to all three of the Henrys' bad faith causes of action against
MOIC.
Id. at 428-29 (emphasis added). Here, the Fifth Circuit confuses keen readers of these opinions by using the
phrase "bad faith causes of action." See id. The Texas Supreme Court has recognized just one bad faith
cause of action and that is the independent tort of bad faith. See Viles v. Sec. Nat'l Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566,
567 (Tex. 1990) (creating an independent tort of bad faith for breaching the common law duty of good faith
and fair dealing). When there is an alleged breach of good faith and fair dealing, however, the resulting
causes of action may sound in contract, in tort, as a separate bad-faith action, or as all three:
The relation which is essential to the existence of the duty to exercise care may arise through an
express or implied contract. Accompanying every contract is a common-law duty to perform
with care, skill, reasonable expedience and faithfulness the thing agreed to be done, and a
negligent failure to observe any of these conditions is a tort, as well as a breach of the contract.
In such a case, the contract is mere inducement creating the state of things which furnishes the
occasion of the tort. In other words, the contract creates the relation out of which grows the duty to
use care.
Montgomery Ward & Co. v. Scharrenbeck, 204 S.W.2d 508, 510 (Tex. 1947) (emphasis added) (quoting 38
Am. JUR. Negligence § 20 (1941)). Therefore, in the present case, it would have been more appropriate for
the Fifth Circuit to have discussed summary judgment issues for each cause of action rather than discussing
multiple causes of action under the unfortunate heading of "bad faith causes of action." See id.
In addition, in the context of insurance law, one often discovers insureds alleging that an insurer
breached Texas's "common law duty of good faith and fair dealing." See Bartlett v. Am. Republic Ins. Co.,
845 S.W.2d 342, 342 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1992, no writ). One also discovers insureds alleging that an
insurer breached "implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing." See id. (insureds commencing an action
against health insurer for breach of contract, breach of duty of good faith and fair dealing, and breach of
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing). Actually, both of these are "claims" or "allegations," and
there is very little, if any, substantive difference between them. See generally id. More importantly, these
are just claims and not causes of action. See id. A breach of either, however, allows an insured to commence
an action in tort, an action in contract, or actions under both theories of recovery:
While this court has declined to impose an implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing
in every contract, we have recognized that a duty of good faith and fair dealing may arise as a
result of a special relationship between the parties governed or created by a contract.
In the insurance context a special relationship arises out of the parties' unequal bargaining
power and the nature of insurance contracts which would allow unscrupulous insurers to take
advantage of their insureds' misfortunes in bargaining for settlement or resolution of claims. In
addition, without such a cause of action insurers can arbitrarily deny coverage and delay payment
of a claim with no more penalty than interest on the amount owed. An insurance company has
exclusive control over the evaluation, processing and denial of claims. For these reasons a duty is
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of the causes of action survived Brad's death. 107 Addressing the first issue, the
Fifth Circuit considered Texas's rules: "Under the common law, an insurer
breaches the duty of good faith and fair dealing if it 'has no reasonable basis
for denying or delaying payment of a claim."1 8 Furthermore, a DTPA action
for a bad-faith refusal to pay insurance proceeds "require[s] the same predicate
for recovery." 1°9 Stated simply, an insurer will not be liable for refusing to pay
a claim "if there [is] any reasonable basis for denial of that coverage."" 10
Reviewing the evidence, the Fifth Circuit held that MOIC had a
reasonable basis for refusing to pay for Brad's IVIG treatment."' The court
observed that the health insurer used several board-certified doctors and
independent-specialist opinions to reach its decision.1 2 Therefore, the Fifth
Circuit embraced the district court's conclusion that MOIC acted in good faith
because there was "a bona-fide dispute" about whether Brad's treatment was
medically necessary.1 3 And to resolve the dispute, MOIC used a methodology
that was "sufficiently thorough and objective to satisfy the reasonable-basis
standard."' 14 Again, even though the court of appeals mischaracterized the
aggregate of the tort-based causes of action as "bad faith actions,"' 5 it applied
Texas law and reached a fairly sound conclusion.
On the other hand, the Fifth Circuit's analysis of the second question was
less than stellar. Once more, the court stated that it would decide "whether any
of the Henrys' causes of action survived Brad's death."' 16 But the court never
discussed that question. 117 Instead, in a fairly short paragraph under the
heading "Wrongful Death," the court reached some highly questionable
conclusions without citing facts or Texas law." 
8
imposed that '[An] indemnity company is held to that degree of care and diligence which a man
of ordinary care and prudence would exercise in the management of his own business.'
A cause of action for breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing is stated when it is
alleged that there is no reasonable basis for denial of a claim or delay in payment or a failure on
the part of the insurer to determine whether there is any reasonable basis for the denial or delay.
Arnold v. Nat'l County Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 725 S.W.2d 165, 167 (Tex. 1987) (citations omitted) (quoting
G.A. Stowers Furniture Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 15 S.W.2d 544, 548 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1929)).
107. Henry, 503 F.3d at 428.
108. Id. at 429 (quoting Higginbotham v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 103 F.3d 456, 459 (5th Cir.
1997)).
109. Id. (quoting Higginbotham,103 F.3d at 460) (internal quotation marks omitted).
110. Id. (quoting Higginbotham,103 F.3d at 460) (internal quotation marks omitted).
111. Id. at430.
112. See id.
113. Id. at 429 ("The question is not whether in the end MOIC's doctors were right or wrong in their
diagnosis of Brad's condition and medical needs; the question is whether their methods and conclusions
were reasonable, and whether MOIC was reasonable in relying on these conclusions.").
114. Id.
115. See discussion supra note 106.
116. Henry, 503 F.3d at 428.




First, the court simply cited a provision under the "Texas Wrongful Death
Statute" that outlines a person's liability for the death of another.' 19 Then the
court stated that "the Henrys cannot maintain a cause of action against MOIC
under the Texas Wrongful Death Statute because MOIC's denial of benefits to
Brad was 'not wrongful.', 1 20 But even more surprising, the court concluded
that "the Henrys cannot employ the Wrongful Death Statute for a claim against
MOIC in which they cannot prove that MOIC denied their son's coverage in
bad faith, viz., wrongfully."'121 Here, it suffices to say that under Texas law, a
wrongful death action is not the same as an independent-tort-of-bad-faith cause
of action.122  Therefore, inserting this incomprehensible statement in the
opinion does little to explain why the Henrys' statutory, tort-based, and
contract-based causes of action did not survive their son's death. 23
B. Workers Compensation Insurance
1. Procedural Question: Whether Texas's Statute of Limitations Bars a
Workers Compensation Insurer's Tort-Based Cause of Action Against Its
Reinsurance Broker
After teaching and observing first-year law students for more than a
quarter-century, I can state unequivocally that students who are enrolled in
Torts and Civil Procedure courses do not rush to the aisles and celebrate when
statutes-of-limitations discussions begin. But limitation statutes generate a
considerable amount of serious interest among young practitioners-especially
among those who represent insurers and insureds. The reason is not obscure: it
is common to find multiple limitation-of-actions provisions or related phrases
in an insurance contract.
For example, many insurance contracts have language regarding a
"contractual limitation,"'' 24 "a legislatively designed" statute-of-limitation
period, 125 and a statute-of-limitation period for mandatory arbitration between
119. Id. ("A 'person is liable for damages arising from an injury that causes an individual's death if the
injury was caused by the person's or his agent's or servant's wrongful act, neglect, carelessness,
unskillfulness, or default."' (quoting TEX. Civ. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 71.002)).
120. Id.
121. Id. (emphasis added).
122. See supra note 121.
123. See Henry, 503 F.3d at 430.
124. See, e.g., Schreiber v. Pa. Lumbermans Mut. Ins. Co., 23, 444 A.2d 647, 649 (Pa. 1982) ("[T]he
limitation of suit provision in [the insurer's] fire insurance policy was not 'dictated by the insurance
company to the insured.' Rather, the Legislature has mandated that every policy of fire insurance issued in
this Commonwealth shall contain the proviso that '[n]o suit or action on this policy for the recovery of any
claim shall be sustainable in any court of law or equity... unless commenced within twelve months next
after inception of the loss."').
125. id. at 650 (Nix, J., dissenting) ("The difference between the legislatively designed statute of
limitation period and that contracted between the parties is that the former represents a societal judgment
[about] when the right of suit should no longer be permitted. In the latter instance, it merely represents the
agreement of the parties based on the normal considerations attendant in contractual relationships.").
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insurers and insureds.126  But more importantly, from time to time, serious
conflicts erupt between insureds and insurers over whether a limitation period
for mandatory arbitration tolls a contractual period of limitation. 127  Similar
conflicts also appear between primary insurers and reinsurers as well as
between insurers and their agents or brokers. TIG Insurance Co. v. Aon Re,
Inc., a recent Fifth Circuit case, is one such significant controversy in which
these very statute-of-limitation issues were the focus of attention.12
8
TIG Insurance Co. (TIG), a California corporation with its principal place
of business in Irving, Texas, sued its reinsurer broker, Aon Re, Inc. (Aon), an
Illinois corporation with its principal place of business in Chicago, Illinois. 29
Because TIG is a large, multifaceted insurer who sells a variety of insurance
services, including workers compensation coverage, to entities across the
country, 13 it should be aware of various statute-of-limitation periods and how
to use them effectively as affirmative defenses.
One facet of TIG's operations involves participating in the reinsurance
business,131 including having assumed Virginia Surety Company's reinsurance
business.132 To help generate more profits and minimize risks, TIG needed to
prepare a package of underwriting information about its business and submit
that information to various other reinsurers. 133  Thus, TIG retained Aon, a
global reinsurance agency, as its broker in soliciting and negotiating proposals
for reinsurance. 1
34
126. See Closser v. Penn Mut. Fire Ins. Co., 457 A.2d 1081, 1086-87 (Del. 1983).
127. See generally id. at 1086-88.
128. TIG Ins. Co. v. Aon Re, Inc., 521 F.3d 351, 354-57 (5th Cir. Mar. 2008). For coverage of TIG Ins.
Co. in the civil procedure context, see Jason Johns, Civil Procedure, 41 TEX. TECH. L. REv. 863 (2009)
129. Id. at 352; Brief of Appellant TIG Insurance Co. at 1, TIG Ins. Co., 521 F.3d 351 (No. 05-11450),
2006 WL 5952436.
130. See Brief of Appellant TIG Insurance Co., supra note 129, at 6; see also TIG Ins. Co., 521 F.3d at
353 (noting the scope of TIG's business).
131. See TIG Ins. Co., 521 F.3d at 352-53. Generally, TIG provides $1-million-or-less coverage for
each workers compensation claim and purchases excess-loss reinsurance under a treaty of reinsurance to cover
claims exceeding that amount. Id. at 353; cf North River Ins. Co. v. Philadelphia Reinsurance Corp., 63 F.3d
160, 162 (2d Cir. 1995) ("A reinsurance treaty is an ongoing contractual relationship between two insurance
companies in which the primary insurer agrees in advance to cede, and the reinsurer to accept, specified
business that is the subject of the contract. Under a treaty, a reinsurer agrees to indemnify a primary insurer
with respect to a portion of the primary insurer's liability in a designated line of business .... [T]ypical[ly],
the reinsurance treaty involve[s] the participation of many reinsurers, each accepting a percentage of the total
liability under a single treaty.").
132. TIG Ins. Co., 521 F.3d at 353.
133. Id.; cf. In re Ins. Antitrust Litig., 938 F.2d 919, 923 (9th Cir. 1991) ("Reinsurance is arranged by
specialized brokers and underwriters. Much reinsurance is done by syndicates doing business through Lloyd's
of London.").
134. TIG Ins. Co., 521 F.3d at 353. Aon Re is a renowned reinsurance agency that sells its services
worldwide. See Aon.com, Reinsurance, http://www.aon.com/reinsurance/reinsurance.jsp (last visited Nov.
12, 2008) ("Aon Re Global, the world's leading reinsurance broker and intermediary, provides clients with
integrated capital solutions and services, delivering objective advice and fostering competition among highly
rated reinsurers and an expanding array of new and alternative capital providers.").
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TIG gave Aon information about its workers compensation business as
well as Virginia Surety Company's "historical loss data." 135 In May 1998,
using TIG's information, Aon prepared a package of underwriting documents
and sent them to WEB Management LLC, an underwriter acting as an agent
for United States Life Insurance Co. (USLife). 136 In the cover letter, Aon
stated that the enclosed claims-loss computer disk contained Virginia Surety's
loss data since 1994.137 That same month, Aon also sent a copy of the packet of
materials to TIG.'
38
In the following month, Aon's representatives met with TIG's in-house
representatives to discuss quotes Aon had received. 139 At that meeting, TIG's
representatives stated that Aon had submitted incomplete data about TIG to all
potential reinsurers. 140 TIG reached this conclusion because WEB's quote was
"out of line on the low side" when compared to other reinsurers' quotes.' 41
Nevertheless, TIG accepted the WEB-USLife reinsurance bid, which covered a
three-year period retroactively beginning on April 1, 1998.142 Most
importantly, during the parties' bargained-for-exchange sessions, they
negotiated and inserted a mandatory arbitration clause in the treaty. 143
For unknown reasons, TIG prospectively cancelled the reinsurance treaty
on January 1, 1999.144 The treaty, however, continued to cover claims
stemming from losses that occurred between April 1, 1998 and January 1,
1999.145
During the summer of 2001, USLife became frustrated because TIG did
not submit a complete audit of operations. 146 When USLife stopped paying
claims, TIG demanded an arbitration hearing, claiming that USLife still had a
contractual duty to pay nearly $9 million in outstanding claims. 147 Over a year
and a half later, in February 2003, the arbitration hearing began. 48 To defend
its decision, USLife stated that it rescinded the reinsurance treaty because Aon
had submitted "materially incomplete" loss data for Virginia Surety's
insurance activities. 149 Ultimately, the arbitration panel decided in favor of
USLife, finding specifically that TIG's agent-Aon Re-had omitted material














149. See id. at 353-54.
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information about Virginia Surety's historical loss data.' 50 Thus the panel
declared that the treaty of insurance was "void ab initio."'l 1
In June 2004, TIG sued Aon in the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Texas. 152 Citing Texas law, the complaint listed breach of
fiduciary duty and various negligence-based claims. 53 Aon filed a summary
judgment motion, arguing that (1) the statutes of limitations barred TIG's
negligence-based causes and (2) the discovery rule did not apply to defer the
accrual of these causes of action. 154 The district court ultimately granted Aon' s
summary judgment motion on several grounds, including the statute-of-
limitations defense and the applicability of the discovery rule.
155
On appeal, TIG argued that the discovery rule did apply.' 56 Specifically,
it contended that its negligence, negligent misrepresentation, and breach of
fiduciary duty claims accrued in February 2003 when it discovered legal
injury. 157 From its perspective, the injury was USLife' s unilateral rescission of
the treaty of insurance because of Aon's misrepresentations. 58 Alternatively,
TIG asserted that it did not suffer a legal injury and could not commence a
lawsuit against Aon until the arbitration panel delivered the adverse ruling in
May 2004.159 Stating the latter argument another way, the insurer insisted that
the statutes of limitations were tolled while the insurer was exercising its
contractual rights under the mandatory arbitration clause and exhausting its
remedies before the arbitration panel.
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the pertinent Texas laws: (1) negligence and
negligent-misrepresentation causes of action must commence "not later than
two years after the day the cause of action accrues";' 6 (2) breach of a fiduciary
duty actions must commence "not later than four years after the day the cause
150. Id. at 354.
151. Id. After subtracting TIG's premiums from USLife's loss payments, the panel determined that
USLife owed TIG a net payment of $2,933,150. Id.
152. See id.
153. See id. TIG also filed a declaratory judgment action, claiming that Aon had a common law duty to
reimburse and indemnify TIG for various unsatisfied claims. Id.
154. Id. TIG moved for a partial summary judgment, arguing that Aon should be collaterally estopped
from relitigating issues resolved in arbitration; the district court denied the motion. See id.
155. See id. at 354. The district court also held in favor of Aon on the common law indemnity claim. Id.
156. See id. at 357.
Under Texas law, the discovery rule is an exception to the general rule that a cause of action
accrues when a wrongful act causes some legal injury. [It] "defer[s] accrual of a cause of action
until the plaintiff knew or, exercising reasonable diligence, should have known of the facts giving
rise to a cause of action."
Id. (footnotes omitted) (quoting HECI Exploration Co. v. Neel, 982 S.W.2d 881, 886 (Tex. 1998)) (citing
S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 8 (Tex. 1996)); see also Moreno v. Sterling Drug, Inc., 787 S.W.2d 348, 351
(Tex. 1990) (concluding that a court's determining whether the discovery rule applies to a particular cause of
action is a question of law).
157. See TIG Ins. Co., 521 F.3d at 355.
158. Id.
159. Id.




of action accrues"; 16 1 (3) "a cause of action accrues when a wrongful act causes
some legal injury, even if the fact of injury is not discovered until later, and
even if all resulting damages have not yet occurred"; 162 and (4) "[a] cause of
action generally accrues, and the statute of limitations begins to run, when facts
come into existence that authorize a claimant to seek ajudicial remedy."' 163 In
light of those rules, "TIG could have sued Aon Re at any time from June 1998
and simultaneously [filed] a declaratory judgment or other action against U.S.
Life to... determine the validity or extent of coverage [under] the treaty."' 164
Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings because the
discovery rule did not apply, and TIG's legal injury was easily discoverable. 165
Certainly, the Fifth Circuit's analysis is fairly thorough and reasonable.
But the court of appeals did not adequately address TIG's "alternative" statute-
of-limitation defense. Again, the insurer asserted that the duration of the
mandatory-arbitration deliberations tolled the statutes of limitations. 66
Clearly, TIG thought the tolling argument was sound. Notably, it is a viable
affirmative defense in California and Illinois, where TIG and Aon Re are
incorporated. 67 In those two states, and others, contractual and mandatory
arbitration proceedings toll statutes of limitations. 168 Arguably, TIG could
have commenced its lawsuit in a district court in the Seventh or Ninth Circuit.
And the most available evidence strongly suggests that TIG is a sophisticated
insurer. Therefore, in light of California and Illinois's more powerful statute-
of-limitations defenses, one should ask: What compelled TIG to commence its
lawsuit in the Fifth Circuit, citing Texas's comparatively weaker statute-of-
limitations defenses?
161. Id. at 355 (quoting TEx. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.004(a)(5)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
162. Id. (quoting S.V. v. R.V., 933 S.W.2d 1, 4 (Tex. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
163. Id. (quoting Johnson & Higgins of Tex., Inc. v. Kenneco Energy, Inc., 962 S.W.2d 507, 514 (Tex.
1998)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Jennings v. Burgess, 917 S.W.2d 790, 793 (Tex. 1995)
(stating that when a defendant moves for summary judgment on a statute of limitations defense, the
defendant must conclusively (1) prove when the cause of action accrued, and (2) if the plaintiff pleaded a
tolling provision, negate its application as a matter of law).
164. TIG Ins. Co., 521 F.3d at 356.
165. Id. at 359.
166. ld. at 355.
167. See 215 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/143.1 (West 2000) ("Whenever any policy or contract for
insurance... contains a provision limiting the period within which the insured may bring suit, the running of
such period is tolled from the date proof of loss is filed.., until the date the claim is denied in whole or in
part."); Johnson v. Santos, 196 Cal. Rptr. 145, 150-51 (Ct. App. 1983) (rejecting the insurer's defense and
concluding that the time spent arbitrating the dispute extends the statute-of-limitation period under California
law-CAL. CWV. PROC. CODE § 1141.17 (West 2007)).
168. See, e.g., Wis. STAT. ANN. § 631.83(5) (West 2004) ("The period of limitation is tolled during the
period in which the parties conducted an appraisal or arbitration procedure prescribed by the insurance
policy or by law or agreed to by the parties.")
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2. Procedural Question: Whether a Federal Court Has Subject Matter
Jurisdiction Over a Removed, Survivor's Lawsuit in Which a Workers
Compensation Insurer and Its Adjuster Were Joined as Defendants in a
Texas Court
In Gasch v. Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co., a different workers
compensation insurer was involved in another significant procedural
controversy. 169 But this time, the insurer was the defendant in a third-party
lawsuit rather than the more common worker-initiated first-party actions. 170
After examining the facts, however, it becomes readily apparent why the
worker did not commence a first-party action.
Linnie Gasch, a maintenance worker, fell from a roof at his place of
employment, fracturing his spine and becoming a paraplegic from the waist
down. 17 1 Hartford Accident & Indemnity Company accepted his claim and
paid workers compensation benefits under the Texas Workers Compensation
Act. 172 When Linnie died four years later, 73 Hartford stopped the payments.
174
Jennifer and Tammy Gasch (the Gasches) are Linnie's wife and minor
child, respectively. 175 Following Linnie's death, they filed a survivors death-
benefits claim. 176 The Gashes asserted that a "compensable injury," a
myocardial infarction, caused Linnie's death. 7 7 Karen Frazier, a Texas
resident and Hartford's insurance adjuster, initially denied the claim,
concluding that the myocardial infarction was not related to Linnie's
paraplegia. 178 But later, Hartford decided to pay death benefits after
determining that a "covered" paraplegia-related pulmonary embolism caused
Linnie's death rather than a myocardial infarction. 1
79
Ultimately, the Gasches claimed that Frazier and Hartford' s initial denial
of death benefits was unwarranted. 80 They believed that Hartford failed to
investigate the death-benefits claim in a reasonable manner. 181 Therefore, the
Gasches brought suit against Hartford and Frazier in a Texas court, claiming
that the defendants breached Texas's common-law duty of good faith and fair
dealing, violated the DTPA, and engaged in bad faith conduct as proscribed in
169. Gasch v. Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co., 491 F.3d 278 (5th Cir. Aug. 2007).
170. Id. at 279.
171. Brief for the Appellants at 2, Gasch, 491 F.3d 278 (No. 06-20498), 2006 WL 4878245; Brief of
Appellees at 4, Gasch, 491 F.3d 278 (No. 06-20498), 2006 WL 4878246.
172. Gasch, 491 F.3d at 280.
173. Id.
174. Briefs for the Appellants, supra note 171, at 1.
175. Gasch, 491 F.3d at 279-80.
176. Id. at 280.
177. Id.






Article 21.21 of the Texas Insurance Code.' 8 2 Because Hartford's principal
place of business is in Connecticut, it removed the case to federal court under
diversity jurisdiction.183 Hartford then claimed that Frazier, a Texas resident,
was improperly joined by the Gasches. 84
Hartford and Frazier filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing that
(1) neither the Texas Insurance Code nor the DTPA provided the Gasches
standing, (2) the plaintiffs had not presented sufficient evidence to raise a
material issue of fact, and (3) Frazier was not a proper defendant because she
was Hartford's employee, and employees are not individually liable for
violating provisions of the Texas Insurance Code. 85
The district court held that the Gasches had standing to sue and that
Frazier was a properly joined defendant. 8 6 But the court did grant Frazier and
Hartford's summary judgment motion and dismissed the suit.' 87 The court
concluded that a reasonable jury would have difficulty finding that Hartford,
through Frazier, failed to investigate the Gasches insurance claim in a
reasonable manner, or that the insurer's initial failure to pay death benefits was
unreasonable. 8 8 The Gasches appealed without raising the jurisdictional
issue.
189
At the outset, the Fifth Circuit correctly observed that Hartford and
Frazier cited diversity jurisdiction and improper joinder as the basis for
removing the case from state to federal court.190 Yet the district court neither
addressed the issue nor explained why it retained jurisdiction over the
controversy.' 9' Because a removal deprives a state court from hearing an
action that is properly before that court, a "removal raises significant
federalism concerns."'192 Removal statutes, therefore, must "be strictly
construed, and any doubt about the propriety of removal must be resolved in
favor of remand."1
93
182. Id.; Brief for the Appellants, supra note 171, at 2; see also TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.50(a)(4) (Vernon 2007); TEX. INS. CODE. ANN. § 541.060(a)(2)(A) (Vernon 2007); supra notes 103-04,
109 and accompany text (discussing DPTA and Insurance Code violations).
183. Gasch, 491 F.3d at 280; The Hartford: Contact Us, httpJ/www.thehardford.com (follow "contact us"
hyperlink) (last visited Dec. 31, 2008).
184. Gasch, 491 F.3d at 280. Hartford asserted that the Gasches "failed to allege any valid state law
cause of action and [that the Gasches would] not be able to demonstrate that Karen Frazier individually
violated any statutory provision." Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 280-81.




191. Id. at 280-81. The Gasches did not file a motion to remand, and the district court never dismissed
Frazier as improperly joined. Id. at 279.
192. Id. at 281 (quoting Carpenter v. Wichita Falls Indep. Sch. Dist., 44 F.3d 362, 365-66 (5th Cir.
1995)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
193. Id. at 281-82 (citing Acuna v. Root Inc., 200 F.3d 335, 339 (5th Cir. 2000); Carpenter, 44 F.3d at
365-66).
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Federal law is clear: a defendant may remove from state to federal court
any civil action over which federal courts would have original jurisdiction.' 94
When diversity citizenship is the basis for federal jurisdiction, however, the
following proviso applies: a defendant may remove the action to federal court
only if none of the properly joined and defending parties in interest are citizens
of the state in which the action commenced. 95 Furthermore, to demonstrate
an improper joinder, the removing defendants must demonstrate either
"(1) actual fraud in the pleading of jurisdictional facts, or (2) inability of the
plaintiff to establish a cause of action against the non-diverse party in state
court.'
9 6
Considering those principles, the Fifth Circuit began its analysis by
highlighting an incontrovertible fact: the Gasches and Frazier are citizens of
Texas. 97 Therefore, the central question was whether the Gasches improperly
joined Frazier. 98 To reach its answer, the court relied on its en banc holding in
Smallwood v. Illinois Central Railroad, which emphasized the importance of
applying a reasonable basis test to all defendants: "'[w]hen the only proffered
justification for improper joinder is that there is no reasonable basis for
predicting recovery against the in-state defendant, and that showing is equally
dispositive of all defendants rather than to the in-state defendants alone,' there
is no improper joinder." 199 Rather, "there is only a lawsuit lacking merit. ''2°°
Because the allegations against Frazier were identical to those against
Hartford and because the defendants asserted that the Gasches lacked sufficient
evidence to support their claim against Frazier, the defendants were really
attacking the merits of the claim, not the joinder of a party.201 And a meritless
claim against a local defendant is not equivalent to improper joinder.20 2 Thus,
the court vacated and remanded the case, concluding that joinder was proper
and that federal courts lacked jurisdiction over the controversy.20 3
194. Id. at 281 (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) (2000)).
195. Id. (discussing 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b)).
196. Id. (quoting Crockett v. R.J. Reynolds Tobacco Co., 436 F.3d 529, 532 (5th Cir. 2006)) (internal
quotation marks omitted). For a discussion of Crockett and misjoinder principles, see William E. Marple,
Removal to Federal Court Based on Misjoinder of Parties, 41 TEX. TECH L. REV. 551 (2009).
197. See Gasch, 491 F.3d at 279-80.
198. See id. at 282-84.
199. Id. at 283 (quoting Smallwood v. Ill. Cent. R.R., 385 F.3d 568, 575 (5th Cir. 2004) (en banc))
(emphasis omitted).
200. Id. at 283 (quoting Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 574) (internal quotation marks omitted).
201. Id. at 283-84.
202. Id. at 284 (citing Smallwood, 385 F.3d at 573)
203. Id.
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C. Flood & Homeowner's Insurance
1. Procedural Question: Whether the National Insurance Flood Act
Expressly or Impliedly Permits an Insured Flood Victim in Texas
To Commence a Private Right of Action Against an Insurer That Sells
Flood Insurance
The Fifth Circuit's 2007 decision in Wright v. Allstate Insurance Co.
(Wright I1) is a follow up to its 2005 Wright I decision.2 °4 Given that I have
critiqued Wright 1,205 this review begins by liberally paraphrasing relevant
facts that appeared in the earlier review.
It is worth repeating that flood insurance is too expensive or unavailable
for many property owners.20 6 To help correct the problem, Congress enacted
the National Flood Insurance Act of 1968 (NFIA).2 07 This Act authorizes the
Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) to establish a National
Flood Insurance Program (NFIP),2 8 which has a flood insurance component
and a unified national plan for flood management. 209 Accordingly, FEMA has
enacted regulations and created the Standard Flood Insurance Policy (SFIP).210
To make flood insurance accessible and affordable, FEMA encourages private
insurers, so-called "Write Your Own" (WYO) insurers, to sell SFEP
contracts. 2"
This litigation involved Dr. Thomas Wright, a resident of Houston, Texas,
who purchased a SFIP insurance contract from Allstate Insurance Co., a WYO
flood insurer.212 In 2001, Tropical Storm Allison, which struck Houston and
caused massive flooding, damaged Wright's home.213 Briefly put, Wright
204. Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Wright!!), 500 F.3d 390, 393 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007); Wright v. Allstate
Ins. Co. (Wright 1), 415 F.3d 385 (5th Cir. 2005).
205. See Willy E. Rice, The Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit: A Legal Analysis and Statistical
Review of 2005-2006 Insurance Decisions, 39 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 843, 869-73 (2007).
206. Id. at 869; cf 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b) (2000) ("[M]any factors have made it uneconomic for the
private insurance industry alone to make flood insurance available to those in need of such protection on
reasonable terms and conditions.")
207. See National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 587 (codified as amended
at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001-4129 (2000)).
208. 42 U.S.C. § 4011(a) (2000); see also id § 4001(d) (authorizing a flood insurance program).
209. Id. § 4001(b)-(c).
210. 44 C.F.R. §§ 61.4(b), 61.13(d) (2007).
211. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 4071 (a)(1), 4081(a). Furthermore, WYO insurers may sell SFIP contracts in their
own names. See United Policyholders, Insurance Advice-Flood Insurance, http'J/www.unitedpolicyholders.
org/claimtipsltip-flood.html (last visited Oct. 21, 2008). FEMA reimburses the benefits that the private
insurers pay under flood insurance policies using funds from the U.S. Treasury. Id. Insurers often
subcontract policy administration and claims handling to outside companies. Id. The private insurer's name
may appear on the policy, yet the insurer had nothing to do with the policy or the claim handling, even if the
private insurer sold the insured the policy. Id. Consequently, outside companies, including mere data
processing businesses, have the authority to administer policies and handle claims. Id.
212. Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Wright I), 500 F.3d 390, 392 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007).
213. Id.
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filed a proof-of-loss claim and Allstate refused to pay.214 Allstate argued that
Wright refused to cooperate under the terms of the policy and refused to file an
adequate proof-of-loss statement in a timely manner under FEMA's
regulations.2 15
Wright then sued Allstate and one of its employees, Guy Chapman, in
Wright I, commencing the suit in the Southern District of Texas.216 The
complaint listed a variety of state law causes of action, including breach of
contract, fraud, and negligent-misrepresentation.217 Wright also petitioned the
district court for leave to amend his complaint.2 18 He wanted to include federal
common law claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.2 9
In Wright I, the district court, concluding that federal law preempted the
state law causes, dismissed every state law claim, except the breach of contract
action.220 And because Wright could not prove that flooding caused all of his
property loss, the court awarded $24,029, plus costs and attorneys' fees.22'
Without explanation, however, the district court also declared that Wright
could not amend his complaint to include the federal common law causes of
222
action. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit agreed that the NFIA did preempt
Wright's state law causes.223 But the court remanded the case, instructing the
district court to explain why Wright's motion to amend was denied.224
On remand, the district court again rejected Wright's motion.225 On that
occasion, the court stated that it was unaware of any federal common law
claims that could be asserted by Wright.226 Unsatisfied with that explanation,
Wright appealed again.227
In Wright II, the Fifth Circuit addressed two variations of a single
procedural question: (1) whether the NFIA expressly creates private rights of
action for Wright's fraud and negligent misrepresentation claims, and
alternatively, (2) whether NFIA implicitly authorizes federal common law
claims for fraud and negligent misrepresentation.22 8
Concerning the first question, Wright asserted that NFIA creates private
causes of action because his standard flood insurance policy stated that
"disputes arising from the handling of an insurance claim shall be governed by
214. See id.
215. Id.
216. Id.; Wright v. Allstate Ins. Co. (Wrightl), 415 F.3d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 2005).
217. Wright I, 500 F.3d at 392; Wright 1, 415 F.3d at 386.
218. Wright I, 500 F.3d at 392; Wright 1, 415 F.3d at 391.
219. Wright II, 500 F.3d at 392; Wright 1, 415 F.3d at 391.
220. Wright II, 500 F.3d at 392; Wright 1, 415 F.3d at 386.
221. Wright 1, 415 F.3d at 386-87; see Wright II, 500 F.3d at 392.
222. Wright I at 391; see Wright II, 500 F.3d at 392.
223. Wright I at 392; see Wright I!, 500 F.3d at 392.
224. Wright I at 391; see Wright II, 500 F.3d at 392.
225. Wright I, 500 F.3d at 392-93.
226. Id.




federal common law., 229 The court of appeals disagreed. While accepting the
fact that a policyholder may sue a WYO insurer to collect legitimate proceeds
under the contract, the Fifth Circuit concluded that Congress did not explicitly
create private causes of action for extra-contractual claims:
Faced with the total absence of indicia of congressional intent to support his
position, Wright attempts to rescue his argument by advancing that he is not
asking us to create a new cause of action; he argues that federal courts have
already recognized federal common law claims for fraud and negligent
misrepresentation. Yet Wright fails to present a single example of such
claims in the context of a hazard insurance policy.
230
The court of appeals also refused to embrace Wright's alternative implied
right of action theory. The Fifth Circuit reached that conclusion by applying
the four-part test outlined in Cort v. Ash.231 In Cort, the Supreme Court
declared that federal courts must answer four questions before creating a
private cause of action by implication: (1) whether the plaintiff is of the class
for whose "special benefit" the statute was created, (2) whether Congress
indicated a legislative intent to create or deny a remedy, (3) whether the
remedy would be inconsistent with the underlying legislative purpose, and
(4) whether the cause of action is one traditionally relegated to state law.232 Of
course, while all four factors are important, the question of whether Congress
intended to create a private right of action for the plaintiff is determinative.233
Examining the facts and applying these rules, the Fifth Circuit held the
following: (1) Wright was not an especial beneficiary because "the primary
purpose of the NFIA is to reduce the financial burden on the federal fisc," and
(2) "Congress expressly provided a private remedy for policyholders in 42
U.S.C. §§ 4053 and 4072... [which] allow a policyholder to sue in federal
court if he is dissatisfied with the amount of a claim payment.",234 Because
Congress, in other sections of the NFIA, expressly authorizes private causes of
action, Wright's theory that Congress implicitly intended courts to create
causes of action was weakened. 235 After finding no congressional intent to
allow courts to fashion extra-contractual causes of action for flood-related
insurance cases, the Fifth Circuit did not address the last two prongs of the Cort
229. Id.
230. Id. at 394.
231. Id. at 395-398 (discussing Cort v. Ash, 422 U.S. 66, 78 (1975)).
232. See id. at 395 (quoting Till v. Unifirst Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 653 F.2d 152, 157 (5th Cir. 1981)
(citing Cort, 422 U.S. at 78)).
233. Id. (citing California v. Sierra Club, 451 U.S. 287, 293 (1981)).
234. Id. at 396-97 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007). "A plaintiff is an 'especial beneficiary' if the statute creates a
federal right in favor of the particular plaintiff. '[Tihe right- or duty-creating language of the statute has
generally been the most accurate indicator of the propriety of implication of a cause of action."' Id. at 395
(quoting Cannon v. Univ. of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677, 690 n.13 (1979)).
235. See id.
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test.2 36 Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court in Wright 11.237
2. Substantive Question: Whether an Insurer Has a Duty To Compensate
Homeowners for Property Losses Under the Common and Statutory Laws of
Louisiana and Mississippi in the Wake of Hurricane Katrina
Hurricane Katrina's three-year anniversary was August 29, 2008.238
Following Katrina's devastation, many adverse legal and extralegal
consequences continue to plague citizens as well as victims' lawyers and
property insurers along the Louisiana-Mississippi coast. Newspapers are
replete with articles describing devastating losses, 239 tense emotions, 240 acts of
bribery by attorneys representing Katrina victims,24! lawsuits against public
24224officials,2  insurance company settlement agreements, 243 and lawsuits against
insurance companies that refuse to settle claims.2"
236. Id. (concluding that it was unnecessary to address the last two questions because the court found a
lack of congressional intent).
237. Id. at 398.
238. See Editorial, Three Years After Katrina, NY TIMES, Aug. 12, 2008, at A20.
239. Cf. Editorial, Taxpayers Get Soaked, WALL ST. J., May 24, 2006, at A14 ("The federal
government says some 120,000 properties nationwide have received 'multiple' taxpayer subsidized flood
insurance payments-at a cost of $7.25 billion.... We're not casting aspersions on... New Orleans
residents who will soon be getting billions of dollars in flood insurance checks, even though their homes had
suffered flood losses before Hurricane Katrina hit. The real villain here is Congress for allowing this free
lunch to continue.").
240. See Liam Pleven & Peter Lattman, Rulings Bolster Insurers-Landscape Is Changing As Katrina
Cases Move Through Higher Courts, WALL. ST. J., Dec. 7, 2007, at C l ("Hurricane wind and surging water
from the Gulf of Mexico caused catastrophic damage in the August 2005 storm. Many insurers rejected
claims contending that damage was caused by water, as opposed to wind .... 'It's not rocket science to
understand that emotions run very high on the coast over Hurricane Katrina,' says Sheila Birnbaum, a lawyer
for State Farm.").
241. See id. ("The indictment of plaintiffs attorney Richard 'Dickie' Scruggs... isn't the only [problem]
facing Gulf Coast homeowners in their battle with insurers over Hurricane Katrina claims .... Mr. Scruggs
[was indicted] along with four others on federal charges of conspiring to bribe a state-court judge....
[O]ther plaintiffs lawyers have said they plan to take over his Hurricane Katrina cases."); see also Zach
Scruggs Gets 14 Months in Prison, WALL ST. J., July 3, 2008, at B5 ("The son of anti-tobacco lawyer
Richard 'Dickie' Scruggs has been sentenced to 14 months in prison for knowing about a judicial bribery
scandal and failing to report it to authorities. Zach Scruggs was sentenced by the same federal judge who sent
his father to prison for five years for planning to bribe a Mississippi judge.... Zach Scruggs, his father and a
law partner were indicted in November after an associate secretly recorded conversations about a plan to bribe
a judge. The law partner, Sidney Backstrom, was sentenced to 28 months in prison.").
242. See, e.g., Paulo Prada, New Orleans Group Sues Over Katrina-Tied Demolitions, WALL. ST. J.,
Aug. 24, 2007, at All ("A group of homeowners filed suit against the City of New Orleans and Mayor Ray
Nagin, seeking damages for houses they say were illegally targeted for demolition as part of the city's drive to
clean up properties damaged by Hurricane Katrina. Attorneys for the group, the owners of five houses and
one church razed since August 2006 and two homes still believed to be on the city's demolition list, filed
notice in the U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana .... ).
243. See Allstate Will Settle Katrina Claims, WALL ST. J., June 26,2007, at B8 ("Allstate Corp. agreed to
a mass settlement of claims by a group of Mississippi policyholders who sued the insurer over damage to
their homes from Hurricane Katrina .. "); Pleven & Lattman, supra note 240.
244. See, e.g., Katrina Verdict Goes Against Allstate, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 2007, at B2 ("The first
Hurricane Katrina policyholder lawsuit against Allstate Corp. to go to a jury returned a $2.8 million verdict
against the insurer, in a case that hinged largely on whether it was Katrina's winds or storm surge that wiped
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But even more relevant, the Fifth Circuit has received some highly
negative coverage in newspapers for its pro-insurer, Katrina-related decisions.
For example, the following appeared in a recent Wall Street Journal article:
Rulings by the [Fifth Circuit] ... [have] favored the [insurance] industry....
•.. While [plaintiffs lawyers] scored some lower-court victories, some of
those rulings have been overturned by the appeals court, which legal
scholars say is one of the nation's most conservative federal appeals courts.
The rulings "are going to make it much more difficult for an individual
with a claim to be successful.. ." says•., one of the attorneys representing
the homeowners who won the $1 million judgment against State Farm ....
The rulings could also bolster insurers' positions in future
catastrophes.
245
For sure, I will let commentators and jurists establish whether the Fifth
Circuit is more or less conservative than other federal appellate courts, or
whether it is a pro-insurer or pro-insured court. But in light of Hurricane
Katrina's destruction in Louisiana and Mississippi, astute reporters and
columnists for national newspapers have correctly identified one of the major
substantive questions "at the heart of the litigation from the start: whether
[flood-exclusion] provisions in homeowners' contracts... are enforceable. ' 246
In fact, during the 2007-2008 term, the Fifth Circuit decided two Katrina-
related cases. 47 Without doubt, for those who believe the Fifth Circuit is a
"pro-insurer court," the discussions of the outcomes and opinions in those
cases will do very little to dispel that perception.
The first case is Arias-Benn v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance
Co.248  As mentioned earlier, Hurricane Katrina caused significant and
out his house.... [T]he verdict includes a $1.5 million penalty for the company's failure to pay damages
quickly enough. Wind damage is covered by the typical homeowner's policy, but flood damage isn't.
[Allstate's] lawyer argued... that the winds that hit Mr. Weiss's Home weren't strong enough to do the
damage. She said Mr. Weiss already had received more than $400,000 in insurance payments, including
$350,000 in federal flood insurance.... [Mr. Weiss's] home was northeast of New Orleans [an area that is
allegedly] too high above sea level to have been destroyed by Katrina's storm surge."); Pleven & Lattman,
supra note 240 ("There are lawsuits pending. State Farm faces 180 lawsuits that were filed by Scruggs
Katrina Group [in Mississippi].... There are also many cases pending in Louisiana ... ").
245. Pleven & Lattman, supra note 240; see also Politics & Economics: Insurers Don't Owe for Katrina
Harm, WALL ST. J., Aug. 3, 2007, at A4 ("Hurricane Katrina victims... cannot recover money from
insurance companies for the damage, [the Fifth Circuit] ruled. 'This event was excluded from coverage under
the plaintiffs insurance policies, and under Louisiana law, we are bound to enforce the unambiguous terms of
their insurance contracts,' Judge Carolyn King wrote for a three-judge panel .....
246. Pleven & Lattman, supra note 240.
247. See Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618 (5th Cir. Apr. 2008); Arias-Benn v.
State Farm Fire & Cas. Ins. Co., 495 F.3d 228 (5th Cir. Aug. 2007); infra notes 248-314 and accompanying
text.
248. See Arias-Benn. 495 F.3d 228.
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extensive power outages in the Gulf region of the United States. 24 9 And after
property owners and others fled for safety, "governmental directives [prevented
many] residents from returning to... the affected area for extended periods of
,,250time. Spoiled perishables in thousands of refrigerators, putrefied contents
in freezers, and residents' inability to mitigate damages were additional
adverse consequences of electrical-power failure in the affected area.25 1
When Katrina struck and power outages occurred, the perishables in the
refrigerator of New Orleans resident Maria Arias-Benn spoiled and
putrefied.252 At the time, State Farm Fire & Casualty Insurance Company
(State Farm) insured Benn's residence under a homeowner's insurance
contract.253 She submitted a claim to State Farm, asking the insurer to replace
her damaged refrigerator.254 State Farm denied the claim.255
In response, Benn filed a putative class action against State Farm in a
Louisiana state court.256 She alleged that State Farm breached various property-
insurance contracts by refusing to replace insured's refrigerators and
freezers.257 The complaint also listed other causes of action: negligence,
breach-of fiduciary duty, fraud and misrepresentation, and a violation of
Louisiana's Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law.258 State
Farm then removed the case to the Eastern District of Louisiana, where it
argued that the class action complaint failed to state a cognizable claim and
should therefore be dismissed.259 Granting State Farm's motion, the district
court dismissed the case with prejudice.260 Benn appealed the ruling.26'
To determine whether the lower court's ruling was proper, the Fifth
Circuit examined a copy of Benn's homeowner's policy. 262 The language in
the pertinent coverage clause stated in relevant part:
249. Brief for Appellants at 6, Arias-Benn, 495 F.3d 228 (No. 2006-30771), 2006 WL 5082917; see also
Arias-Benn, 495 F.3d at 229 (noting that the hurricane "resulted in an extended loss of electrical power").
250. Brief for Appellants, supra note 249, at 6.
251. See id.; see also Arias-Benn, 495 F.3d at 229 ("[M]any residents of the affected areas experienced
refrigerator and freezer damage due to the spoilage and putrefaction of the contents.").
252. Arias-Benn, 495 F.3d at 229; see also Brief for Appellants, supra note 249, at 6.





258. Id.; see Unfair Trade Practices and Consumer Protection Law, LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 51:1401-
1426 (2003) (permitting a complainant to bring a private cause of action for damages under § 51:1409).
259. See Arias-Benn, 495 F.3d at 229. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure state that, in any pleading,
every defense to a claim must be asserted in the responsive pleading given that one is needed, but a party may
defend itself by motioning that the other party failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. FED.
R. Crv. P. 12(b)(6).
260. Arias-Bern, 495 F.3d at 229.
261. Id.
262. See id. at 229-32.
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We insure for accidental direct physical loss to property described in
Coverage B caused by... [w]indstorm or hail. This peril does not include
loss to property contained in a building caused by rain, snow, sleet, sand or
dust. This limitation does not apply when the direct force of wind or hail
damages the building causing an opening in a roof or wall and the rain, snow,
sleet, sand or dust enters through this opening.
263
Coverage also appeared under two additional specified-risks clauses-"power
interruption" and "refrigerated products."26  The former provision stated in
pertinent part:
POWER INTERRUPTION. We cover accidental direct physical loss caused
directly or indirectly by a change of temperature which results from power
interruption that takes place on the residence premises. The power
interruption must be caused by a Loss Insured occurring on the residence
premises. The power lines off the residence premises must remain
energized.
265
However, the second specified-risk clause stated:
REFRIGERATED PRODUCTS. Coverage B is extended to cover the contents of
deep freeze or refrigerated units on the residence premises for loss due to
power failure or mechanical failure. If mechanical failure or power failure is
known to you, all reasonable means must be used to6_rotect the property
insured from further damage or this coverage is void.
Berm asserted that the insurance contract covered "all personal property in
a building" if windstorm or hail caused an "accidental direct physical loss.
' 267
Citing the Louisiana Supreme Court's "efficient proximate cause" rule in Lorio
v. Aetna Insurance Co., Benn maintained that Hurricane Katrina was the
efficient proximate cause of the power outage and residents' inability to
mitigate their losses in refrigerators and freezers.26 s Conversely, State Farm
insisted that the language in the "refrigerated products" provision should
determine the outcome of the controversy.
269
263. Id. at 231 (emphasis added).
264. See id. at 229-32.
265. Id. at 232 (emphasis added).
266. Id. (emphasis added).
267. Id. at 231 (internal quotation marks omitted).
268. Brief for Appellants, supra note 249, at 14-15 ("Moreover, since in a great number of factual
situations it has been shown that wind is often not the sole contributing cause of the loss or damage,
acceptance has been accorded the view that it is sufficient, in order to recover upon a windstorm insurance
policy not otherwise limited or defined, that the wind was the proximate or efficient cause of the loss or
damage, notwithstanding other factors contributing thereto. This is in line with the jurisprudence of our own
State." (emphasis added) (quoting Lorio v. Aetna Ins. Co., 232 So. 2d 490, 493 (La. 1970)) (internal
quotation marks omitted)).
269. See Arias-Benn. 495 F.3d at 232.
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The court of appeals embraced State Farm's argument and stressed that
the first priority was determining whether class members' losses were
accidental direct physical losses.270 If they were, determining whether
Hurricane Katrina was the efficient proximate cause of those losses would be
addressed.27 ' To reach a just conclusion, the court applied Louisiana's
doctrine of ambiguity 272 and traditional rules of contract construction and
interpretation. 273 Without mincing words, the court declared that State Farm
did not intend to cover the losses because power outages outside of the class
members' residences caused perishables in refrigerators and freezers to
spoil.274 Therefore, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's ruling and
concluded that Benn failed to state any claim upon which relief could be
granted.275
In the second case, Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Casualty Co.,
Norman and Genevieve Broussard were plaintiffs who owned a home
approximately one-fourth of a mile from the Gulf of Mexico, in Biloxi,
Mississippi. 276 When Hurricane Katrina arrived on August 29, 2005, storm
surge flooding from the Gulf swept away the Broussard's home.277 Like the
homeowners in Arias-Benn, State Farm insured the Broussard's residence
under a homeowner's insurance policy. 278 The Broussard's, however, did not
have flood insurance. 279 Hurricane Katrina left only the house's foundation
slab and totally destroyed the Broussard's personal property and dwelling.280




272. Id. at 231 ("[A]n insurance contract is to be construed as a whole, and one portion thereof should not
be construed separately at the expense of disregarding another." (quoting Pareti v. Sentry Indem. Co., 536 So.
2d 417, 420 (La. 1988)) (internal quotation marks omitted); id. ("Any ambiguity should be construed against
the insurer." (citing LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2056 (1985))).
273. Id. ("Under Louisiana law, an insurance policy is a contract between the parties, and it should be
construed according to the general rules of contract interpretation set forth in the Civil Code." (quoting
Riverwood Int'l Corp. v. Employers Ins. of Wausau, 420 F.3d 378, 382 (5th Cir. 2005)) (internal quotation
marks omitted); id. ("According to the Civil Code, contract interpretation is the determination of the common
intent of the parties." (citing LA. Civ. CODE ANN. art. 2045 (1985))); id. ("[l]ntent is to be determined in
accordance with the general, ordinary, plain and popular meaning of the words used in the policy, unless the
words have acquired a technical meaning." (quoting La. Ins. Guar. Ass'n. v. Interstate Fire & Cas. Co., 630
So. 2d 759, 763 (La. 1994)) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
274. Id at 232.
275. Id.
276. Broussard v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 523 F.3d 618, 622 (5th Cir. Apr. 2008); Brief of State
Farm Fire & Casualty Co. at 3, Broussard, 523 F.3d 618 (No. 07-60443), 2007 WL 4285863.
277. Broussard, 523 F.3d at 622.
278. See Arias-Benn, 495 F.3d at 228; Broussard, 523 F.3d at 622.
279. Broussard, 523 F.3d at 622.
280. See id. at 622-23.
281. Id. at 623.
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Citing both personal- and residential-property losses, the Broussards
submitted two claims to State Farm.282 After inspecting the site, a claims
adjuster concluded that flooding rather than wind was the principal cause of
28328the losses. State Farm, therefore, denied the claim.2 4
The Broussards then filed suit in a Mississippi state court against State
Farm, seeking extra-contractual and punitive damages for the insurer's alleged
breach of contract and bad-faith conduct. 285 State Farm later removed the case
to the Southern District of Mississippi.
286
The case was tried before a jury in two parts-the causation stage and the
damages stage.287 After presenting evidence in the causation phase, each side
orally moved for a judgment as a matter of law (JMOL).288 The district court
granted the Broussard's JMOL motion on their personal-property and
residential-property claims.289 And regarding the loss-of-dwelling claim, the
court concluded that State Farm had the burden of proving that the excluded
peril-flooding-was the cause of the loss of the structure.290  During the
damages stage of the trial, the district court gave a punitive damages charge to
the jury.291 The jury awarded $2.5 million in punitive damages, which the
district court remitted to $1 million.292
State Farm appealed the district court's adverse JMOL ruling and asked
the Fifth Circuit to reverse or reduce the jury's punitive damages award.293
Examining the facts, the court of appeals discovered that the Broussard's
homeowner's policy contained two types of coverage. 294 The "open peril"
clause covered any accidental direct physical loss to the insured's dwelling.295
On the other hand, the "named peril" clause covered personal property when
specified perils-including windstorm--caused an accidental, direct physical
282. Id.
283. Id. at 622-23.





289. Id. ("[T]he district court found... that State Farm was liable under the 'named peril' personal
property coverage because windstorm was a named peril.").
290. Id. ("The district court noted that State Farm's expert admitted that he could not distinguish
between the wind and water damage to the Broussard's home with any reasonable degree of probability. In
light of this admission, the district court found that 'there was no sound evidence upon which the finder of




293. Id. ("State Farm also appeal[ed] the district courts denial of [a] motion to strike the testimony of the
Broussards' expert, James Slider, a structural engineer who testified that wind or a tornado destroyed the
Broussards' home before the Katrina storm surge arrived. Finally, State Farm appeal[ed] the district courts
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loSS. 296 The policy limits for the "open peril" and "named peril" coverage
were $120,698 and $90,524, respectively.
297
Notably, two other clauses limited the scope of coverage. An exclusion
clause excluded water-related losses:
298
We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not have
occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded events....
Water Damage, meaning: (1) flood, surface water, waves, tidal water,
tsunami, seiche, overflow of a body of water, or spray from any of these, all
whether driven by wind or not[.] 29
And the "open peril" and "named risk" coverages were subject to an "Anti-
Concurrent Cause" (ACC) clause:
We do not insure under any coverage for any loss which would not have
occurred in the absence of one or more of the following excluded events. We
do not insure for such loss regardless of: (a) the cause of the excluded
event; or (b) other causes of the loss; or (c) whether other causes acted
concurrently or in any sequence with the excluded event to produce the
loss .... 300
The Fifth Circuit began its analysis by emphasizing that it had decided
Katrina-related conflicts involving the same homeowners insurance
contract.30 1 More importantly, the court noted the clarity of JMOL standards:
[M]otions for JMOL should be granted "only if 'the facts and inferences
point so strongly and overwhelmingly in favor of one party [such that] ...
reasonable men could not arrive at a contrary verdict .... On the other
hand if there is substantial evidence.., of such quality and weight that
reasonable and fair-minded men in the exercise of impartial judgment
might reach different conclusions, the motions should be denied ... 302
Applying the JMOL standard, the court held that State Farm presented




299. Brief of State Farm Fire & Casualty Co., supra note 276, at 3-4.
300. Broussard, 523 F.3d at 623.
301. Id. at 624 (citing Tuepker v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 507 F.3d 346, 350-53 (5th Cir. Nov. 2007)
(interpreting a State Farm policy with provisions identical to the Broussards' policy in all significant
respects); Leonard v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 499 F.3d 419,423 (5th Cir. Aug. 2007) (holding Nationwide
Mutual homeowners insurance policy, including an ACC clause, to be valid and enforceable under
Mississippi law).
302. Broussard, 523 F.3d at 624 (second and fourth omissions in original) (quoting Brown v. Bryan
County, 219 F.3d 450, 456 (5th Cir. 2000)).
303. Id. at 625.
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that "tornadic" winds destroyed their home,304 "[a] rational jury could
conclude, based on the testimony of State Farm's experts, that the Broussards'
home and personal property were destroyed by water.,
30 5
To reach that general conclusion, the court of appeals considered several
bits of relevant information. 30 6 First, the parties had "stipulated that the
Broussards' property was destroyed during Hurricane Katrina [and] that
Hurricane Katrina was a windstorm." 3°7 But the Fifth Circuit declared that the
stipulation "is insufficient to establish that [the property] was destroyed by a
windstorm, since Hurricane Katrina unleashed both wind and water forces. 30 8
Furthermore, two State Farm experts testified that the storm surge damaged the
actual structure of the Broussards' home.309 One expert, noting that Katrina's
winds were too weak to cause structural damage to the home, stated "that it was
'75% likely' that wind caused a relatively small amount of damage to the
Broussards' roof before the storm surge arrived.
3 10
Thus, the Fifth Circuit held that the district court erred by (1) finding that
"windstorm"-a "named peril" under one coverage clause--destroyed personal
property simply because the Broussards totally lost their personalty during
Hurricane Katrina, 311 and (2) concluding "that State Farm failed to meet its
burden of proof under the dwelling coverage was clear error. 3 12 Therefore,
the court of appeals reversed the district court's JMOL ruling and vacated the
jury's award of punitive damages.313 It also remanded the case for a new trial
to permit the Broussards to prove that a "covered peril" or a "peril insured
against" efficiently and proximately caused the destruction of their personal
property.31 4
3. Substantive Question: Under Texas Common Law, Does an Insurer Have
a Contractual Duty To Compensate Homeowners for Mold Removal
and Remediation
Mold infestation continues to be a major concern for homeowners in
Texas. 315 As a result, insureds are continuing to ask their insurers to pay for
304. Id. at 623-24.
305. Id. at 625 (citing Wall v. Swilley, 562 So. 2d 1252, 1256 (Miss. 1990)).
306. Id. at 624-25.
307. Id. at 623.
308. Id. at 624-25.
309. Id. at 625.
310. Id.
311. Id. at 624.
312. Id. at 625.
313. Id. at 631.
314. Id. at 625.
315. See, e.g., Ken Rodriguez, Final Four Fact: No Plan B If Grand Hyatt Fails To Open, SAN ANTONIO
ExPRESS-NEWS, Feb. 20, 2008, at B 1, available at 2008 WLNR 3319995 ("The Valley Morning Star reported
that Landmark paid $11 million to settle a 2002 mold lawsuit ...."); Traci Shurley, Lawsuit Blames City for
Water Damage & Ailments, FORT WORTH STAR-TELEGRAM, Jan. 1, 2008, at B 1, available at 2008 WLNR
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mold remediation and related costs. But fairly often, property insurers refuse
to indemnify or pay homeowners, so mold-related controversies continue to
appear in state and federal courts.3 16 Carrizales v. State Farm Lloyds is one of
the latest conflicts.3 17 Javier and Eva Carrizales purchased a Texas
Standardized Homeowners Policy-Form B (Form B) from State Farm
Lloyds.318 During the policy period, plumbing in their garage began to leak.3 19
Apparently, the damage was considerable because the Carrizales filed several
claims. 320 Ultimately, after inspecting the property and investigating whether
any of the Carrizales claims were sound, State Farm paid $107,724.30.32l
During the next year and a half, the Carrizales vacated their home and
lived in an apartment.322 State Farm paid an additional $60,154.52 for those
living expenses. 323 While the house was vacant, however, significant repairs
did not occur. 324 In fact, the air conditioner and other utilities were turned
off. 325 Mold developed, which allegedly generated more than $200,000 in
losses.326 Therefore, Carrizales submitted three mold-remediation claims to
State Farm-all of which were denied.327
The Carrizales then sued State Farm in Texas state court, alleging that the
insurer violated the Texas Insurance Code, breached the insurance contract,
and breached the common law duty of good faith and fair dealing.328 State
Farm removed the case to the Southern District of Texas.329 Ultimately, the
district court granted in part and denied in part the parties' summary judgment
1790586 ("City officials say that they aren't responsible for the damage to the Wards' home and that the 42-
inch main was not the cause.... In the lawsuit, the Wards say that someone representing the city told
them... that there was a leak. They and their children have had numerous respiratory ailments, and the
family has been advised to move from the home until mold remediation can be performed .... ).
316. See, e.g., Carrizales v. State Farm Lloyds, 518 F.3d 343,345 n.1 (5th Cir. Feb. 2008) (per curiam)
("At least fourteen other suits, by other plaintiffs, were filed against State Farm concerning the mold issue.");
Janet Elliott, Court Says Mold Wasn't Covered/Policy Ruling Is Win for State Farm, Hous. CHRON., Sept.
1, 2006, at 1, available at 2006 WLNR 15194115 ("Standard insurance policies used by homeowners to
recover billions of dollars in mold losses actually didn't cover mold, the Texas Supreme Court ruled .... The
Fiesses... contended that a significant percentage of the mold had been caused before the flood by leaks in
the roof, plumbing, ducts, doors and windows. State Farm paid the couple $34,425 for mold remediation, but
the couple sued in state court, contending the payment was inadequate .... State Farm moved the case to
federal court, which concluded that the policy excluded mold damage. The Fiesses appealed, and the U.S.
5th Circuit Court of Appeals posed a certified question to the Texas Supreme Court.").
317. Carrizales, 518 F.3d at 343.










328. Id.; see also supra note 106 (discussing Texas's common law duties).
329. Carrizales, 518 F.3d at 345.
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motions. 330 Granting State Farm's motion for summary judgment, the district
court concluded that mold was an excluded peril under Form B.33' On the
other hand, the court granted the Carrizales' summary judgment motion
regarding merit of their common law and statutory good faith claims.332
After the court barred all evidence of mold or mold-related losses, a jury
heard the case.333 At the close of evidence, the court fashioned a controversial
jury charge.334 In essence, it stated that the Carrizales' mitigation of damages
was a condition precedent for State Farm's duty to pay under Form B.335 In the
end, State Farm prevailed.336 The Carrizales appealed, asking the Fifth Circuit
to address three issues: (1) whether the district court's summary judgment in
favor of State Farm was proper, (2) whether the district court's preventing
jurors from considering mold-related evidence was proper, and (3) whether the
district court's mitigation-of-damages jury charge was erroneous.337
As a threshold matter, however, the court of appeals observed that the
Texas Supreme Court has never addressed an overriding question: whether
plumbing-related mold contamination is a covered risk under Form B.338 The
Fifth Circuit, therefore, made an "Erie guess" by reviewing two doctrines that
Texas courts employ to construe words and phrases in insurance contracts:
(1) the general rules of contract construction 339 and (2) the doctrine of
ambiguity.
340
Examining Form B, the court of appeals found coverage and exclusion
provisions that were similar to the homeowners' insurance contract in
Broussard.34 1 In particular, Form B divided coverage into two parts:
(1) "Coverage A" insured the Carrizales' dwelling against "all-risks," and
(2) "Coverage B" insured the Carrizales' personal property against enumerated











339. Id. at 345-46 (noting that insurance contracts are subject to normal rules of contract construction
(citing Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 520 (Tex. 1995))); id at 346 (noting
that all parts of a contract must be read together to give effect to the parties' intent (citing State Farm Life Ins.
Co. v. Beaston, 907 S.W.2d 430, 433 (Tex. 1995))).
340. Id. ("Ambiguities in insurance contracts giving rise to two reasonable interpretations, one
providing and the other denying coverage, are read ... in favor of the insured." (citing Puckett v. U.S. Fire
Ins. Co., 678 S.W.2d 936, 938 (Tex. 1984))).
341. See id.; supra text accompanying notes 295-96.
342. Carrizales, 518 F.3d at 346.
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Accidental Discharge, Leakage or Overflow of Water or Steam from within
a Plumbing, Heating or Air Conditioning System or Household Appliance.
A loss resulting from this peril includes the cost of tearing out and replacing
any part of the building necessary to repair or replace the system or
appliance. But this does not include loss to the system or appliance from
which the water or steam escaped.
343
Like the plan in Broussard,344 however, an exclusion clause placed limitations
on the "all-risk" and "specific-risks" coverages: "We do not cover loss [under
Coverage A or Coverage B] caused by... rust, rot, mold or other fungi. 345
Again, the overriding question was whether plumbing-related mold
contamination was a covered risk under Form B.346 Clearly, the exclusion
clause stated that mold was not a covered risk under either Coverage A or
Coverage B.347 Under Coverage B, however, the insurer contracted to pay
insurance proceeds if an accidental discharge, leakage or overflow of water
from within the plumbing system damaged the Carrizales' personal
property.348 Thus, did State Farm have a duty to pay if a leak in the plumbing
caused mold to grow throughout the dwelling as well as on personal
property? 349  And was the mold-exclusion clause confusing when read in
conjunction with the "specified-risk" clause?350
The Carrizales thought so. Citing the doctrine of ambiguity and the Texas
Supreme Court's holding in Balandran v. Safeco Insurance Co., they argued
that coverage should be extended anytime an ambiguous provision may be
interpreted to provide coverage.35' But embracing the Texas Supreme Court's
analysis and decision in Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, rather than in Balandran,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the two provisions in Form B did not create
any ambiguity when read together.352 The court of appeals noted that the Texas
Supreme Court decided this very question in Fiess and reached the same
conclusion holding that "[w]hile other parts of the policy sometimes make it
difficult to decipher, [the court could not] hold that mold damage is covered
when the policy says it is not. 353 Therefore, the court did not resolve the
343. Id. at 346 n.2.
344. See supra notes 298-300 and accompanying text.
345. Carrizales, 518 F.3d at 346 n.3.
346. Id. at 344.
347. See id. at 346 n.3.
348. Id. at 346; see supra note 343 and accompanying text.
349. Carrizales, 518 F.3d at 345.
350. See id. at 346.
351. Brief of Appellants at 12, Carrizales, 518 F.3d 343 (No. 06-40286), 2006 WL 5721817 ("'Where
an ambiguity involves an exclusionary provision of an insurance policy, [courts] must adopt the
construction urged by the insured as long as the construction is not unreasonable, even if the construction
urged by the insurer appears to be more reasonable or a more accurate reflection of the parties intent."'
(quoting Balandran v. Saveco Ins. Co., 972 S.W.2d 738, 741 (Tex. 1998))); see Carrizales, 518 F.3d at 346-
47.
352. See Carrizales, 518 F.3d at 347-48.
353. Id. at 347-48 ("First, the [Texas Supreme Court] noted that the words 'we do not cover loss caused
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second issue regarding whether the trial court properly excluded mold-related
evidence because Form B did not cover mold.3M
But the court did address the last issue regarding whether the jury
instruction required the Carrizales to mitigate damages in order to be able to
recover.355 The Carrizales argued that mitigation of damages was not a
condition precedent-and therefore an affirmative defense-to liability, but
rather that it was an issue that the jury should decide when determining the
amount of damages to award.356
The Fifth Circuit agreed.357 First, the court observed that "the duty to
mitigate damages is an equitable doctrine, and means a reduction in the amount
of damages, not an affirmative defense., 358 But the court of appeals discovered
that Texas courts had not yet decided whether the duty to mitigate damages is
an offset to reimbursement under the generic homeowners' policy or a
condition precedent to recovery.359 Making an Erie guess, the Fifth Circuit
concluded that under Texas law mitigation of damages is an offset, not a
condition precedent. 360 Therefore, the appellate court reversed and remanded
the case for consideration of the Carrizales' breach of contract action.36'
4. Substantive Question: Under Texas Common Law, Does a Property
Insurer Have a Contractual Duty To Pay for Losses After an Intentional
Fire Destroyed the Insured's House and Personal Property
Arguably, the average layperson in Texas would find the disagreement in
Muhioz v. State Farm Lloyds of Texas easy to understand.362 The underlying
facts are not intricate, and the legal questions are not novel. That same
awareness, however, might cause property owners in Texas to find more than a
bit of irony in the Fifth Circuit's opinion. The insurer in Mufioz maintained
by mold' in Section I are plain and unambiguous. Second, the ensuing loss provision did not rewrite the first
line to say 'we do too cover loss caused by mold.' With respect to what exactly the ensuing loss provision
accomplished, the court reaffirmed that the only reasonable construction of this clause was that it applied
when an excluded risk was followed by an intervening occurrence that in turn caused an ensuing loss.'
Notwithstanding Balandran, Fiess shows an obvious direction in the Texas Supreme Court's mold
jurisprudence that is easier to reconcile with the result we reach in this case than with the result plaintiffs ask
us to announce." (citations omitted) (quoting Fiess v. State Farm Lloyds, 202 S.W.3d 744, 745, 748 (Tex.
2006))).
354. Id. at 348 ("'The question in this case is not whether insurers should provide mold coverage in
Texas, a public policy question beyond our jurisdiction as a court. The question instead is whether the
language in an insurance policy provides such coverage-no more and no less.' Here it does not." (citations
omitted) (quoting Fiess, 202 S.w.3d at 745)).
355. Id. at 348-51.
356. Id. at 348-49.
357. Id. at 349.





362. See Mufloz v. State Farm Lloyds of Tex., 522 F.3d 568, 570 (5th Cir. Mar. 2008).
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that the insured's conduct "prejudiced" the insurer's decision to perform. 363
Yet without citing or applying an iota of Texas law, the Fifth Circuit applied
the law of the circuit and concluded that the insurer was indeed "prejudiced. '364
Put simply, the analysis in Muhioz is less than stellar, and the decision is highly
questionable.365 Without a doubt, those attributes do very little to dispel a
prevailing view that the Fifth Circuit is a pro-insurer court.
366
Here are the most salient facts-many of which were omitted from the
opinion. Luis and Carmela Mufioz lived in Raymondville, Texas, where Luis
owned a profitable roofing and construction company.367 They and the
Cavazoses, their next-door neighbors, had an on-going dispute over a
remodeling contract, which required the police to visit the residences at least
twenty-one times.368 Additionally, the Mufiozes and the Cavazoses had an on-
going court battle.369 This animosity culminated in Carmela's receiving
anonymous phone threats, stating that the Mufiozes' house would be burned
down. 370 Then on January 1, 2003, when Carmela was out of town on vacation
and Luis was at his place of business, someone intentionally started a fire at the
Mufiozes' residence.37'
For ten years, State Farm Lloyds insured the Mufiozes' residential
property under a homeowner insurance contract, which insured against fire and
other perils.372 The day after the fire, Luis called State Farm and filed a claim,
and the following day, State Farm employee inspected the Mufiozes'
residence.373 Ten days later, on January 13, 2003, the Mufiozes answered
various questions on a Personal Property Inventory Form and returned the
form to the insurer.374
Under the terms of the policy, State Farm had a duty to notify the
Mufiozes in writing within thirty days whether the company would pay or deny
the claim, or whether more information was needed.375 State Farm did not
request additional information until March 18, 2003-more than sixty days
after State Farm received the Mufiozes' Personal Property Inventory Forms.
3 76
State Farm also referred the claim to its special investigations unit, and
363. Id. at 571.
364. Id. at 574-75.
365. See id.
366. See supra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
367. See Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants at 4, Mufzoz, 522 F.3d 568 (No. 06-40827), 2007 WL
5356672.




372. Id.; see Mufloz v. State Farm Lloyds of Tex., 522 F.3d 568, 571 (5th Cir. Mar. 2008).
373. Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, supra note 367, at 5.
374. Id.
375. Id. at 6.
376. ld. at 6-7.
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between April 22, 2003, and June 10, 2003, State Farm requested, and the
Mufiozes delivered, very personal information to the insurer.377
After responding to State Farm's demands and receiving no financial
assistance for nearly two years, the Mufiozes sued the insurer in a Texas state
court on May 11, 2004.378 The complaint alleged that State Farm breached the
insurance contract, violated the Texas Insurance Code, and breached the
common law duty of good faith and fair dealing.379 State Farm removed the
case to the Southern District of Texas, asserting that (1) the Muflozes breached
a condition precedent in the insurance contract by refusing to deliver requested
documents to State Farm and (2) the Mufiozes intentionally destroyed their
house, which was not a covered peril under the policy.38
0
Before the jury trial, the parties stipulated that someone intentionally
started the fire.38' During trial, however, State Farm presented evidence that
Luis failed a polygraph exam.3 82 The Mufiozes countered with evidence that a
grand jury did not indict Luis for arson. 383
Ultimately, the jury returned a verdict overwhelmingly in favor of the
Mufiozes. First, it found that the Mufiozes did not breach any conditions
precedent in the insurance policy, State Farm breached the insurance contract,
the Mufiozes did not intentionally set the fire, and the Mufiozes' damages were
$148,000 for home repairs and $82,700 to repair or replace the contents.
Second, the jury found that State Farm breached the common law duty of good
faith and fair dealing.385 And despite concluding that State Farm's alleged
deceptive trade practices and bad faith did not cause any economic damages,
the jury still ordered the insurer to pay $20,000 for the Mufiozes' mental
anguish.386 Finally, the "jury found that State Farm did knowingly engage in
the deceptive trade practices" but awarded no additional damages.387 After
377. Id. at 7-8 ("The first set of documents ... was delivered to State Farm on April 22, 2003.
Thereafter, the Mufiozes delivered a second set of documents to State Farm in June of 2003. [One document
requested an] authorization to obtain the Muflozes credit reports and [the other requested] an authorization to
obtain Mrs. Mufioz's W-2 forms from employers.... Moreover, the Mufiozes [gave the insurer permission
to review] numerous bank records and business records." (citations to the record omitted)).
378. Id. at 2.
379. Mufioz v. State Farm Lloyds of Tex., 522 F.3d 568, 571 (5th Cir. Mar. 2008); see also supra note
106 (discussing Texas's common law duties).





385. Id.; see also Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, supra note 367, at 10 (noting, more specifically,
that the jury found that State Farm did not attempt, "in good faith, to effectuate a fair settlement after its
liability had become reasonably clear; [did not] affirm or deny coverage of the claim within a reasonable time;
and [refused] to pay the claim without conducting a reasonable investigation").
386. Mufloz, 522 F.3d at 571; Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, supra note 367, at 10.
387. Brief for Appelees/Cross-Appellants, supra note 367, at 10; see Muhioz, 522 F.3d at 571.
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adjusting some of the damages the district court entered judgment on the jury's
verdict.3
88
On appeal, State Farm insisted that it had been the victim of "prejudice"
before and during the trial.3 89 Therefore, State Farm presented two questions
for review: (1) whether State Farm had to prove that the Mufiozes' breach of a
condition precedent prejudiced State Farm's benefit of the bargain under the
insurance contract, or alternatively whether State Farm was prejudiced as a
matter of law;390 and (2) whether the district court issued an erroneous and
prejudicial ruling when it admitted evidence of a grand jury's failure to indict
Luis Mufioz for arson.39'
Unfortunately, several factors prevented the Fifth Circuit's analysis in
MuFhoz from being a well-reasoned decision. For unknown reasons, the
decision's most obvious defect is that the court did not address whether the
Mufiozes' alleged breach of a condition precedent prejudiced State Farm's
ability to protect its rights under the contract. To be sure, this was a serious
omission for several reasons.
For one, the insurance contract required the Mufiozes to satisfy a
condition precedent-deliver various documents to State Farm-before
receiving insurance proceeds.392 But the facts are indisputable: the Mufiozes
delivered the requested documents for nearly two years.393
More importantly, the court's failure to address the "materiality" of the
alleged breach of the condition is a serious oversight for another reason: Texas
law clearly states that a condition precedent or subsequent in an insurance
contract "will not operate to discharge the insurer's obligations under the
policy unless the insurance company is actually prejudiced or deprived of a
valid defense by the actions of the insured., 394 But there is more. Under Texas
law, an insured's "immaterial breach" of a condition in an insurance contract
"does not deprive the insurer of the benefit of the bargain and thus cannot
relieve the insurer of the contractual coverage obligation. 395 Stated more
specifically, if an insurer cannot establish that an insured's inaction produces
388. Brief for Appellees/Cross-Appellants, supra note 367 at 11; see Mufioz, 522 F.3d at 571-72. The
district court reduced the damage award for contents by $2,500, and added $79,451.11 in penalty interest,
$26,976.96 in pre-judgment interest, and $130,860.17 in costs and attorneys fees. Brief for Appellees/Cross-
Appellants, supra note 367 at 11.
389. Appellant's Brief at 31, Mufioz, 522 F.3d 568 (No. 06-40827), 2007 WL 5356671.
390. Id. at 17.
391. Id. at 35. A fair reading of the decision also indicates that State Farm wanted the Fifth Circuit to
address a third question: whether State Farm had a duty to pay, even though the Mufiozes intentionally set fire
to their house. See Mufioz v. State Farm Lloyds, 522 F.3d 568, 571 (5th Cir. Mar. 2008) ("State Farm
removed the case to federal court, asserting... [that] the Mufiozes could not recover because they had set fire
to their house."). But the court did not address this issue, even though the court mentioned the "intentionally
set fire" several times. Id. Notably, the parties briefs do not discuss this question.
392. See Muftoz, 522 F.3d at 571.
393. See id.
394. See McGuire v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 431 S.W.2d 347, 353 (Tex. 1968).
395. PAJ, Inc. v. Hanover Ins. Co., 243 S.W.3d 630, 631 (Tex. 2008) (citing Hernandez v. Gulf Group
Lloyds, 875 S.w.2d 691, 692 (Tex. 1994)).
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"prejudice," an insured's failure to comply with a condition precedent does not
defeat coverage under an insurance contract.39
But perhaps most importantly, the Texas Supreme Court has embraced a
multi-pronged test to determine whether a breach of a condition in an insurance
contract is "material":
(i) the extent to which the injured party can be adequately compensated for
the part of that benefit of which he will be deprived; (ii) the extent to which
the party failing to perform or to offer to perform will suffer forfeiture;
(iii) the likelihood that the party failing to perform or to offer to perform
will cure his failure, taking account of all the circumstances including any
reasonable assurances; and (iv) the extent to which the behavior of the party
failing to perform or to offer to perform comports with standards of good
faith and fair dealing.397
Once more, the court of appeals completely overlooked this body of law.
Instead, the Fifth Circuit then discussed State Farm's second issue of
whether the district court erred by admitting evidence of a grand jury's failure
398to indict Luis Mufioz for arson. But that analysis is not thorough either.
Even more troubling, the court of appeals reached its conclusion without
citing, discussing, or applying any Texas law. Rather, the court tersely stated
that it would rely on the holdings of its sister courts:
Several of our sister circuits have considered the issue of introducing
evidence of non-prosecution or acquittal of arson in a civil case regarding
insurance proceeds. They have uniformly held that such evidence is
impermissible because it is highly prejudicial.... We agree with our sister
circuits and find that the court below committed reversible error.
3 99
This decision is less than ideal. Citing Rules 401 and 403 of the Federal
Rules of Evidence, State Farm timely objected to the non-indictment
evidence. 4° A careful reading reveals that Rule 403 requires a federal court to
find "unfair prejudice" which is "an undue tendency to suggest decision on an
396. See id. at 636-37.
397. Id. at 693 n.2 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACrS §241 (1981)). "In determining the
materiality of a breach, courts will consider, among other things, the extent to which the nonbreaching party
will be deprived of the benefit that it could have reasonably anticipated from full performance." Id. at 693
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 24 1(a) (1981)).
398. Mufioz v. State Farm Lloyds, 522 F.3d 568, 572-74(5th Cir. March 2008).
399. Id. at 572-73 (citations omitted).
400. Id.; see FED. R. EvID. 401 ("'Relevant evidence' means evidence having any tendency to make the
existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less probable
than it would be without the evidence."); FED. R. EVID. 403 ("Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if
its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or
misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." (emphasis added)).
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improper basis, commonly, though not necessarily, an emotional one.', 1 But
in Muhioz, the court of appeals concluded that jurors heard "prejudicial
evidence. ' 4 2 The appellate court did not apply any test to determine whether
that prejudice was "unfair.' '4 3 To be sure, that is a significant omission
because federal courts, and the Fifth Circuit in particular, have held that "Rule
403 [is] an extraordinary remedy, [which should] be used cautiously and
sparingly." 404
Arguably, this last observation really underscores the problems with the
court of appeals analysis in Muhioz. Rule 403 of the Texas Rules of Evidence is
very similar to the Federal Rule of Evidence 403 .4 5  Omitting the phrase
"waste of time," the Texas rule states, "Although relevant, evidence may be
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of
unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by
considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of cumulative
evidence." 40 Although Rule 403 gives courts a considerable amount of
discretion, courts may exclude evidence only if the danger of unfair prejudice
exceeds the evidence's probative value.4 7 The Fifth Circuit should have
thoroughly researched and applied Texas law before reversing the district
court's judgment, remanding the case, and ordering a new trial. Without a
doubt, the district court's judgment and rulings were more sound than the Fifth
Circuit's analysis in Mufioz.
401. Steger v. Gen. Elec. Co., 318 F.3d 1066, 1079 (11th Cir. 2003) (quoting FED. R. EvID. 403
advisory committee's note) (internal quotation marks omitted).
402. See Mufloz, 522 F.3d at 573-74 ("State Farm was presented with the fact that Mr. Garza intended to
reference the non-indictment evidence during closing argument. The district court asked State Farm for the
'language of the instruction it desired.' In requesting that Mr. Garza not be permitted to mention the
evidence, State Farm was merely attempting to prevent further prejudicial error... State Farm did not
abandon, waive, or otherwise sanction the district court's initial error of admitting the non-indictment
evidence .... State Farm timely objected and was overruled. Given the highlyprejudicial nature of the non-
indictment evidence, we find that the district court abused its discretion and committed reversible error,
notwithstanding its good faith attempt to remedy its mistake." (emphasis added)).
403. See id.
404. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1135 (5th Cir. 1991) (Reavley, J.,
dissenting) ("The advisory committee notes to Rule 403 define 'unfair prejudice' as 'an undue tendency to
suggest decision on an improper basis.' . . . We have viewed Rule 403 as an extraordinary remedy to be used
cautiously and sparingly" (citing United States v. McRae, 593 F.2d 700, 707 (5th Cir. 1979); Dollar v. Long
Mfg., N.C. Inc., 561 F.2d 613,618 (5th Ci. 1977))); see also United States v. Thevis, 665 F.2d 616, 634 (5th
Cir. Unit B 1982) ("[T]he application of Rule 403 must be cautious and sparing.").
405. See Shields v. Dretke, 122 F. App'x. 133, 149 (5th Cir. 2005) ("Under both the Federal Rules of
Evidence and the Texas Rules of Evidence, relevant evidence may be excluded if its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. The advisory committees notes to Rule 403
define 'unfair prejudice' as 'an undue tendency to suggest decision on an improper basis, commonly though
not necessarily, an emotional one,' and we have adopted this definition.").
406. Compare TEX. R. EVID. 403 (emphasis added), with FED. R. EviD. 403.
407. See Aragon v. State, 229 S.W.3d 716, 724 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2007) ("[B]efore Rule 403
requires an exclusion of evidence, there must be a marked distinction between the evidence's probative value
and any danger of unfair prejudice. Unfair prejudice is defined as the undue tendency of the evidence to
suggest a decision on an improper basis." (internal citations omitted)).
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III. THIRD-PARTY INSURANCE CONTRACTS-STATE COMMON LAW
CLAIMS & DECISIONS
A. Third-Party Liability Claims-Injury to Persons
1. Substantive Question: Whether Louisiana Law Gives Standing to a
Bankruptcy Trustee To Commence a Legal-Malpractice Action Against an
Insurance-Defense Law Firm as Well as a Right To Collect Damages from
the Errors and Omission Liability Insurer That Hired the Law Firm To
Represent the Debtor-Insured
Stanley v. Trinchard is a truly fascinating case because the controversy
involves multiple areas of federal and state law-civil rights, bankruptcy,
insurance, legal malpractice, common law breach of contract, and statutory
violations. 4 8 Furthermore, the opinion is thoughtful and thorough. But even
more importantly, the opinion is populated densely with challenging facts,
multiple levels of intricate rules, and exceptions to rules. Therefore, it presents
a clear illustration of why law schools should always encourage students to
think critically about overlaying issues and applying rules intelligently instead
of just memorizing and enumerating rules on law examinations.
This controversy involves four lawsuits with three underlying lawsuits-a
criminal trial, a civil rights trial, and a bankruptcy proceeding. 4°9 The present
suit is a legal-malpractice action filed against the insurer and an insurance-
defense law firm.41 ° It all started on October 17, 1980, when Douglas Frierson
was murdered in St. Tammany Parish in Louisiana.41 1 Gary Hale was a
detective in the St. Tammany Parrish Sheriff s Office at the time, and spending
seven days investigating the murder, his information implicated Gerald Burge,
who was subsequently arrested for the murder.412
Concluding that there was insufficient evidence to secure a conviction,
however, the St. Tammany Parish District Attorney (TPDA) decided against
prosecuting Burge.413 But when Burge was incarcerated in a Mississippi
correctional facility on an unrelated criminal conviction, he was indicted for
murdering Frierson after a fellow inmate reported that Burge was "the trigger
man. '414 He was then tried and sentenced to prison.415 After petitioning for
408. Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007).
409. See id. at 415.
410. See id.
411. Original Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Northwestern National Insurance Co. at 3, Stanley, 500 F.3d
411 (Nos. 06-30120, 06-30299), 2006 WL 5012891.
412. Id. at 3-4.
413. Id. at4-5.
414. Id. at 4.
415. Id. at 5.
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post-conviction remedies, Burge secured a second trial.416 Ultimately, the
second jury concluded that Burge was not guilty of murdering Frierson. 7
Before the first criminal trial began, Burge's attorney had asked the state
to turn over all exculpatory materials, and the prosecution responded.418 But
allegedly the state did not turn over copies of reports that Hale prepared during
his investigation-reports that purportedly implicated Burge's inmate rather
than Burge.419 Therefore, Burge filed a § 1983 civil rights suit against the
sheriff of St. Tammany Parish, the St. Tammany Parish Sheriff's Office, and
detective Hale. 420 Because Northwestern National Insurance Company (NNIC)
insured the Sheriffs Office under a liability-insurance contract, Burge also
listed NNIC as a defendant.421 Stated simply, Burge sought damages for the
defendant's alleged breach of his federal constitutional rights.422 He asserted
that the state withheld exculpatory evidence at his first trial, which would have
prevented his conviction and incarceration for the death of Frierson.423
NNIC retained Trinchard & Trinchard law firm to represent the sheriff
and Hale.424 Later, NNIC retained separate counsel to represent NNIC's
interests in the litigation.425 Shortly before the civil rights suit began, NNIC's
counsel reached a partial settlement with Burge.426 In exchange for $75,000,
Burge agreed to release NNIC from all liability under insurance policies.427
Burge also gave the sheriff and Hale partial releases for any civil rights
violations that occurred during the policy period.428  But Burge expressly
reserved his right to sue the sheriff and Hale for punitive damages and for
violations that occurred outside of the policy period.429
Hale consented to the settlement and signed a separate "Release and
Acknowledgment," which absolved NNIC from "any and all liability" under
the insurance contracts-including "claims for indemnification, defense, legal
416. Id.
417. Id.
418. Id. at 4.
419. Id. at 4-5.
420. Id. at 5; see Stanley v. Trinchard, 500 F.3d 411,415-416 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007) (summarizing the
facts briefly); see also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2000). Section 1983 does not create federal, substantive rights.
Jackson v. Atlanta, Tex., 73 F.3d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1996). Instead, it creates a private right of action and
provides a possible remedy whenever anyone, acting under color of state law, deprives a person of federal
rights, privileges, or immunities; violation of state law, by itself, does not allow for relief under § 1983. See
id.
421. Stanley, 500 F.3d at 416 ("In 1980, American Druggists Insurance Company (ADIC) issued a
liability insurance policy... to the Louisiana Sheriffs Association.... When ADIC became insolvent in
1986, its reinsurer, NNIC, assumed responsibility for any coverages under the ADIC policies pursuant to a
'cut-through' reinsurance endorsement.").
422. Original Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Northwestern National Insurance Co., supra note 4 1, at 5-6.
423. Id. at 6.








fees and costs, [and] bad faith. '430 The release did not outline the terms of the
settlement, and therefore, Hale did not know that Burge reserved his right to
sue Hale for conduct occurring outside of the policies' periods. 43' After
securing Hale's consent to release NNIC, Trinchard's lawyers stopped
representing Hale and the sheriff.432 But again, at that point, Hale was still
exposed to a potential lawsuit for his conduct beyond coverage under the
liability insurance contracts.433
Five months after the settlement, Burge exercised his right under the
partial release agreement and sued the sheriff and Hale.434 A different law firm
represented the sheriff, and Hale defended himself.435 A federal district court
jury decided in favor of Burge and awarded $4,000,000 in compensatory
436damages. After the court entered the judgment, Hale did not appeal, and a
month later, that judgment forced Hale into involuntary bankruptcy.437 The
U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of Mississippi appointed H.S.
Stanley, Jr., as Trustee of the Bankruptcy Estate of Gary Hale.438 Burge was
Hale's only creditor, and ultimately, Hale was discharged from bankruptcy.
439
Six months after becoming the trustee, however, Stanley filed a legal
malpractice action against the attorneys in Trinchard & Trinchard law firm and
NNIC.440 The action commenced in the District Court for the Eastern District
of Louisiana, and the complaint alleged that (1) Trinchard's attorneys
negligently represented Hale, and (2) NNIC had breached its fiduciary duty of
good faith and fair dealing when the insurer partially settled the civil rights
suit.441 Granting Trinchard and NNIC's respective motion for summary
judgment, the district court reached two holdings: (1) Hale's bankruptcy
discharge made it impossible for Stanley to establish that the attorneys' alleged
malpractice caused the judgment against Hale, and (2) Stanley failed to
produce any evidence of NNIC's alleged breach of a fiduciary duty of good







436. Id. Citing prosecutorial immunity, a federal district court dismissed Burge's claims against the
District Attorney's Office and individual prosecutors. Id. at 416 n.2 (citing Burge v. Parish of St. Tammany,
Civ. A. No. 91-2321, 1994 WL 86694 (E.D. La. Mar. 9, 1994), affd on other grounds, 187 F.3d 452 (5th Cir.
1999)). "Burge voluntarily dismissed the Sheriff's Office as a defendant early in the case, but continued to
pursue his claims against the Sheriff in his official capacity." Id.
437. See id. at 417-18.
438. Original Brief of Defendant-Appellee, Northwestern National Insurance Co., supra note 411, at 7.
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court's rulings in the legal malpractice suit, arguing that those rulings were
based on erroneous interpretations of the law.
The Fifth Circuit structured the first appellate issue this way: whether
Hale's bankruptcy discharge barred Stanley from commencing a legal
malpractice action against Trinchard's attorneys, because Hale's alleged injury
occurred before Hale filed for bankruptcy.444 The district court concluded that
it did, but the Fifth Circuit refused to embrace that conclusion." 5
The court of appeals began its analysis by stressing that the district court
failed to distinguish between Hale's individual interests and the interests of the
bankruptcy estate. 446 Unquestionably, this distinction is important for several
reasons. Under federal bankruptcy law, a bankruptcy estate comprises all
"legal or equitable interests [of the debtor] in property as of the commencement
of the [bankruptcy] case." 447 Thus, the estate includes any causes of action
belonging to the debtor when the bankruptcy proceeding begins,44 8 a trustee of
the bankruptcy estate may pursue any claims that are the estate's property. 449
Further, these pre-petition rights in property are determined according to state
law.
450
Applying these rules, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the district court's
summary judgment ruling was erroneous because, among other reasons, Hale's
legal malpractice action against Trinchard accrued at least a month before the
civil rights judgment forced Hale into bankruptcy. 45' As a consequence,
Stanley had a right to sue the insurance defense lawyers because Hale's right to
commence a legal malpractice action became part of the bankruptcy estate.452
Moving to the second issue, Stanley asked the Fifth Circuit to address
whether the district court erred by concluding Stanley's evidence was
insufficient to prove that NNIC breached its statutory duty of good faith and
fair dealing.453 This statutory duty from La. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 22:1220(A)
states in pertinent part:
443. Id.
444. Id. at 421.
445. See id. at 421-22.
446. See id. at 422
447. See id. at 418 (alteration in original) (quoting In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d 218, 223 (5th Cir. 2001)).
448. See id. (quoting In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d at 223).
449. See id. (citing 11 U.S.C. § 323; Wieburg v. GTE Sw. Inc., 272 F.3d 302, 306 (5th Cir. 2001)
("Because the claims are property of the bankruptcy estate, the Trustee is the real party in interest with
exclusive standing to assert them.")).
450. See id. (quoting In re Segerstrom, 247 F.3d at 224).
451. Id. at 419.
452. See id. at 425 ("[We hold that, at the time bankruptcy proceedings commenced, Hale had incurred a
legal injury-in the form of an adverse money judgment-sufficient to allow Stanley to assert a legal
malpractice claim against the Trinchard defendants on behalf of Hale's bankruptcy estate and that Hale's
subsequent discharge from personal liability for that judgment had no effect on the right and duty of the
trustee to pursue that claim.")
453. See id. at 426.
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An insurer.., owes to his insured a duty of good faith and fair dealing. The
insurer has an affirmative duty to adjust claims fairly and promptly and to
make a reasonable effort to settle claims with the insured or the claimant, or
both. Any insurer who breaches these duties shall be liable for any
damages sustained as a result of the breach.4 4
In addition, subsection (B) of the statute lists a variety of acts that constitute a
breach of an insurer's duties.455
Although the district court concluded that the bankruptcy trustee failed to
identify NNIC's prohibited conduct under § 22:1220(B), the Fifth Circuit
disagreed.456 After examining the facts and the contract, the court of appeals
held that Stanley actually accused NNIC of breaching an implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing.457 To reach that conclusion, the court cited Theriot
v. Midland Risk Insurance Co., in which the Louisiana Supreme Court
declared that § 22:1220(A) "recognizes the jurisprudentially established duty
of good faith and fair dealing [that an insurer owes an] insured, which is an
outgrowth of the contractual and fiduciary relationship between the insured
and insurer.' '458 The supreme court also held that the second sentence in that
section applies "to both insureds and claimants. 459
Turning to Stanley's allegations, the Fifth Circuit noted that the trustee
had multiple examples of NNIC's misconduct: (1) NNIC's failure to
adequately represent Hale's interest before, during, and after the civil rights
suit;46° (2) NNIC's conflicts of interest and ethical breaches that Trinchard
created during the firm's joint representation of Hale, the Sheriff, and NNIC;461
(3) NNIC's breach of fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing by settling
the civil rights suit "without negotiating a full release for Hale" ; 462 and
(4) NNIC's breach of fiduciary duty of good faith and fair dealing by failing
454. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1220(A) (2006).
455. See LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 22:1220(B) (2006). Insurers are prohibited from engaging in the
following acts:
(1) Misrepresenting pertinent facts or insurance policy provisions relating to any coverages at
issue.
(2) Failing to pay a settlement within thirty days after an agreement is reduced to writing.
(3) Denying coverage or attempting to settle a claim on the basis of an application which the
insurer knows was altered without notice to, or knowledge or consent of, the insured.
(4) Misleading a claimant as to the applicable prescriptive period.
(5) Failing to pay the amount of any claim due any person insured by the contract within sixty
days after receipt of satisfactory proof of loss from the claimant when such failure is arbitrary,
capricious, or without probable cause.
Id.
456. See Stanley, 500 F.3d at 428.
457. See id. at 429.
458. See id. at 427 (quoting Theriot v. Midland Risk Ins. Co., 694 So. 2d 184, 188 (La. 1997)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
459. Id. (quoting Theriot, 694 So. 2d at 188) (internal quotation marks omitted).
460. See id. at 428.
461. See id.
462. See id. at 429.
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"to truthfully and accurately communicate essential information" to Hale,
especially regarding coverage and limits under the liability insurance
contract. 43
Again, Stanley sued the lawyers for legal malpractice and NNIC for
breaching its duty of good faith and fair dealing. The Fifth Circuit concluded
that those actions were sound because Stanley-as a bankruptcy trustee rather
than a third-party victim-stood "in the shoes of NNICs insured." 464 In the
end, the Fifth Circuit remanded the case after reversing the district court's
summary judgment in favor of Trinchard's attorneys and NNIC. 465
2. Substantive Question: Whether a Federal Court Should Apply
Mississippi or Louisiana Substantive Choice-of-Law Rules To Resolve a
Duty-To-Defend Controversy Between a Liability Insurer and Its Insured
Nursing Home, After the Latter Paid Independently Retained Attorneys To
Defend the Nursing Home Against Multiple Lawsuits
Fundamentally, Hartford Underwriters Insurance Co. v. Foundation
Health Services Inc. is a choice-of-law case. 46 But the underlying substantive
conflict between the parties concerns whether an insurer has a contractual duty
to pay for its insureds' retained lawyers. 47 Foundation Health Services, Inc.,
is a Louisiana non-profit corporation that owns and manages healthcare
facilities and nursing homes in seven states.468 Magnolia Healthcare, Inc., a
Mississippi corporation, is one of Foundation's several wholly-owned
subsidiaries.469 Magnolia owns and operates four nursing homes in
Mississippi. 47 ° Its corporate offices, however, are located in Louisiana.
47 1
Briefly put, alleged third-party victims filed fourteen civil actions against
472Magnolia in Mississippi state courts. Each suit arose out of Magnolia's
operation of its Mississippi nursing homes.473 Hartford insured Magnolia
under two liability insurance contracts, each of which included a duty-to-
defend clause.474  In light of the policies' duty-to-defend clauses and
463. See id. at 428.
464. See id. at 427.
465. See id. at 431.
466. See Hartford Univ. Ins. Co. v. Found. Health Servs., Inc., 524 F.3d 588, 593 (5th Cir. Apr. 2008).
467. See id.






474. Id. Although Hartford issued only two of the policies named in Magnolia's original complaint, it
"does not dispute that those policies insured the underlying risks and triggered the duty to defend." Id at 591
n.1.
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reservation of rights,475 Hartford secured lawyers to defend Magnolia against
each lawsuit. 476 But Magnolia also retained independent counsel to defend the
company's interest in the fourteen lawsuits.477 When Magnolia asked Hartford
to pay the retained lawyers' fees, however, Hartford refused.478
Asserting that Hartford breached the insurance contract and committed
various torts, Foundation sued Hartford in a Mississippi state court.4 79 Hartford
then removed the case to the Northern District of Mississippi.480 But folowing
48Htfol i
a customary practice among liability insurers,4 ' Hartford already had filed a
declaratory-judgment action, even before learning about Foundation's
lawsuit.482 Having filed its lawsuit in Louisiana, Hartford asked a different
federal district court to declare that Hartford had no duty to pay for Magnolia's
independently-retained counsel's representation.483 Pursuant to a motion from
Foundation, the Louisiana court transferred Hartford's suit to the Northern
District of Mississippi, where Foundation's lawsuit was pending.4 4
The Mississippi district court simultaneously considered the two cases, in
which both Hartford and Foundation had filed motions for partial summary
judgment.485 Concluding that Mississippi, rather than Louisiana, law
controlled the disposition of the two cases, the district court granted
Foundation's motion for partial summary relief and denied Hartford's motions
475. "When an insurer provides a defense for an insured under a reservation of rights, the insurer
defends the insured 'while at the same time reserving the right to deny coverage in [the] event ajudgment is
rendered against the insured."' Id. at 592 n.2 (alteration in original) (quoting Moeller v. Am. Guar. & Liab.
Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d 1062, 1069 (Miss. 1996)); see also 14 LEER. RuSS & THOMAS F. SEGALLA, COUCH ON
INSURANCE § 202:38 (3d ed. 2007) ("A 'unilateral reservation of rights' is a notice given by the insurer that it
will defend but reserves all rights it has based on noncoverage under the policy .....





481. See St. Paul Ins. Co. v. Trejo, 39 F.3d 585, 590-91 (5th Cir. 1994) (listing seven factors for a court
to consider when dismissing a declaratory judgment action (quoting Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bureau
Fed'n, 996 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1993)); Willy E. Rice, Insurance Contracts and Judicial Discord Over
Whether Liability Insurers Must Defend Insured's Allegedly Intentional and Immoral Conduct: A Historical
and Empirical Review of Federal and State Courts' Declaratory Judgments-1900-1997,47 AM. U. L REV.
1131, 1156 (1998); see also Shell Oil Co. v. AC & S, Inc., 649 N.E.2d 946,949 (I1. App. Ct. 1995) (noting
that under state law, an "insurer must either (1) seek a declaratory judgment as to its rights and obligations
before or pending trial or (2) defend the insured under a reservation of rights"); Am. Employers Ins. Co. v.
Crawford, 533 P.2d 1203, 1207 (N.M. 1975) (concluding that companies may sue for a declaratoryjudgment,
before undertaking a defense, to determine their liability).
482. See Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 524 F.3d at 592; see also 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (2000) ("In a case
of actual controversy within its jurisdiction ... any court of the United States... may declare the rights and
other legal relations of any interested party seeking such declaration .... Any such declaration shall have the
force and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such.").
483. Hartford Underwriters Ins. Co., 524 F.3d at 592.
484. Id.
485. Id.
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486in both cases. Hartford then appealed the adverse rulings to the Fifth
Circuit.
487
After examining Louisiana and Mississippi laws, the Fifth Circuit noted a
significant conflict and determined that Hartford's reservation of right created a
choice-of-law issue.488 Under Mississippi law, if an insurer defends an insured
under a reservation of rights, the insurer must provide the insured with an
independent counsel to circumvent the inherent or "built-in" conflict of
interests. 489 Louisiana law, however, does not require an insurer to provide
independent legal representation for an insured simply because an insurer
defends an insured under a reservation of rights. 490 Instead, Louisiana requires
separate counsel only when an insured establishes that a concurrent conflict of
interest exists.49' Since Foundation had a viable cause of action to recover
attorney's fees under the laws of only one state, the court of appeals had to
conduct an exhaustive choice-of-law analysis.492
First, the Fifth Circuit had to identify the "forum state," because federal
law requires federal courts sitting in diversity to apply the forum state's choice-
of-law rules to determine which state's substantive laws govern.493 The court of
appeals simply concluded that Mississippi was the "forum state," presumably
because Magnolia, the subsidiary, is a Mississippi corporation, and the
underlying third-party lawsuits commenced in Mississippi. 494  A more
elaborate discussion of this issue, however, would have been enlightening
because (1) Foundation, the plaintiff of record, operates in seven states,
(2) Foundation is a Louisiana corporation, (3) Magnolia's corporate offices are
located in Louisiana, and (4) Hartford also insures Foundation's business
activities in Louisiana.495
Having concluded that Mississippi's choice-of-law analysis governed, the
court noted that Mississippi resolves choice-of-law issues by applying a three-
pronged test.496 First, courts must determine whether substantive or procedural
rules are the focus of attention.497 Second, if substantive laws are involved, the
court must determine whether the controversy commenced under tort, property,
486. Id.
487. Id.
488. See id. at 592-94.
489. See id. at 592-93 (citing Twin City Fire Ins. Co. v. Madison, 309 F.3d 901, 905 (5th Cir. 2002)
(applying Moeller v. Am. Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 707 So. 2d 1062, 1069 (Miss. 1996))).
490. See id at 593 (citing Trinity Universal Ins. Co. v. Stevens Forestry Serv., Inc., 335 F.3d 353, 356
(5th Cir. 2003) (applying Louisiana's law)).
491. See id. at 593 n.3 (citing Belanger v. Gabriel Chems., Inc., 787 So. 2d 559, 565 (La. Ct. App. 2001);
Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, Pa. v. Circle, Inc., 915 F.2d 986, 991 (5th Cir. 1990)).
492. See id. at 593 (citing Zurich Am. Ins. Co. v. Goodwin, 920 So. 2d 427,432 (Miss. 2006) ("Choice
of law analysis arises only when there is a true conflict between the laws of two states, each having an interest
in the litigation.")); Chapman v. Thrasher Trucking Co., 729 F. Supp. 510, 510 (S.D. Miss. 1990).
493. See id. (citing In re Katrina Canal Breaches Litig., 495 F.3d 191, 206 (5th Cir. 2007)).
494. See id.
495. Id.
496. Id. (citing Zurich, 920 So. 2d at 433-34).
497. Id. (citing Zurich, 920 So. 2d at 433-34).
1062 [Vol. 41:1013
INSURANCE DECISIONS
or contract principles.49s Finally, the court must consult the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws and apply the appropriate section.4
Regarding the first two prongs, the Fifth Circuit concluded that
Foundation and Hartford's disagreement involved substantive law:
While this dispute generally involves reimbursement for attorney's fees, the
more precise issue is whether an insurer must provide an insured with
independent counsel when defending them under a reservation of rights.
Because resolution of this issue determines whether Foundation "has a
viable cause of action," and not merely whether a party is entitled to
attorneys fees for prevailing in a particular case, the issue is substantive.
500
The court also concluded, and the parties agreed, that Foundation's cause of
action sounded in contract. °!
For the third prong, Mississippi's methodology requires a highly
sophisticated analysis by determining "the 'center of gravity' of a dispute and
apply[ing] 'the law of the place which has the most significant relationship to
the event and parties or which... has the greatest concern with the specific
issues.'''502 To achieve that end, Mississippi embraces the Restatement
(Second) of Conflict of Laws.50 3 Looking to the Restatement, the court found
three relevant sections: §§ 6, 188, and 193.50
Section 193 applies to all kinds of insurance contracts, except life
insurance contracts.50 5 It focuses on the principal location of the insured risk:
[An individual's rights under contract] are determined by the local law of the
state which the parties understood.., to be the principal location of the
insured risk during the term of the policy, unless with respect to the
particular issue, some other state has a more significant relationship under
the principles stated in § 6 to the transaction and the parties, in which event
the local law of the other state will be applied.506
On the other hand, § 188 states that courts should apply the law that "has
the most significant relationship to the transaction and the parties., 50 7 To
determine which state has the most substantial connection with the parties and
the dispute, § 188 outlines several factors: "(a) the place of contracting, (b) the
place of negotiation of the contract, (c) the place of performance, (d) the
498. Id. (citing Zurich, 920 So. 2d at 433-34).
499. Id. (citing Zurich, 920 So. 2d at 433-34).
500. Id. (quoting Hancock v. Watson, 962 So. 2d 627, 629 (Miss. Ct. App. 2007)).
501. Id.
502. Id. at 593-94 (emphasis added) (quoting Zurich, 920 So. 2d at 433).
503. See id. at 594 (quoting Ingalls Shipbuilding v. Fed. Ins. Co., 410 F.3d 214, 230 (5th Cir. 2005)).
504. See id.
505. See id. (citing Boardman v. United Servs. Auto. Ass'n, 470 So. 2d 1024, 1033 (Miss. 1985)).
506. Id. (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 193 (1971)).
507. Id. at 595 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 (1971)) (internal
quotation marks omitted).
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location of the subject matter of the contract, and (e) the domicile, residence,
nationality, place of incorporation and place of business of the parties. 5 °s
Initially, the court focused on the first two factors by noting that "the
place of contracting and [the] place of negotiation are often relevant to disputes
involving contract interpretation. ''s°9 Interestingly, the Fifth Circuit embraced
Hartford's and the district court's conclusions that the place of contracting was
most likely Louisiana.510 And even more surprising, it stated that "the contract
negotiation, to the extent there was any, likely occurred in Louisiana. '' 511 The
court then recognized that "to some extent, whether Hartford has a duty to
provide independent counsel to Magnolia is related to the scope of Hartford's
contractual duty to defend. 512
But ultimately the court of appeals placed more emphasis on the place of
performance than on other factors in § 188:
[Tihis case is different from the typical contract interpretation case...
because the issue of whether Hartford owed a duty to provide...
independent counsel is closely connected to the court where the "defending"
took place. The court where a case is tried has a substantial interest in
preventing conflicts of interest.
513
Thus, a "de facto presumption" suggested applying Mississippi law.514
Before firmly holding that Mississippi law applied, however, the court
assessed whether the principles § 6 could rebut that initial presumption.515
Section 6 focuses on the policies underlying choice-of-law doctrine:
[T]he factors relevant to the choice of the applicable rule of law include
(a) the needs of the interstate and international systems, (b) the relevant
policies of the forum, (c) the relevant policies of other interested states and
the relative interests of those states in the determination of the particular
issue, (d) the protection of justified expectations, (e) the basic policies
underlying the particular field of law, (f) certainty, predictability and
uniformity of result, and (g) ease in the determination and application of the
law to be applied.
516





513. Id. at 595-96.
514. Id. at 597.
515. Id. at 597-60. "[Tlhe factors enumerated in Restatement § 6 will from case to case be given such
relative weight as they are entitled, consistent with the general scheme of the center of gravity test." Id at 598
(quoting Boardman v. United Servs. Auto Ass'n, 470 So. 2d 1024, 1032 (Miss. 1985)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
516. Id. at 597-98 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 6(2) (1971)).
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The "place of performance" rule, the needs of the interstate system, the
relevant policies of the forum, and the justified expectations of the parties
caused the Fifth Circuit to embrace the district court's conclusion:
Mississippi's law governs this dispute.517
3. Substantive Question: Whether Under Texas Law a Liability Insurer
Has a Contractual Duty To Indemnify a Manufacturer Who Settled
Numerous Personal Injury Suits After Selling a Defective Nutrition
and Weight-Loss Product
Basically, AdvoCare International, L.P. v. Horizon Laboratories, Inc., is
another duty-to-defend/indemnify controversy between an insurer and its
insured. 518 Again, the Fifth Circuit encountered a choice-of-substantive-law
issue as in Foundation.519
AdvoCare International L.P. is a Texas corporation with corporate offices
in Carrollton, Texas.520 It receives orders for nutritional and skincare products
and ships those goods to national and international distributors.521 Its
adversary, Horizon Laboratories, Inc., is a manufacturer and a California
corporation with a sole place of business in Chatsworth, California. 22 These
two companies are tied to one another through Richard Scheckenbach, who
wholly owns R-Squared Nutrition, Inc.,523 a Washington State corporation.524
Scheckenbach and R-Squared were AdvoCare consultants who both allegedly
sold raw materials to Horizon for use in AdvoCare's products.2 5
Under two consecutive contracts, Horizon agreed to manufacture
products for AdvoCare. 526 Both contracts required Horizon to purchase
products liability insurance and list AdvoCare as an additional "named
insured" under the insurance policy. 527 Under the second contract, AdvoCare
also agreed to purchase a minimum amount of Horizon's products each
month.528 As part of the exchange, Horizon agreed to become certified under
the Dietary Supplement Verification Program (DSVP) within 180 days.529
517. Seeid. at599.
518. See AdvoCare Int'l, L.P. v. Horizon Labs., Inc., 524 F.3d 679, 680 (5th Cir. Apr. 2008).
519. See id. at 690; see also Hartford Underwriters, 524 F.3d at 592-93.
520. See AdvoCare International L.P., http://www.advocare.com (last visited on Oct. 17, 2008).
521. See Brief of Appellee Advocate International, L.P. at 53, AdvoCare Int'l, 524 F.3d 679 (No. 06-
11157), 2007 WL 5356999.
522. See Brief of Appellant, Horizon Laboratories, Inc. at 17, AdvoCare Int'l, 524 F.3d 679 (No. 06-
11157), 2007 WL 5356997.
523. See AdvoCare Int'l L.P. v. Horizon Labs., Inc., No. 3:04-CV-1988-H, 2005 WL 1832116, at * 1 n.1
(N.D. Tex. Aug 2, 2005).
524. See Brief of Defendants-Appellants Scheckenbach and R-Squared at 11, AdvoCare Int'l, 524 F.3d
679 (No. 06-11157), 2007 WL 5356998; see also AdvoCare Int'l, 2005 WL 1832116, at *8-9.
525. Brief of Appellee Advocate International, L.P., supra note 521, at 23, 31.
526. See AdvoCare Int'l, 524 F.3d at 683.
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Horizon, however, never secured a DSVP certification.530 Thereafter,
AdvoCare terminated the second contract, but Horizon continued to ship
products and send invoices to AdvoCare, emphasizing that AdvoCare would
owe 18% interest for all outstanding debt.531 Previously, consumers had filed
approximately eleven personal injury and wrongful death lawsuits against
AdvoCare for allegedly selling weight loss products that contained ephedra or
532
ephedrine. Because Horizon did not help AdvoCare defend against or settle
the ephedra-related lawsuits, AdvoCare refused to pay its delinquent bills.
533
During this period, Lexington Insurance Company insured Horizon under
various liability insurance contracts.534 It too refused to pay for Horizon's legal
defense.535
Ultimately, AdvoCare sued Horizon, Scheckenbach, and R-Squared in a
Texas state court.5 36 AdvoCare claimed that Scheckenbach and R-Squared
conspired with Horizon to inflate the cost of the raw materials used in
AdvoCare's products.537 Although stipulating that it owed Horizon
approximately $3.4 million for unpaid bills, AdvoCare also filed a breach of
contract action against Horizon for the manufacturer's failure to obtain a DSVP
certification and provide adequate insurance coverage for AdvoCare. 38 In
response, Horizon counterclaimed with a breach of contract action against
AdvoCare. 539  It claimed that AdvoCare wrongfully terminated the 2002
contract and neglected to purchase the minimum monthly supply of
products.54
Horizon then removed the case to the Northern District of Texas. 541 In
that same federal district court, Horizon filed a declaratory-judgment action
against Lexington, asking the district court to declare that Lexington had a duty
to indemnify Horizon for ephedra-related claims.542 Both AdvoCare and
Horizon filed summary judgment motions.543 The district court granted partial
summary judgment to AdvoCare; it found that by failing to obtain DSVP
certification within 180 days, Horizon breached the 2002 contract, and by
failing to insure AdvoCare under a liability insurance contract, Horizon
breached the 1997 and 2002 contracts. 544 The court also granted Lexington's
530. See id.
531. See id.
532. See id. at 685.
533. See id. at 683.
534. See Brief of Appellant, Horizon Laboratories, Inc., supra note 522, at 17.
535. See AdvoCare Int'l, 524 F.3d at 683.
536. See id.
537. See id.
538. See id. at 683-84.
539. See id.
540. See id.
541. See id. at 683.





motion for summary judgment and dismissed Horizon's declaratory judgment
lawsuit regarding the duty to indemnify.545 Finally, finding that AdvoCare did
not fraudulently fail to buy a minimum amount of products each month, the
court denied Horizon's summary judgment motion.
Ultimately, ajury awarded AdvoCare breach of contract damages of $2.8
million and $500,000 for present and future damages, respectively.547 In turn,
the jury awarded Horizon approximately $3.5 million for AdvoCare's unpaid
bills. a Applying Texas law, the district court computed a 6% interest rate
and attached that amount to AdvoCare's outstanding debt.549 After the
judgment, Horizon challenged the application of the 6% interest rate by
arguing that an 18% interest rate under California law was more appropriate.5 °
But the district court refused to amend the judgment.551 Horizon appealed the
adverse rulings.5 2
Resolving the interest-rate question, the Fifth Circuit looked to which
state had the most significant relationship and concluded that the district court
properly denied Horizon's challenge to the Texas interest rate:
Because we find no agreed-upon choice-of-law provision governing the
interest issue, the "most significant relationship" test applies. This test
provides that "the law of the state with the most significant relationship to
the particular substantive issue will be applied to resolve that issue."...
Both California and Texas would reasonably have a policy interest in
limiting the interest rate that can be charged for amounts overdue,
although Texas has a strong interest, as the payments were made in Texas.55
3
Next, Horizon argued that the district court erred by granting Lexington's
motion for summary judgment.554 But before addressing that conflict, the
court of appeals found that Lexington insured both Horizon and AdvoCare, the
additional "named insured, under a liability insurance contract. '555 Thus,
545. See id.
546. See id. at 684 n.4.
547. See id. at 684.
548. See id.
549. See id. "The Final Judgment included the following awards for Horizon: actual damages of $66,796
from AdvoCare (resulting from a $3,429,253.70 [sic] recovery on the stated account, plus interest, less the
$3,396,399 jury award to AdvoCare for Horizon's breach of contract) prejudgment interest of $158,054 from
AdvoCare, and postjudgment interest at a rate of 4.91% per annum." Id. at 684 n.7.
550. See id. at 684. Horizon presented this argument even though the contract had a Texas choice-of-
law provision. See id. at 684 n. 1.
551. See id. at 690.
552. See id. at 685, 688, 691.
553. Id. at 691-92 (quoting Duncan v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 665 S.W.2d 414,421 (Tex. 1984)).
554. See id. at 685.
555. See id. at 683. The contract was an "occurrence" policy where an occurrence was defined as "an
accident, including continuous or repeated exposure to substantially the same general harmful conditions."
See id. at 685.
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under the liability insurance contract, Lexington was obligated to cover
legitimate third-party injuries that occurred during the policy period.556
The contract's Weight Management Pharmaceutical Exclusion stated that
the insurance did not apply to bodily injury, property damage, personal injury,
or advertising injury "arising out of any pharmaceutical used for the treatment
of obesity, weight control, and/or weight management, including but not limited
to Dexfenfluramine, Phentermine and Ephedra. 557 Horizon insisted that the
policy ambiguously excluded coverage for ephedra and argued that the
exclusion clause only applied to pharmaceuticals. 5 8 Citing California's legal
definition of pharmaceuticals, Horizon stressed that its herbal products are
dietary supplements, or "food," rather than pharmaceuticals.559 Conversely,
Lexington argued that the plain language interpretation in the exclusion clause
indicated that Lexington did not cover diet pills containing ephedra.56
To resolve this conflict, the Fifth Circuit observed that California has
embraced the plain meaning rule and the doctrine of ambiguity to interpret
insurance contracts.561 Under the former rule, "[w]ords in an insurance policy
must be understood in their ordinary sense unless given special meanings by
the policy. '562 And under the latter, "[a]ny ambiguity or uncertainty in an
insurance policy [must] be resolved against the insurer., 563 Nevertheless, "[a]
policy provision will be considered ambiguous when it [has] two or more
[reasonable] constructions"; therefore, "exclusionary clauses are interpreted
narrowly against the insurer.' '5 4
Applying the doctrine of ambiguity, the Fifth Circuit held that the district
court did not err by granting Lexington's motion for summary judgment. 65
The court of appeals embraced the district court's conclusion that the insurance
policy unambiguously excluded defense costs for ephedra-related lawsuits.
566
Applying Texas law and the doctrine of ambiguity, the Fifth Circuit concluded
that Horizon breached the contract when it failed to buy products liability
insurance to cover ephedra-related products because the contract
unambiguously required Horizon to purchase the insurance.567 Unquestionably,
556. See id.
557. Id.
558. See id. at 686.
559. Id. (citing CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 117747(a) (West 2006) (defining pharmaceutical as "a
prescription or over-the-counter human or veterinary drug"); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 109925(c)
(West 2006) (defining drug as "any article other than food")).
560. See id.
561. See id.
562. Golden Eagle Ins. Co. v. Ins. Co. of the W., 121 Cal. Rptr. 2d 682, 686 (Ct. App. 2002) (quoting
Md. Cas. Co. v. Nationwide Ins. Co., 76 Cal. Rptr. 2d 113, 117 (Ct. App. 1998).
563. Crane v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 485 P.2d 1129, 1130 (Cal. 1971).
564. Advocare Int'l, 524 F.3d at 686 (quoting TRB Invs., Inc. v. Fireman's Fund Ins. Co., 145 P.3d472,
477 (Cal. 2006)).
565. d at 688-89.




this latter holding is fairly significant. In light of the facts, Horizon raised
several arguably sound defenses-the doctrines of impossibility and waiver.568
In the end, however, they were not sound enough.
569
4. Substantive Question: Whether Under Texas Law a Comprehensive
General Liability Insurer Has a Contractual Duty To Indemnify an Owner-
Operator of a Petroleum-Based, Sludge-Removal Company Who Settled a
Personal Injury Suit After Workers Were Exposed to Toxic Levels of Various
Chemicals and Vapors
In 1980, Congress enacted the Comprehensive Environmental Response,
Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA).570 The anti-pollution statute is a
response to widespread concerns about (1) the production and careless disposal
of hazardous wastes in the United States and (2) the severe effects hazardous
substances have on the environment and citizens' health.57' CERCLA has two
stated purposes: (1) to ensure the "prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites"
and (2) to "[impose] all cleanup costs on the responsible party., 572
To achieve the stated goals, CERCLA authorizes the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA) to take immediate action, if necessary, to remove
hazardous spills and prevent the release of hazardous substances "which may
present an imminent and substantial danger to the public health or welfare."
573
The agency may commence a remedial action to prevent or minimize the
release and migration of hazardous substances.5 74 But even more relevant, the
EPA has "[designed] cleanup plans and [sought] payment from responsible
parties and, by extension, their insurers. 575
In 1998, liability insurers paid $2.9 billion for pollution remediation and
environmental losses.576 A year later, insurers paid $1.5 billion. 77 In recent
years, insurers' exposure to environmental-pollution claims have continued to
decline.578 Improved and cheaper remediation techniques partially explain the
decreasing costs. 579 A more proactive business decision, however, probably
explains the decreasing exposure more than any other factor. From the 1940s
to the mid-1980s, liability insurance contracts did not contain absolute-
568. See id. at 687.
569. See id.
570. Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980, Pub. L No. 96-
510, 94 Stat. 2767 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675 (2000 & Supp. V 2005)).
571. See Eagle-Picher Indus. v. EPA, 759 F.2d 922, 925-26 (D.C. Cir. 1985).
572. Gen. Elec. Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422 (8th Cir. 1990).
573. § 9601(23); § 9604(a)(1).
574. § 9601(24)
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pollution-exclusion clauses.580  Of course, in 1986, pollution exclusion
provisions began to appear.
58
'
Therefore, one should expect insurers' liability for pollution remediation
to decline precipitously as the pre-1986 policies expire. But now, insurers are
facing a different type of exposure. Increasingly, insureds and third-party
victims are asserting that absolute pollution-exclusion clauses do not exclude
coverage for toxic-fumes injuries. This controversial issue has divided the
courts over whether insurers must pay damages for toxic-fumes injuries.
Although, a few state courts have ordered insurers to compensate toxic-fumes
victims, 582 the greater majority of state courts have not forced insurers to
pay.583 In addition, federal courts addressing this issue have concluded that
pollution-exclusion clauses exclude coverage for toxic-fumes injuries.
The litigants in United National Insurance Co. v. Hydro Tank, Inc. asked
the Fifth Circuit to decide a rather complex pollution exclusion, toxic-fumes
question.585  Here are the basic facts in the underlying third-party lawsuit:
Motiva Enterprises, L.L.C. (Motiva) "refines, distributes, and markets oil
products in the eastern and southern U.S." 586 It hired Hydro Tank, Inc. (Hydro)
580. Id.
581. Id.
582. See Richardson v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 826 A.2d 310, 340 (D.C. 2003) (concluding that the
absolute pollution exclusion did not exclude coverage injuries arising from carbon monoxide poisoning after
tenant inhaled fumes from an allegedly malfunctioning furnace in an apartment complex), vacated by
settlement, 844 A.2d 344 (D.C. 2004); Freidline v. Shelby Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 37, 43 (Ind. 2002) (finding
that absolute pollution-exclusion clause did not exclude coverage for employee's injuries after the employee
inhaled toxic fumes from carpet glue because toxic fumes are not pollutants under the insurance contract);
Belt Painting Corp. v. TIG Ins. Co., 742 N.Y.S.2d 332, 333 (App. Div. 2002) (concluding that employer's
insurance contract's absolute pollution exclusion did not exclude coverage for an employee's injuries after
the employee released paint and paint solvent fumes).
583. See Deni Assocs. of Fla., Inc. v. State Farm Fire& Cas. Ins. Co., 711 So. 2d 1135, 1137 n.2 (Fla.
1998) (noting that insurers and amici cited more than 100 cases from thirty-six other states that had applied
the plain language of the exclusion clause and denied coverage); Cincinnati Ins. Co. v. Becker Warehouse,
Inc., 635 N.W.2d 112, 118 (Neb. 2001) (listing cases); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Cowen Constr., Inc., 55
P.3d 1030, 1035 (Okla. 2002) (finding similar language excluded coverage for property damage or bodily
injury regardless of whether there was damage to the general environment); Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of
Pittsburgh, Pa. v. CBI Indus., Inc., 907 S.W.2d 517, 521-22 (Tex. 1995) (finding that the absolute pollution
exclusion clause excluded coverage for personal injuries and property damage that arose out of the accidental
release of a large cloud of hydrofluoric acid from an oil refinery); Quadrant Corp. v. Amer. States Ins. Co.,
110 P.3d 733, 744 (Wash. 2005) (finding that that the plain language of the absolute pollution exclusion
clause excluded coverage for a tenants injuries after the tenant inhaled waterproofing-material fumes that
were used in tenants apartment).
584. See, e.g., Nat'l Elec. Mfrs. Ass'n v. Gulf Underwriters Ins. Co., 162 F.3d 821, 825-26 (4th Cir.
1998) (concluding that the pollution exclusion should be enforced as written because it excluded coverage for
atmospheric, environmental and other forms of pollution); Technical Coating Applicators, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. &
Guar. Co.. 157 F.3d 843, 846 (11 th Cir. 1998) (holding similar language unambiguously excluded coverage
for bodily injuries sustained by breathing vapors emitted from roofing products); see also Owners Ins. Co. v.
Farmer, 173 F. Supp. 2d 1330, 1333-34 (N.D. Ga. 2001) ("The unambiguous language of the policy excludes
all pollutants and does not exclude pollutants based on their source or location.").
585. United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Hydro Tank, Inc., 497 F.3d 445, 446-47 (5th Cir. Aug. 2007).




to clean a tank at its Port Arthur, Texas refinery.587 When two Hydro workers
entered a mixing tank at the refinery to remove sludge, they were injured.588 A
third worker was also injured while attempting to rescue the workers inside the
tank.589 Each worker was hospitalized.59 The workers then sued Motiva in a
Texas state court, alleging that Motiva's negligence and exposure to "toxic
levels of hydrogen sulfide and/or other chemicals and vapors" caused their
severe brain and cardio-pulmonary injuries.59'
The contract between Motiva and Hydro required Hydro to indemnify
Motiva against claims arising out of Hydro's work.592 Hydro also agreed to
purchase liability insurance and list Motiva as an additional "named insured"
under the policy.593 Hydro purchased a $5 million umbrella policy from United
National Insurance Company (National), which was current when the workers
were injured.594 After settling the workers' state court suit, Motiva asked
National to pay the settlement costs up to the policy's limit, and they refused.
595
To determine whether it had a contractual obligation to indemnify Motiva,
National filed a declaratory-judgment action in the District Court for the
Southern District of Texas.59a National argued that hydrogen sulfide gas
caused the workers' injuries. 597 Because hydrogen sulfide gas is a pollutant
under the insurance contract's pollution exclusion provision, the insurer
insisted that it had no duty to indemnify.598 Conversely, Motiva maintained
that the pleadings in the Workers Suit allowed one to conclude that the
chemicals covered under the insurance contract caused the workers' injuries. 59
Thus, the insurer had a duty to reimburse the settlement expenditures. 600 After
examining the policy's pollution exclusion clause, the district court declared
that National had no duty to indemnify and Motiva appealed.WI
The Fifth Circuit reviewed the pollution exclusion provision in National's
insurance contract. It reads in relevant part:
Nov. 12, 2008). Although its refinery is located in Port Arthur, Texas, Motiva's principal place of business is
Houston, Texas. Id.











598. Id. at 448.
599. Id.
600. Id.
601. Id. at 447-48.
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EXCLUSIONS - This insurance does not apply to: ... F. (1) "Bodily injury"
or "property damage" which would not have occurred in whole or in part
but for the actual, alleged or threateded [sic] discharge, seepage, migration,
dispersal, release or escape of "pollutants" at any time .... "Pollutants"
means any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant or contaminant,
including smoke, vapor, soot, fumes, acids, alkalis, chemicals and waste.
"Waste" includes materials to be recycled, reconditioned or reclaimed. 
6M
The court of appeals also considered the workers' state court pleading.6
In the underlying suit, the injured workers alleged that they "sustain[ed]
serious injuries... in a tank when they were exposed to toxic levels of
hydrogen sulfide and/or other chemicals and vapors. 6° 4 As a consequence,
Motiva's "chemicals and toxins... [caused their] brain injury and damage."6 5
Motiva argued that the conjunction "and/or" creates two plausible outcomes:
an event in which a pollutant-hydrogen sulfide gas--caused the workers'
injuries, and an event in which other pollution-free "chemicals and vapors"
caused the injuries. 6° 6 Motiva asserted that the latter scenario epitomizes what
happened to the workers.
6 °7
The Fifth Circuit disagreed, stating that Motiva's interpretation ignored
the contract's plain language and Texas law.60 8 The exclusion clause excludes
coverage for "bodily injury... which would not have occurred in whole or in
part but for the... alleged... release.., of pollutants." 6° 9 Accordingly, a
liability insurance contact does not cover a "bodily injury" if a claim alleges
that the injury arose in part from the release of a pollutant.610
But Motiva raised another argument the Fifth Circuit did not address
decisively.61' "Shortly after entering the tank, two of the workers were
overcome by fumes and fell face first into the sludge., 612 Stated simply, the
refining company argued that it was "properly stored," petroleum-based sludge
in the mixing tank, rather than hydrogen sulfide gas, that caused the injuries.6 13
The court of appeals called this argument "clever" and dismissed it.
614
602. See id. at 488 n.3.
603. See id. at 488.





609. Id. (emphasis added).
610. See, e.g., Amoco Prod. Co. v. Hydroblast Corp., 90 F. Supp. 2d 727, 732-33 (N.D. Tex. 1999)
(concluding that an allegation of a pollutant-related injury is sufficient to trigger the pollution-exclusion
clause); Bituminous Cas. Corp. v. Kenworthy Oil Co., 912 F. Supp. 238, 241 (W.D. Tex. 1996) (concluding
the same).
611. United, 497 F.3d at 447.
612. Id.
613. Id. at 449-50 ("Motiva claim[ed] that since the workers do not allege the particular mechanism of
their exposure to hydrogen sulfide, it is possible that they were injured by skin-to-sludge contact, rather than
by inhalation of a gas.").
614. ld. at 450.
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Focusing solely on Motiva's properly stored argument, the Fifth Circuit
concluded: "[A] pollution exclusion clause applies whenever a pollutant causes
harm... irrespective of where the injury took place or whether the pollutant
was released into the environment.,
615
The definition of a pollutant in the pollution exclusion clause, however, is
exceedingly clear: A pollutant is "any solid, liquid, gaseous or thermal irritant
or contaminant."616 Motiva asserted that the sludge was not a pollutant.
617
Sludge is a petroleum byproduct-like plastics,618 naphtha,6 9 some synthetic
polymers, 620 some oxygen additives,621 and asphalt.622  But no reasonable
person would seriously conclude that these latter products are pollutants, per se.
And without knowing more, no reasonable trier of facts should conclude that
petroleum-based sludge is a pollutant. Thus, the Fifth Circuit's failure to
address this issue intelligently and thoroughly was a serious omission.
But even more unsettling, the court of appeals never explained or decided
623whether hydrogen sulfide is a pollutant a. Instead, the Fifth Circuit assumed
that the gas is a pollutant-a "toxic fume." 624 If the court had been a bit more
inquisitive, however, it would have discovered these relevant facts:
615. Id. (citing Hamm v. Allstate Ins. Co., 286 F. Supp. 2d 790, 794-95 & n.2 (N.D. Tex. 2003)
(pollution exclusion barred insurers duty to defend when injury resulted from indoor accumulation of
toluene fumes during an office renovation); Zaiontz v. Trinity Universal Ins. Co., 87 S.W.3d 565, 571-72
(Tex. App. 2002) (injury caused by "odor eliminator" chemical that was confined to its proper area of
application triggered pollution exclusion)).
616. Id. at 448 (emphasis added).
617. Id.at451.
618. See Jason Booth, Asias Drillers Get Lift from Surge in Oil Prices; Some Analysts Bet on Them in
Event of Tech Skid, WALL ST. J., Mar. 10, 2000, at C14 ("High oil prices are typically bad economic news.
Transport costs go up, and inflation can be pushed higher as the cost of anything made from petroleum
byproducts, such as plastics, increases.").
619. See Geraldo Samor, Braskem Looks to Mine Profit in Geopolitics-As Latin America Moves to the
Left, Brazil's Petrochemical Giant Seeks Raw Materials, WALL ST. J., Feb. 3, 2006, at B2 ("Braskem...
lowered its tax bill, reduced overhead costs and made the plant's operations more efficient.... If oil
continues to trade at lofty prices, it will push up prices for naphtha, a petroleum byproduct and Braskem's
main raw material.").
620. See Valerie Bauerlein & Mary Jacoby, Other Ways to Deter Floods, WALL ST. J., Sept. 21 2005, at
A15 ("Some engineers favor expanding existing levees with a type of super dirt, reinforced with a synthetic
polymer made of a petroleum byproduct. These 'geogrids' create a strengthened soil that has been used to
build roads on weak ground and retaining walls.").
621. See Scott Kilman, California Gets No Exemption On Gas Rules-Building of Ethanol Plants May
Experience a Boost In Wake of EPA Order, WALL ST. J., June 12, 2001, at A6 ("Federal regulations require
cities plagued by air pollution to put oxygen additives in gasoline. The oxygen helps the fuel burn more
thoroughly, leaving less carbon monoxide in the air. The two most popular additives are corn-derived
ethanol and methyl tertiary butyl ether, or MTBE, a petroleum byproduct.").
622. See Chad Terhune, Asphalt Waste Poses No Risk, Study Shows, WALL ST. J., June 3, 1998, at F1
("Contrary to the worst fears of environmentalists and regulators, new research shows that those growing
stockpiles of recycled asphalt.., don't pose a serious pollution hazard after all.... Road asphalt, a petroleum
byproduct mixed with rocks and sand could be considered a clean fill material like rock and gravel.").
623. See United Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Hydro Tank, Inc., 497 F.3d 445, 450 (5th Cir. Aug. 2007).
624. See id. at 450.
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Hydrogen sulfide occurs ... naturally and from human-made processes. It
is... in crude petroleum and natural gas. Hydrogen sulfide also is
associated with municipal sewers and sewage treatment plants, swine
containment and manure-handling operations.... Industrial sources of
hydrogen sulfide include petroleum refineries, natural gas plants,
petrochemical plants, coke oven plants, food processing plants, and
tanneries. Bacteria... in your mouth and gastrointestinal tract produce
hydrogen sulfide during the digestion of... vegetable or animal proteins....
Hydrogen sulfide is produced by the natural bacteria in your mouth and is a
component of bad breath (halitosis). 625
Even more importantly, the Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease
Registry (ATSDR) does not list hydrogen sulfide as a pollutant or a "toxic
fume." 626  ATSDR only applies those labels when the concentration of
hydrogen sulfide reaches a certain level.627 Regarding the level of hydrogen-
sulfide fumes in Motiva' s mixing tank, the court of appeals simply noted: "[The
workers alleged that] 'they were exposed to such high levels of toxic substances
[to cause] brain damage... [and] not a slight exposure that would ordinarily
cause no harm. 628 In the end, the Fifth Circuit declared that National had no
duty to indemnify Motiva because a pollutant caused the workers' injuries.629
Nevertheless, the opinion is seriously flawed because the court of appeals
never established, as a matter of law, with probative evidence or otherwise,
whether hydrogen sulfide is a pollutant or whether "high levels of a pollutant"
were the proximate cause of the workers' injuries.630
625. AGENCY FOR Toxic SUBSTANCES AND DISEASES, DEP'T OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERvs., PUBLIC
HEALTH STATEMENT FOR HYDROGEN SULFIDE 1 (2008), available at http://www.atsdr.cdc.govltoxprofilesl
phs1 14.html.
626. Id. "The Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry (ATSDR), based in Atlanta, Georgia,
is a federal public health agency of the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services. ATSDR serves the
public by using the best science, taking responsive public health actions, and providing trusted health
information to prevent harmful exposures and diseases related to toxic substances." Agency for Toxic
Substance and Disease Registry, http:/Iwww.atsdr.cdc.gov/ (last visited Aug. 23, 2008).
627. Public Health Statement: Hydrogen Sulfide, http:lwww.atsdr.cdc.gov/toxprofiles/phsl 14.html (last
visited Oct. 21, 2008) ("People usually can smell hydrogen sulfide at low concentrations in air, ranging from
0.0005 to 0.3 parts per million .... [H]owever, at high concentrations, a person might lose their ability to
smell it. This can make hydrogen sulfide very dangerous.... The levels of hydrogen sulfide in air and water
are typically low.").
628. United, 497 F.3d at 450.




5. Substantive Question: Whether Under Texas Law a Federally Mandated
Endorsement in a Motor-Carriers Liability Insurance Contract Requires an
Insurer To Pay Damages for Third-Party Personal Injuries That Occurred
in Mexico
Unlike the highly litigated issue in Motiva, the question in Lincoln
General Insurance Co. v. De La Luz Garcia presents a case of first
impression.63' Maria De La Luz Garcia resides in Houston, Texas, and she
owns Garcia's Tours, which has a bus route between Houston, Texas, and
Celaya, Mexico.632 On April 7, 2004, a Garcia's Tours bus collided with
another vehicle in Monterrey, Mexico.633 Jesus Escoto (Escoto), an employee
of Garcia's Tours, was driving the bus.634 The other driver was a member of
the Morquecho family (the Morquechos).635 Two Morquechos were killed and
six were injured.636
Three months after the accident, the Morquechos sued Garcia's Tours and
Escoto in a Texas state court by alleging several negligence-based claims-
637
negligent hiring, negligent entrustment, and negligent retention. When the
accident occurred, Lincoln General Insurance Company (Lincoln) insured
Garcia's Tours under a motor carriers liability insurance contract.638 But
Lincoln refused to defend Garcia's Tours in the state court action, and after
Garcia's Tours was found liable for over $1.2 million in damages, Lincoln also
refused to indemnify its insured.639
In fact, while the state court suit was pending, Lincoln had already filed a
declaratory-judgment action in the Southern District of Texas.640 Lincoln
asked the district court to declare that it had no duty to defend or indemnify
Garcia's Tours under the terms of the policy.641 Given their interest in the
outcome of the declaratory-judgment action, the Morquechos intervened. 642
They wanted the court to declare that the motor-carriers policy covered the
accident and that an endorsement covered every judgment against Garcia's
Tours in the Morquechos underlying suiti" 3 Ultimately, the lower federal
court concluded that an endorsement to the insurance contract did not cover






637. See id. at 438.
638. See id. at 437.




643. See id. Both Lincoln and the Morquechos filed motions for summaryjudgment. See id. Ultimately,
the district court granted Lincoln's motion. See id.
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the accident. 644 Therefore, Lincoln had no duty to pay any judgment against
Garcia's Tours. 645 The Morquechos appealed.
646
Again, this is a case of first impression for the Fifth Circuit because the
liability insurance contract in this case is unique. Like many policies, Lincoln's
policy stated in pertinent part: "[The insurer] will pay all sums an insured
legally must pay as damages because of bodily injury or property damage to
which this insurance applies, caused by an accident and resulting from the
ownership, maintenance or use of a covered auto."'647 The insurance contract
also had a territorial-restriction clause that provided that Lincoln "will cover
accidents and losses occurring only within ... the United States, the territories
and possessions of the United States, Puerto Rico, and Canada.,
648
Under the Regulatory Reform Act of 1982, Congress requires for-hire
motor carriers to purchase third party insurance to satisfy the Act's minimum
financial responsibility requirements. 649 Therefore, unlike most motor vehicle
insurance contracts, the federally mandated MCS-90B endorsement was
attached to Lincoln's policy.650 "For carriers with a seating capacity of sixteen
passengers or more, such as Garcia's Tours, the minimum level of financial
responsibility is $5 million. 651
To be sure, the MCS-90B endorsement is very long; thus, only the most
relevant portions appear here:
In consideration of the premium stated in the policy to which this
endorsement is attached, the insurer (Lincoln) agrees to pay, within the limits
of liability described herein, any final judgment received against the insured
for public liability resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or
use of motor vehicles subject to financial responsibility requirements of
Section 18 of the Bus Regulatory Reform Act of 1982 regardless of
whether.., such negligence occurs on any route or in any territory
authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere ....
It is understood and agreed that no condition ... in the policy... shall
relieve the company from liability or from the payment of any final
judgment, within the limits of liability.... However, all terms, conditions
and limitations in the policy.., shall remain in full force and effect as
binding between the insured and the company.
652
644. See id. at 438-39.
645. See id. at 439.
646. See id.
647. Id. at 437-38 (emphasis added).
648. See id. at 438 (emphasis added).
649. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 31138(a) (West Supp. 1 2008). The corresponding regulations may be found at
49 C.F.R. §§ 387.31(a), (d)(1), 387.33, 387.39 (2007).
650. See Lincoln, 501 F.3d at 438.
651. Id. at 438 n.; see also 49 U.S.C.A. § 31138 (b)(1).
652. See FED. MOTOR CARRIER SAFETY ADMIN., U.S. DEP'T OFTRANSP., ENDORSEMENT FOR MOTOR
CARRIER POLICIES OF INSURANCE FOR PuBuc LIABILITY UNDER SECTION 18 OF THE Bus REGULATORY
REFORM ACT OF 1982, OMB No.: 2126-0008 [hereinafter ENDORSEMENT FORM], available at http://www.
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Also, regarding the minimum financial responsibility for transporting
passengers, 49 U.S.C. § 31138(a)(1) states:
The Secretary of Transportation shall prescribe regulations to require
minimum levels of financial responsibility sufficient to satisfy liability
amounts established by the Secretary covering public liability and property
damage for the transportation of passengers for compensation by motor
vehicle in the United States between a place in a State and-
(A) a place in another State;
(B) another place in the same State through a place outside of that State; or
(C) a place outside the United States.653
After reviewing the insurance contract, the MCS-90B endorsement, and
§ 31138(a)(1), the district court found that "form MCS-90B only applies to
transportation that occurs within the United States, [rather than] to
transportation occurring outside of the United States. 654 As a consequence,
the district concluded that Lincoln had no duty to pay the final judgment that
the Morquechos won against Garcia's Tours.6 5 Remarkably, the Fifth Circuit
embraced the district court's findings and conclusion.656
The court of appeals explained:
Reading [U.S.C. § 31138(a)(1)(C)] in conjunction with the MCS-90B
endorsement, the minimum levels of financial responsibility requirements
apply to the transportation of passengers in the United States; thus the
endorsement does not require an insurer to pay judgments recovered
against the insured if the transportation of passengers by motor vehicle does
not occur in the United States.65
7
The Fifth Circuit then applied the plain meaning rule: "[A]lthough
[§ 31138(a)(1)(C)] recognizes that a commercial motor vehicle may be
transporting passengers 'to a place outside the United States,' it requires
minimum levels of financial responsibility only for the part of the
transportation that occurs 'in the United States.'
' 658
Indisputably, a federal court's employing plain-meaning rules to interpret
a controversial insurance statute is highly warranted because the process is an
efficient way to resolve a dispute quickly and fairly. But the doctrine of plain
meaning comprises a set of very clear rules and a federal court should carefully
fmcsa.dot.gov/documents/forms/part-387.pdf.
653. 49 U.S.C. § 31138(a)(1) (emphasis added).
654. Lincoln, 501 F.3d at 439.
655. See id.
656. See id. at 442.
657. Id. at 441 (emphasis added).
658. Id. at 440-41 ("[By its plain language,] the endorsement does not cover the Morquechos's accident
in Mexico because the accident occurred in a place where the motor vehicle was not subject to the minimum
financial responsibility requirements [under] § 31138.").
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consider and apply those principles, especially if the court has exercised
diversity jurisdiction. The Supreme Court of Texas is exceedingly clear that
the paramount objective of statutory construction is to determine and give
effect to the legislature's intent.659 First, the court must construe the statute as
written and, if possible, determine the legislature's intention from the statute's
language.66° To reach that end, courts must examine the plain meaning of
words in the statute, and if the meaning is unambiguous, the court's
interpretation must harmonize with the plain meaning of the words and phrases
in the statute.661 Second, a court should read every word, phrase, and
expression in a statute as if the legislature deliberately inserted them into the
662
statute. 2 Finally, courts must presume that a legislature wanted the words
and phrases in a statute to be read and applied in their entirety rather than in
isolation.6 3
In the present case, the court of appeals clearly did not adhere to the
statutory construction rules. Again, the Fifth Circuit stated that the statute
"requires minimum levels of financial responsibility only for.., the
transportation that occurs 'in the United States.' 664 Bluntly put, that statement
does not appear in § 31138(a)(1)(C). 665 But even more importantly, if the
MCS-90B endorsement only covers bus routes "in the United States;" the court
of appeals should have explained why Congress inserted the phrase "a place
outside the United States" in the statute.666 The Fifth Circuit did not; therefore,
the analysis of endorsement controversy is critically unsound.667
There is one final issue the court of appeals did not address completely.
The Morquechos filed a negligence-based cause of action against Garcia's
Tours.68 They asserted that the bus company negligently hired and retained
Escoto-the bus driver. 669 In addition, the Morquechos alleged that Garcia's
Tours negligently entrusted Escoto to operate the bus that was involved in the
accident.67° Without elaborating, however, the Fifth Circuit simply state that
[i]t is undisputed that the operational negligence of Escoto, the bus driver,
occurred in Mexico. Thus, the negligent hiring, retention, and entrustment
would not exist 'but for' the bus crash in Mexico, for which we have
659. See Cont'l Cas. Co. v. Downs, 81 S.W.3d 803, 805 (Tex. 2002).
660. See Del Indus., Inc. v. Tex. Workers Comp. Ins. Fund, 973 S.W.2d 743, 745 (Tex. App.-Austin
1998), aff'd, 35 S.W.3d 591 (Tex. 2000).
661. See City ofSan Antonio v. City of Boerne, 111 S.W.3d 22, 25 (Tex. 2003); St. Luke's Episcopal
Hosp. v. Agbor, 952 S.W.2d 503, 505 (Tex. 1997).
662. See City of Austin v. Quick, 930 S.W.2d 678,687 (Tex. App.-Austin 1996), afftd, 7 S.W.3d 109
(Tex. 1998).
663. See Jones v. Fowler, 969 S.W.2d 429, 432 (Tex. 1998).
664. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co. v. De La Luz Garcia, 501 F.3d 436,441 (5th Cir. Sept. 2007).
665. See 49 U.S.C.A. § 31138(a)(1)(C) (West Supp. 12008).
666. Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 501 F.3d at 441; see 49 U.S.C. § 31138(a)(1)(C).
667. See Lincoln Gen. Ins. Co., 501 F.3d at 436.





concluded there is no coverage under the endorsement. That the
Morquechos alleged the negligence occurred in Texas is irrelevant because
the cause of action against them arises out of the bus crash in Mexico,
which does not fall within the coverage of the endorsement.67'
Arguably, if the Fifth Circuit had read the territorial condition clause in
the liability contract and the MCS-90B endorsement more carefully, the court
would have discovered a gross ambiguity and reached a different conclusion.
Without a doubt, the contract's condition provision stated that Lincoln would
pay judgments only for accidents that occurred in Puerto Rico, Canada, the
United States, and the territories and possessions of the United States.672 But
the endorsement stated that Lincoln would "pay, within the limits of
liability.., any final judgment.., against the insured for public liability
resulting from negligence in the operation, maintenance or use of motor
vehicles... regardless ofwhether. . . such negligence occurs on any route or
in any territory authorized to be served by the insured or elsewhere.'
673
Arguably the last phrase is an ambiguity, which the court should construe in
favor of Garcia's Tours and by extension in favor of the third party victims.
674
But there is more. The MCS-90B endorsement reads: "[N]o condition...
in the policy... shall relieve the company from liability or from the payment
of any final judgment .... ,675 The endorsement, however, also reads: "[A]I1
... conditions ... in the policy.., shall remain in full force and effect as
binding between the insured and the company.', 676 Does this mean that Lincoln
may not use the territorial restriction condition as an affirmative defense and
walk away from its financial obligation under the endorsement? If the answer
is yes, this leads to the next question: Does the endorsement effectively allow
Garcia's Tours and the Morquechos to establish coverage for the accident by
effectively invoking the unpopular doctrine of estoppel into coverage?677 The
671. Id. at443.
672. Id.
673. See ENDORSEMENT FORM, supra note 652 (emphasis added).
674. Cf. Gonzalez v. Mission Am. Ins. Co., 795 S.W.2d 734, 737 (Tex. 1990) ("[I]t is well-established
law that where an ambiguity exists in a contract, the contract language will be construed strictly against the
party who drafted it since the drafter is responsible for the language used."); Republic Nat'l Bank v. Nw.
Nat'l Bank, 578 S.W.2d 109, 115 (Tex. 1978) (concluding that any ambiguous writing in contract-
including an endorsement-must be construed strictly against the party who drafted it since the drafter is
responsible for the language).
675. See ENDORSEMENT FORM, supra note 652.
676. See id.
677. See Ulico Cas. Co. v. Allied Pilots Ass'n, 187 S.W.3d 91, 98 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth, 2005), rev'd,
262 S.W.3d 773 (Tex. 2008) ("In a proper case, estoppel can prevent an insurer from asserting policy
defenses. This can occur when an insurer undertakes defense of a case without qualification or reservation of
the right to later deny its obligation to provide indemnity if its insured is found liable. Generally, estoppel
cannot be used to create insurance coverage when none exists under the policy. An exception to this general
rule-commonly called the Wilkinson exception-provides that an insurer undertaking or continuing defense
of a claim while having knowledge of facts indicating the claim is not covered under its policy, without an
effective reservation of rights, may waive or be estopped from asserting all policy defenses, including the
defense of noncoverage.... Although the Texas Supreme Court has never addressed this exception, it has
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endorsement is ambiguous, and the Fifth Circuit should have construed the
confusion in favor of the third-party victims and the insured.
B. Third-Party Liability Claims-Injury to Property
1. Substantive Question: Whether Under Mississippi Law a Liability
Insurer Has a Duty To Defend and Indemnify an Insured Residential
Developer After the Owners-Operators of a Golf Course Commenced a
Slander-of-Title Lawsuit Against the Insured
Very likely, the overwhelming majority of jurists are familiar with an
action for slander of person. Stated simply, a defendant is liable for damages if
the plaintiff establishes that the defendant orally communicated a defamatory
statement about the plaintiff to a third person without a legal excuse.678 On the
other hand, an action for slander of title is probably less familiar. Essentially, a
person who has an interest in property may sue a wrongdoer and receive special
damages if the wrongdoer's slanderous statements "injure" or "undermine" a
plaintiff s interest in property.
679
Among numerous reasons, a slander-of-title action lies against a person for
(1) placing a judicial lien on someone's homestead impairing or clouding the
owner's rights under a title;680 (2) disparaging one's title to property and thus
causing special damages by making a false statement with malice;681
(3) forging a signature on a mortgage and publishing a foreclosure notice with
an intent to annoy or injure a person's property; 682 or (4) negligently,
intentionally, or unjustifiably interfering with a business owner's mail, even if
been utilized, recognized, or both by several Texas courts of appeals and federal courts applying Texas law."
(citing Farmers Tex. County Mut. Ins. Co. v. Wilkinson, 601 S.W.2d 520,522 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1980,
writ ref'd n.r.e.))).
678. See, e.g., Duran v. Furrs Supermarkets, Inc. 921 S.W.2d 778, 792 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1996, no
writ). A defamatory statement injures a person's reputation and exposes that person to public hatred,
contempt, ridicule, or financial injury. Id.
679. See Walley v. Hunt, 54 So. 2d 393, 396 (Miss. 1951) ("'Slander of title' is a phrase commonly
employed to describe words or conduct which bring or tend to bring in question the right or title of another to
particular property, as distinguished from the disparagement of the property itself. The slander may consist of
a statement in writing, printing, or by word of mouth, and may relate to personal as well as real property....
[T]he general rule of liability for slander of title is stated as follows: 'One who falsely and maliciously
publishes matter which brings in question or disparages the title to property, thereby causing special damage
to the owner, may be held liable in a civil action for damages....' Words spoken of property are not in
themselves actionable. But the publication of false and malicious statements, disparaging of plaintiffs
property or the title thereto, when followed, as a natural, reasonable and proximate result, by special damage
to the owner, are actionable. The false statement may consist of an assertion that plaintiff has no title to the
property of which he is the ostensible owner, or that his title is defective, or that defendant has an interest in or
lien upon the property.... Whatever be the statement, however, in order for it to form the basis of a right of
action it must have been made, not only falsely, but maliciously.").
680. See In re Henderson, 18 F.3d 1305, 1309 (5th Cir. 1994).
681. See Jeanes v. Henderson, 703 F.2d 855, 860 (5th Cir. 1983).
682. See Proctor v. Gissendaner, 579 F.2d 876, 880, 883 (5th Cir. 1978).
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the interference does not affect the owners benefit of a bargain. 6" This term,
the Fifth Circuit decided Nationwide Mutual Insurance Co. v. Lake Caroline,
Inc. 8 The underlying conflict involved a slander-of-title action.685 The
central question in Nationwide, however, was whether the insurer had a duty to
defend the insured against a slander-of-title lawsuit.6 86 Because the facts in the
underlying lawsuit were fairly simple, the Fifth Circuit easily and intelligently
resolved the insurance-related controversy. 7
Lake Caroline, Inc. (LCI) developed a subdivision (Lake Caroline) in
Madison County, Mississippi.68s LCI created the Lake Caroline Planned Unit
Development (PUD).6 89 A&F Properties (AFP) wanted to construct and
operate a golf course within the boundaries of Lake Caroline. 69 Therefore,
LCI gave AFP 154 acres of land in exchange for AFP's promise to build and
maintain a golf course for at least ten years.6 91 The Board adopted a master
plan for the LCI PUD, which included a golf course at Lake Caroline.
6 92
Several years later, AFP wanted to build residential units on the golf course.
6 93
LCI and hundreds of individual homeowners opposed the idea. 94
695Consequently, the Board denied AFP's petition to redevelop the golf course.
Shortly thereafter, AFP sued LCI in a Mississippi state court, and the
complaint listed several causes of action: breach-of-contract, breach-of-
warranty-deed, and slander-of-title.696  When the underlying lawsuit
commenced, Nationwide Mutual Insurance Company (Nationwide) insured
LCI under a liability insurance contract.697 Thus, after discovering the lawsuit,
Nationwide filed a declaratory-judgment action in the District Court for the
Southern District of Mississippi. 698 Nationwide contended that it had no duty
to defend LCI against AFP's lawsuit.699 The court found that AFP's lawsuit
was, in essence, an action for slander-of-title.700 Because slander involves
intentional conduct, the district court declared that the insurance contract did
not cover calculated acts, and LCI appealed.7°'
683. See Kelite Prods. v. Binzel, 224 F.2d 131, 138 (5th Cir. 1955).
684. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Lake Caroline, Inc., 515 F.3d 414 (5th Cir. Jan. 2008).
685. Id. at 420.
686. Id. at 418-20.
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The Fifth Circuit agreed that AFP's suit was basically a slander-of-title
action because APF alleged that LCI intentionally and/or maliciously
(1) withheld material information about the Board's proposed and
implemented master plans; (2) failed to disclose to the Board that AFP had a
right to use the golf course land for another purpose after the contract expired;
and (3) led the Board to believe that AFP was not a developer who had a legal
right to develop the property. °2
To determine whether Nationwide had a duty to defend LCI, the court of
appeals reviewed the insurance coverage provisions under the "occurrence"
703liability insurance contract. The "property loss" provision read in pertinent
part:
[Nationwide] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of... "property damage" to which this insurance
applies. [Nationwide] will have the right and duty to defend the insured
against any "suit" seeking those damages. However, we will have no duty to
defend the insured against any "suit" seeking damages for... "property
damage" to which this insurance does not apply.
70
The insurance contract's "personal and advertising injury" clause stated in
pertinent part:
[Nationwide] will pay those sums that the insured becomes legally obligated
to pay as damages because of "personal and advertising injury" to which
this insurance applies. [Nationwide] will have the right and duty to defend
the insured against any "suit" seeking those damages. However,
[Nationwide] will have no duty to defend the insured against any "suit"
seeking damages for "personal and advertising injury" to which this
insurance does not apply.705
In addition, the contract defined "property damage" as a "[p]hysical injury to
tangible property including loss of use of that property" and "[1]oss of use of
tangible property that is not physically injured."7°  The policy also defined
"personal and advertising injury" to include "[o]ral or written publication.., of
material that slanders or libels a person or organization or disparages a person's
or organization's goods, products or services. 70 7
702. Id. at 420.
703. Id. (limiting coverage to property damage that was "caused by an occurrence" within the "coverage
territory."). The contract defined an occurrence as being "an accident, including continuous or repeated




707. Id. at 417-18.
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Finally, the insurance contract also contained two pertinent exclusion
clauses.7 °8 The "expected or intentional conduct" provision excluded coverage
for property damage that was "expected or intended from the standpoint of the
insured.,,709 A "knowledge of falsity" clause excluded coverage for any
"'[p]ersonal and advertising injury' arising out of oral or written publication of
material, if done by or at the direction of the insured with knowledge of its
falsity. '71°
The Fifth Circuit noted that AFP alleged that LCI's conduct was
711intentional and malicious. Under Mississippi law, a party's reckless
disregard for the truth can be malicious. 712 A reckless disregard for the truth
requires plaintiff to show that the defendant had serious doubts about the truth
of the publication.713 Additionally, in a prior case applying Mississippi law,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the knowledge of falsity exclusion does not
exclude coverage when allegedly offensive conduct involves "gross and
reckless disregard of the truth. 714 Therefore, because AFP alleged that some
of LCI's actions were malicious, the court of appeals concluded that the
knowledge of falsity exclusion did not preclude coverage.71 5
Under the liability contract, however, Nationwide promised to defend its
insured only if a third-party accused the insured of slandering a person or an
organization.71 6 When the Fifth Circuit wrote the opinion, Mississippi courts
had not decided whether a slander-of-title action allows a complainant to secure
damages for both real and personal property injuries.7 17 But, among other
courts, the law is unanimous: An action for slander-of-title provides no relief
for injury to persons, organizations, goods, or services.718 Concluding that
Mississippi courts would reach the same conclusion, the Fifth Circuit declared
708. Id.
709. Id. at 417.
710. Id. at418.
711. Id. at417.
712. See Eckman v. Cooper Tire & Rubber Co., 893 So. 2d 1049, 1053 (Miss. 2005); Bulloch v. City of
Pascagoula, 574 So. 2d 637, 642 (Miss. 1990).
713. See Journal Publ'g Co. v. McCullough, 743 So. 2d 352, 361 (Miss. 1999) (quoting Harte-Hanks
Commc'ns, Inc. v. Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 688 (1989)).
714. See Am. Home Assur. Co. v. United Space Alliance, LLC, 378 F.3d 482,488 (5th Cir. 2004) ("[I]f
liability can be imposed without proving that the false statements were made with the knowledge that they
were false, the knowledge of falsity exclusion will not apply to preclude coverage.") (applying Texas law);
EEOC v. S. Publ'g Co., Inc., 894 F.2d 785, 790-91 (5th Cit. 1990) (emphasis removed).
715. Nationwide, 515 F.3d at 420.
716. Id.
717. Id. at420-21.
718. See, e.g., ABM Indus., Inc. v. Zurich Am. Ins. Co., 2006 WL 2595944, at *26-27 (N.D. Cal. Sept.
11, 2006); U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. v. Saddle Ridge, L.L.C., 1999 WL 1072905, at *5 (D. Kan. Sept. 27, 1999);
Kickham Group, Inc. v. Am. Nat'l Fire Ins. Co., 1997 WL 600710, at *2-3 (N.D. Tex. Sept. 24, 1997);
Etchison v. Westfield Ins. Co., 2006 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 71467, at *25-29 (N.D. W. Va. Sept. 29, 2006);
Thompson v. Md. Cas. Co., 84 P.3d 496, 506-07 (Colo. 2004); Wylin v. Auto Owners Ins. Co., 2005 WL
2656642, at *5 (Mich. Ct. App. Oct. 16, 2005); Acme Constr. Co., Inc. v. Cont'l Nat'l Indem. Co., 2003 WL
194879, at *6-7 (Ohio Ct. App. Jan. 30, 2003); Bank One, Milwaukee, NA v. Breakers Dev., Inc., 559
N.W.2d 911, 912-13 (Wis. 1997).
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that AFP's slander-of-title claims did not trigger coverage under the liability
insurance contract. 719 Therefore, Nationwide did not have a duty to defend
LCI against AFP's lawsuit.72°
2. Substantive Question: Whether Under Texas Law an Insured Electrical
Contractor's Primary and Excess Insurer Has a Duty To Defend and a Duty
To Indemnify After a Third Party Commenced a Multiple-Claims, Tort-
Based Lawsuit Against the Contractor
Scottsdale Insurance Co. v. Knox Park Construction, Inc. also presents a
duty-to-defend controversy. 721 In Scottsdale, however, the conflict is between
two liability insurers rather than an insured and its insurer.722 The underlying
facts are brief and familiar. Knox Park Construction Company (Knox Park)
hired Shade Tree Electric, Inc. (Shade Tree) to do construction work.723 After
Knox Park discovered construction defects, the construction company sued
Shade Tree in a Texas state court.724 The complaint listed several causes of
action: negligence, breach-of-warranty, and breach-of-contract.725
When Shade Tree performed the construction work, Landmark Insurance
Company (Landmark) and Scottsdale Insurance Company (Scottsdale) insured
the contractor under two liability insurance contracts.726 Respectively,
Scottsdale and Landmark were the primary and secondary/excess insurers.727
Ultimately, Scottsdale, Shade Tree, and Knox Park settled the state court
728action. Under the settlement agreement, Scottsdale agreed to pay and Knox
Park accepted $535,000.729 In return, Knox Park released Shade Tree and
Scottsdale from all liability.730 Knox Park, however, retained the right to
collect the difference between $535,000 and $1.2 million from Landmark.73'
Similarly, Scottsdale retained its right to recoup part of the $535,000 from
Landmark.732
Therefore, the primary insurer filed a declaratory-judgment action in the
District Court for the Northern District of Texas.733 Scottsdale asked the
district court to declare that Landmark had a contractual duty to defend or
719. Nationwide, 515 F.3d at 420.
720. Id. at 424.
721. Scottsdale Ins. Co. v. Knox Park Constr., Inc., 488 F.3d 680, 682 (5th Cir. 2007).
722. Id. at 683.
723. Id. at 682.
724. Id.
725. Id. at 683.










indemnify (or both) Shade Tree.7M Scottsdale and Landmark filed motions for
summary relief.735 Landmark presented three arguments: (1) Scottsdale did
not establish an "'ultimate defined loss"'-which exceeded the limits of
liability under Scottsdale's policy and triggered Landmark's contractual duty
to defend or indemnify (or both) under the excess-liability policy;
(2) Scottsdale's breach of every condition precedent precluded Landmark's
duty to defend or indemnify (or both); and (3) Scottsdale failed to prove that
Shade Tree was the insured under Landmark's insurance contract.7 36 After
considering Landmark's first argument, the district court granted and denied
respectively Landmark's and Scottsdale's summary judgment motions.737
After the federal judge found that Landmark had no duty to defend Shade
Tree and that the excess liability policy did not cover the third-party claims,
Scottsdale appealed.738 Before the Fifth Circuit, Scottsdale argued that
Landmark's-rather than Scottsdale's-insurance contract covered Knox
Park's breach-of-warranty action.739 Thus, from the primary insurer's
perspective, Landmark had a duty to pay for a portion of the $535,000
settlement cost.74° To help determine whether Landmark had a duty to
indemnify, the court of appeals reviewed the excess insurer's policy. 741 In
relevant part, Landmark's insurance contract stated:
We will pay those sums the insured becomes legally obligated to pay for
"ultimate net loss" in excess of the "retained limit" because of "bodily
injury" or "property damage" to which this insurance applies. 742
The policy defined "ultimate net loss" as the insured's total legal liability for
causing third-party "bodily injury," "property damage" or "advertising
injury., 743 "Retained limit" was defined as proceeds from "underlying
insurance" or from "other collectible primary insurance. ' 74 And "underlying
insurance" was defined as "coverage(s) afforded under [designated] insurance
policies."745
According to Scottsdale, Landmark's insurance contract provided for
horizontal coverage if Scottsdale's policy did cover a given claim. 746
Alternatively, Scottsdale argued that the coverage clause in Landmark's policy




738. See id. at 685.
739. Id.
740. See id.
741. See id. at 686.
742. Id.
743. Id. at 686 n.2.
744. Id. at 686.
745. Id. (emphasis in original).
746. See id. at 687.
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was ambiguous, because "coverage(s) afforded" could mean insurance that
Scottsdale's policy did not exclude.747 Under Texas law, if an insurance
contract has more than one reasonable interpretation, courts must resolve the
ambiguity by adopting the construction that favors coverage.748 Applying that
rule, the Fifth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding and declared that
Landmark's policy conceivably required the excess insurer to indemnify
Scottsdale.749
Did Landmark also have a duty to defend Shade Tree against Knox Park's
multiple-action lawsuit? 750 The court of appeals said no.75 Landmark's
liability insurance contract stated in relevant part:
We have a duty to defend the insured[, Shade Tree,] against any "suits" to
which this insurance applies: (a) But which are not covered by any
"underlying insurance".., or (b) If the applicable limit of "underlying
insurance" is exhausted.
752
In light of the duty-to-defend clause, the Fifth Circuit correctly found that
Scottsdale's insurance contract covered some of Knox Park's claims in the
underlying lawsuit. 75 3 This finding was significant because Texas law is
exceedingly clear: If an insurer has a duty to defend a single claim against its
insured, the insurer has a duty to defend the insured against all third-party
claims in the suit. 754 Consequently, the court of appeals declared that
Scottsdale-the primary insurer-had a contractual duty to defend Shade Tree
against the entire underlying suit, and reversed the district court's ruling.
755
3. Substantive Question: Whether Under Texas Law a Fidelity and
Guaranty Insurer Has a Duty To Defend and Indemnify a Bank Against a
Depositor Conversion-of-Funds Lawsuit After the Bank Allowed a Third-
Party To Endorse Checks and Use the Depositor's Funds in an
Unauthorized Manner
Homeowners' policies are widespread and quite familiar. On the other
hand, a financial institution bond is less well-known.75 6 But like a
homeowners' policy, a fidelity or surety bond is a contract of insurance. In
747. See id. at 686-87.
748. See, e.g., Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hudson Energy Co., 811 S.W.2d 552, 555 (Tex. 1991).
749. Scottsdale, 488 F.3d at 687.
750. See id. at 689.
751. See id.
752. Id. (emphasis added).
753. See id.
754. See Utica Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Am. Indem. Co., 141 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. 2004).
755. Scottsdale, 488 F.3d at 689.
756. See Lynch Props., Inc. v. Potomac Ins. Co. of fI., 140 F.3d 622,627 (5th Cir. 1998) (observing the
Surety & Fidelity Association of America developed Form 24--on which many financial institution bonds
are modeled).
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addition, like the typical homeowners' insurance contract, a bond has both
first-party and third-party coverages.757 In recent years, fidelity and surety
insurers have not asked the Fifth Circuit to settle many duty-to-defend or duty-
to-indemnify disputes involving institutional bonds; however, the court of
appeals recently decided a bond case-Citibank Texas, N.A. v. Progressive
Casualty Insurance Co.-a timely and important decision given the variety of
ways that consumers may transact business with various financialinstitutions.75
Although these are the few underlying facts in Citibank, the financial
institution and the third parties interrelationships are moderately complex.
First, Todd P. Lindley (Lindley) is an exceedingly corrupt attorney. 759 He
formed GoldenLife/Richardson L.P. (GoldenLife), a Texas limited
partnership. 76° GoldenLife's stated goal was to develop and operate a skilled
nursing facility in Richardson, Texas. 761 Additionally, Lindley was the
president, director, and sole owner of Pilatus Company.762 Furthermore,
757. See The Surety & Fidelity Association of America, Surety, http://www.surety.org/content.cfm?id=
70&catid=2 (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). The standard Form 24, Financial Institution Bond contains four
basic coverage agreements: (1) an employee dishonesty/fidelity clause, (2) an on-the-premises loss of
property provision, (3) an in-transit loss of property provision, and (4) a counterfeit-currency clause. Scott
Simmonds, Bank Insurance-Financial Institution Bond, http://www.scottsimmonds.com/content/financial-
institutionbond.html (last visited Nov. 11, 2008). In addition, under most standard policies, a financial
institution may purchase "optional coverage" for agents, audit-related expenses, losses from automated teller
machines, check-kiting fraud, computer-systems fraud, data-processing services, debit-card fraud,
destruction-of-data/hacker fraud, computer-viruses generated losses, losses from forgeries, unauthorized-
signatures losses, and losses from fraudulent mortgages. Id. Also, additional riders or endorsements maybe
added to cover other risks. See id.
758. See Citibank Tex., N.A. v. Progressive Cas. Ins. Co., 522 F.3d 591 (5th Cir. Mar. 2008).
759. See Press Release, U.S. Dept. of Justice Dallas, Lawyer Pleads Guilty To Mail Fraud (Nov. 26,
2006), http://www.usdoj.gov/usao/txn/PressRelO6lindley-ple-pr.html (last visited on Aug. 31,2008). ('Todd
Patrick Lindley, a lawyer residing in Highland Park, Texas, pled guilty today to one count of mail fraud ....
Lindley, who was originally charged in a multi-count federal indictment returned by a grand jury in January,
faces a maximum statutory sentence of 20 years imprisonment, a $250,000 fine and restitution. He is
scheduled to be sentenced on February 15, 2007, by United States District Judge Ed Kinkeade. Lindley's sole
practitioner law office is located.., in Dallas. Lindley was also the sole owner and director of Pilatus
Company, Inc., which he ran from the same office on Preston Road. Pilatus was the general partner and
managing partner for GoldenLife/Richardson L L.P. which Lindley ran out of the Preston Road office.
Lindley represented to investors that the purpose of GoldenLife/Richardson was to build a senior care center,
also called a skilled nursing facility, in Richardson, Texas. Acting on behalf of Pilatus, Lindley represented
that investor funds would be used to construct the project. He solicited money from investors by sending
them a business plan in which he, as the President of Pilatus, proposed to construct the project. Lindley
admitted that from November 15, 2000 to July 25, 2003, he devised a scheme to defraud investors of their
money and property by representing to the investors that all the money he solicited would be used to acquire,
own, develop, manage, lease, finance and operate, as well as build the project. However, Lindley admits that
he converted investor money to his own purpose, among other things, to finance his prosecution of personal
injury litigation. The amount of the fraud is approximately $1.5 million.").
760. Citibank, 522 F.3d at 592.
761. Id.
762. Id.
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"Pilatus was the general and managing partner for GoldenLife. '763 The
attorney also created Lindley Properties, Inc. (Properties).7 64
Put simply, Lindley developed the entire corporate web "to defraud
investors of their money" so that he could finance his personal-injury law
practice. 765 In fact, GoldenLife's limited partners invested $2,570,000 in the
partnership. 766 Both GoldenLife and Properties had separate accounts at
Citibank Texas, N.A. (Citibank).767 And although Lindley was an authorized
signatory on both accounts, Properties' account was essentially Lindley's
768personal account. Therefore, to reach his fraudulent goal, Lindley endorsed
sixteen "payable to GoldenLife" checks. 769 The face value of the checks was
$1,170,000.770 He deposited those funds into the Properties account and used
them in an unauthorized manner.7
71
After discovering Lindley's misappropriations, GoldenLife filed an
772action for conversion against Citibank in a Texas state court. Eventually,
the state court decided in favor of GoldenLife.773 However, before determining
GoldenLife's damages, Citibank and GoldenLife settled the dispute for
$845,000. 774 When the conversion occurred, Progressive Casualty Insurance
Co. (Progressive) insured Citibank under a Financial Institution Bond
(Bond).775 The Bond covered the bank's losses up to $7,000,000, if forgeries,
"unauthorized" signatures, fraud, and other acts of dishonesty caused the
losses.776 Citibank asked Progressive to reimburse the $845,000; however, the
fidelity insurer refused.777
Citibank sued Progressive in the District Court for the Northern District of
Texas.778 The complaint alleged that the fidelity insurer breached the contract
and violated the Texas Insurance Code by acting in bad faith. 779 Citibank
wanted reasonable settlement funds and attorneys' fees for defending itself
against GoldenLife's lawsuit.780 The bank also wanted damages for the






















asserted that the Bond did not cover any of the claims in the underlying state-
court lawsuit.782 However, the district court concluded that Progressive
breached the fidelity contract by failing to pay the settlement costs. 783 But the
district court held that Progressive did not act in bad faith but did not owe
attorneys' fees, and Progressive appealed.784
The Fifth Circuit fashioned the question presented this way: "whether the
district court correctly held that Lindley's [check] endorsements were
unauthorized under the Bond.', 785 Under the Bonds Insuring Agreement D,
Progressive promised to indemnify Citibank for "[a loss] resulting directly
from... [f]orgery or alteration of, on or in any Negotiable Instrument. '786 The
Bonds Unauthorized Signature Rider (Rider), however, modified the Insuring
Agreement D.787 The Rider stated in relevant part: "Accepting, paying or
cashing any Negotiable Instruments or Withdrawal Orders that bear
unauthorized signatures or endorsements shall be... a [florgery under this
Insuring Agreement. 788
The district court read the same clauses, but concluded that Progressive
was liable for Citibank's lOSS. 7 89 The lower federal court found that Lindley's
endorsements were "unauthorized" and therefore covered under the Bond.7 9°
To arrive at that conclusion, the district court embraced the definition of
"unauthorized endorsement" under the Texas Business & Commerce Code: An
endorsement is unauthorized when a party makes it "without actual, implied,
or apparent authority., 79 ' But the Fifth Circuit determined that the state court's
use of the definition of unauthorized endorsement under Texas law was
irrelevant, and concluded that the district court's interpretation was "overly
expansive., 792 Therefore, the court of appeals fashioned a new definition out of
thin air: "[A]n endorsement is unauthorized if the person signing... had no
authority.., to endorse negotiable instruments for the named payee... or...
782. Id.
783. Id. at 593 n.4 (noting the district court awarded (1) $695,000-the $845,000 for the settlement less
the Bond's $150,000 deductible; (2) $48,540 pre-judgment interest, and (3) $79,591.84 in attorneys fees for
prosecuting its claim on the Bond against Progressive). The total judgment was $823,132.35-plus post-
judgment interest at the rate of 4.99% per annum. Id.
784. Id. at 593.
785. Id. at 595.
786. Id. at 593.
787. Id.
788. Id. (emphasis added).
789. Id. at 592-93.
790. Id. at 592.
791. Id.; see TEX. BuS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(b)(41) (Vernon Supp. 2008).
792. Citibank, 522 F.3d at 595 ("The Bond's terms and definitions were not before the state court in the
suit between Citibank and GoldenLife, so that court applied the definition of unauthorized endorsement found
in the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC).... The state court's determination that Lindley's endorsements
were unauthorized under the UCC definition is neither in dispute nor legally relevant to this appeal. Rather,
we must decide whether the district court correctly held that Lindley's endorsements were 'unauthorized'
under the Bond.").
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had some authority to endorse for the named payee but exceeded the scope of
his endorsement authority.,
793
Citibank argued, and the district court found, that Lindley fraudulently
endorsed the sixteen checks for his personal use, and he did so without securing
any actual, implied, or apparent authority from GoldenLife. 794 But citing its
newly fabricated definition of an "unauthorized endorsement," the Fifth Circuit
stressed that "even though Lindley exceeded the scope of his endorsement
authority," he still had some authority to endorse the checks.795 Therefore, from
the court of appeals perspective, because Lindley was "an authorized endorser
of GoldenLife checks for some purposes," his endorsement of the checks was
not a covered peril.796 Stated slightly differently, since Lindley "had some
authority to endorse" the negotiable instruments, his endorsements-for better
or worse-were authorized.797 Consequently, the court of appeals declared
that the Bond did not cover the losses.798
Unquestionably, the Fifth Circuit's decision in Citibank is the most
unduly strained, decisively unfair, and needlessly bothersome ruling of all the
decisions appearing in this review. The reasons for this conclusion are not
terribly complex. First, the Fifth Circuit decided Citibank without applying
any existing Texas law.799 What is more disturbing is that, although a plain
reading of an on-point Texas statute would have resolved the controversy
decidedly and fairly, the Fifth Circuit chose the more difficult path by creating
a rule out of whole cloth and applying it to reach a strained and arguably
predetermined result.80
0
Second, the Texas Supreme Court has embraced five doctrines to
interpret insurance contracts.801 However, without citing a single Texas case,
the Fifth Circuit concluded that the doctrine of ambiguity did not apply. 02
Citing its own decisions, the court concluded that the language in Citibank's
Bond could not be construed against Progressive because the American
Bankers Association and the Surety & Fidelity Association of America often
negotiate and jointly draft financial institution bonds.803 But there is a major
793. Id. at 596.
794. See id.
795. Id.
796. Id. (emphasis added).
797. See id.
798. See id. at 596-97.
799. See id. at 595-97.
800. Id.
801. See sources cited supra notes 525-59. Again, those doctrines include the following: the general rules
of contract construction, the doctrine of ambiguity, the qualified reasonable expectation doctrine, the doctrine
of plain meaning, and the adhesion doctrine. Insurance contract rules have also been applied to such things as
fidelity and surety bonds. See Great Am. Ins. Co. v. Langdeau, 379 S.W.2d 62,65 (Tex. 1964) (stating that
when construing fidelity bonds and surety bonds, courts follow the rules applicable to insurance contracts and
not strict rules of suretyship).
802. See Citibank, 522 F.3d at 595-97.
803. See id. at 596 n. 12 ("The general rule that ambiguities in insurance contracts are to be construed
strictly against the underwriter does not apply in this case.. .. '[B]anker's blanket bonds'.. . are often
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problem with the Fifth Circuit's conclusion: In Citibank, there was no evidence
that Citibank, Progressive, or members of the insurers and bankers associations
negotiated and drafted the Bond. °4
IV. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF A STATE STATUTE THAT REGULATES
INSURERS' BUSINESS ACTIVITIES-SUBSTANTIVE QUESTION: WHETHER A
TEXAS STATUTE VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTION'S DORMANT COMMERCE
CLAUSE AND THE FIRST AMENDMENT FOR PREVENTING AUTOMOBILE
INSURERS FROM OWNING AND OPERATING AUTOMOTIVE BODY SHOPS
Increasingly, insurers are trying to "manage" auto repairs like they
manage health care.8 °5 Therefore, to reduce costs, liability insurers encourage
their insureds to use a shop whose name appears on an approved list of auto
body repair shops.806 "According to the National Association of Independent
Insurers, a trade group, about 22% of customers offered a direct-repair option
take it."'807 For nearly 20 years, Allstate Corporation has operated its Priority
Repair Option (PRO) program.80 8 And the explanation is simple: "Repairing
cars is a huge business. In a typical year, [insureds file] 25 million to 30
million auto claims.... [Those include] collisions and weather-related claims




Without doubt, PROs have been controversial, because "[under]
conventional direct-repair programs, customers [may] choose from a broader
list of shops or [they may] elect not to participate., 8 °10 But again, insurers want
drafted by the joint efforts of associations represented by insurers and insureds. If the banks and the insurers
are equally responsible for the language in the 'Standard Form' Bond, the general principle that our
interpretation of ambiguous contract language favor the insured would be inapt." (citing Calcasieu-Marine
Nat'l Bank v. Am. Employers Ins. Co., 533 F.2d 290, 295 n.6 (5th Cir. 1976))); see also Nat'l Bank of
Commerce in New Orleans v. Fid. & Cas. Co. of N.Y., 312 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. La. 1970) (concluding that
since a banker's blanket bond evolves from the American Bankers Association and the Surety Association
and the Surety Association of Amercia's joint efforts and negotiation, the terms in a bond should not be
applied hostilely against the insurer), affid, 437 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1971).
804. Cf., Shoals Nat'l Bank of Florence v. Home Indem. Co., 384 F. Supp. 49, 54 (N.D. Ala. 1974)
(noting that bankers' blanket bonds can evolve from the efforts of insurers and bankers, but concluding that
ambiguities in the insurance contracts must be construed against the insurer because there was no evidence in
the record indicating that the bank, or any association acting on its behalf, negotiated the language in the bond
with the insurer).
805. See Anne Colden, Insurers Try "Managed Care "for Autos-Interest in Using Prescribed Repair
Shops Increases, WALL ST. J., Aug. 25, 1995, at A5C.
806. Id.
807. Id.
808. Id. ("Geico Corp. participates, as do nonstandard insurers Progressive Corp. and Integon Corp.
Multiline insurers IT Hartford... and St. Paul Companies also take part, although St. Paul's program... is
limited to glass repair.").
809. See Christopher Oster, Car Insurers Get Into the Repair Business-To Control Costs, Carriers
Take Over the Fix-It Work; But Will They Cut Corners?, WALL ST. J., Apr. 8, 2003, at DI ("In 2001, the
most recent year for which statistics are available, the total damage from such claims was $35.4 billion,
according to the Insurance Information Institute, a trade group.").
810. Colden, supra note 805.
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more control over how insurance proceeds are spent. 81' And that explains in
part why Allstate-the nations second-largest auto insurer-purchased a chain
of auto repair shops in 2001.812 In the wake of consumers' complaints,
however, regulators in New York ordered Allstate to terminate its PRO
program.1 3 But a federal district court reversed a part of the order, concluding
that it violated Allstate's freedom of speech under the First Amendment.8 4
Allstate's PRO program also has generated a lot of controversy in
Texas.815 And that program caused the constitutional conflict that Allstate
asked the Fifth Circuit to address in Allstate Insurance Co. v. Abbott.816
Allstate acquired Sterling Collision Centers, Inc. (Sterling), a multi-state chain
of repair shops.817 At the time, Sterling operated "approximately 60 auto body
repair shops in 14 states, including 15 shops in the state of Texas.818 After the
acquisition, Allstate instructed its telephone service representatives to use a
specific script when discussing auto repairs with their insureds.819  Stated
briefly, the agents encouraged consumers to use Allstate's PRO services at the
Sterling shops, without disclosing that policyholders also had a right use a
different auto-repair shop.
820
In 2003, the Texas Legislature heard testimony from consumers and auto-
repair associations, detailing the dangers of allowing insurance companies to
own auto body repair shops.821 Those opponents argued that such arrangements
would produce conflicts of interest, elevate the risk of illegal steering, and
encourage body shops to make shoddy repairs to reduce costs to the insurers. 822
After considering those concerns and others, the Legislature enacted H.B.
113 1-The Insurer Interests in Repair Facilities Act. 23
H.B. 1131 has several relevant provisions. 24 First, it prohibits an insurer
from owning or acquiring an interest in an auto repair facility."' But it
exempts body repair facilities that were open before the statute was enacted.826
811. Id.
812. See Oster, supra note 809.
813. See id.
814. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Serio, No. 97CIV.0670(RCC), 2000 WL 554221, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. May 5,
2000).
815. See Colden, supra note 805 ("[T]he Automotive Service Association-based in Bedford, Texas-
said its membership is also split on whether direct repair is a good idea. In a survey in 1994, about 55% of its
5,500 collision division members said they took part in direct-repair programs, said spokeswoman Monica
Buchholz.").
816. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Abbott, 495 F.3d 151, 154-55 (5th Cir. Aug. 2007).
817. Id.
818. Id. at 155.
819. See id.
820. See id.
821. See id. at 156.
822. See id.
823. TEX. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2307.002 (Vernon 2005); Abbott, 495 F.3d at 156.





Most notably, H.B. 1131 prevents an insurer from entering into a "favored
facility agreement exclusively with its tied repair facilities. ' ' 27 Put simply, an
insurer must establish an identical "referral program" with at least one
unaffiliated body shop. 828 Shortly after the legislature enacted H.B. 1131,
Allstate filed suit.82 9 The insurer claimed that H.B. 1131 violated the dormant
Commerce Clause of the Constitution and the First Amendment.
830
More specifically, Allstate argued that the bill's purpose and effect
discriminated irrationally against interstate commerce because the bill
prevented Sterling from opening additional body shops in Texas. 831 Allstate
claimed that the bill violated the First Amendment because the insurer's ability
to promote the Sterling shops-using truthful and non-deceptive commercial
speech-was contingent on Allstate promoting other body shops.832 The
district court concluded that the bill did not violate the dormant Commerce
Clause; therefore, Texas could prevent Allstate from acquiring additional auto
body repair shops.833 On the other hand, the district court held that H.B. 1131's
speech provisions violated the First Amendment. 834 Both Allstate and the
State of Texas appealed.
835
The Fifth Circuit conducted a de novo review because the district court's
judgment concerned the constitutionality of a statute.836 Federal constitutional
law is clear: "A [state] statute violates the dormant Commerce Clause where it
discriminates against interstate commerce either facially, by purpose, or by
effect., 837 A discriminatory statute may be valid "if the state 'can demonstrate,
under rigorous scrutiny, that it has no other means to advance a legitimate local
interest."' 838  Furthermore, a non-discriminatory statute may violate the
dormant Commerce Clause if the statute's burden on interstate commerce is
"clearly excessive" when compared to the local benefits. 839 Applying those
principles and citing an array of probative facts, the Fifth Circuit embraced the
district court's conclusion and held that H.B. 1131 did not violate the dormant
Commerce Clause. 84°
827. TEx. Occ. CODE ANN. § 2307.006(11) (Vernon 2005).





833. Id. at 158.
834. Id.
835. Id.
836. Id. at 160 (citing Castillo v. Cameron County, 238 F.3d 339, 347 (5th Cir. 2001)).
837. See id. (quoting Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263, 270 (1984)).
838. Id. (quoting C & A Carbone, Inc. v. Town of Clarkstown, N.Y., 511 U.S. 383, 392 (1994).
839. Id. (citing Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970)).
840. Id. at 160-64 ("Allstate and Sterling have failed to demonstrate a clear and consistent pattern of
discriminatory action by the Texas Legislature .... Allstate has failed to establish a history of hostility
towards Allstate singularly or towards out-of-state companies in general.... Moreover, much of Allstate's
evidence of 'discrimination' towards out-of-state companies is simply evidence of a legislative desire to treat
differently two business forms-independent auto body shops on the one hand and insurance-company-owned
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The district court also declared that H.B. 1131 violated the First
Amendment's protection of truthful and non-deceptive commercial
advertising.84' The district court found a violation in light of another settled
constitutional principle: If commercial speech is not false, deceptive, or
misleading, the First Amendment protects the speech from unwarranted
governmental regulation. 842 The Supreme Court fashioned a multi-pronged test
to determine whether a statute could regulate commercial speech.843 Applying
the Central's test in Abbott, the Fifth Circuit concluded that (1) H.B. 1131
prohibited advertisements that were not misleading; (2) H.B. 1131 did not
directly and materially advance Texas's asserted interest of protecting
consumers and ensuring fair competition; and (3) Texas could have chosen a
more narrowly tailored restriction to advance the state's interest.
844
V. CONCLUSION
This Article has reviewed nineteen of the Fifth Circuit's 2007-2008
insurance law decisions.845 Generally, the lucidity and thoroughness of the
analyses ranged from very good to less than ideal. On one hand, the opinions
were well-reasoned and the Fifth Circuit diligently applied Louisiana,
Mississippi, and Texas common law and statutes. Furthermore, when
comparing this year's opinions to those decided five years ago, the result is
undisputable: Rather than awarding or denying summary relief without an
explanation, both the district courts' and the Fifth Circuit's panels discussed
auto body shops on the other-a distinction based not on domicile but on business form.... Allstate and
Sterling [also] argue[d] that H.B. 1131 has a discriminatory effect because it favors in-state body shops and
will cause these services to shift from an out-of-state provider (i.e., Sterling) to in-state providers....
[However, that] argument is unpersuasive. As an initial matter, H.B. 1131 does not require Allstate to shut
any Sterling stores. Thus it is unclear how the new regulations would affect any shift in the current level of
business presently enjoyed by out-of-state suppliers of body shops to in-state shops. However, even if we
were to assume that H.B. 1131 would act to reduce Sterling's ability to attract new business, which local body
shops would then capture, this would still not establish a Commerce Clause violation.... Further, even if we
were to characterize Sterling's inability to expand as a burden on interstate commerce, that burden would not
be clearly excessive as compared to H.B. 1131 's putative local benefits.... [Thus] we conclude H.B. 1131
does not violate the dormant Commerce Clause[.]").
841. Id. at 157-58.
842. Id. at 165 (citing Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel, 471 U.S. 626, 628 (1985)).
843. Id. (citing Cent. Hudson Gas & Elec. Corp., v. Pub. Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 557,564-66
(1980)) ("[A court must ask] whether the commercial speech concerns unlawful activity or is misleading. If
so, ... the speech is not protected .... If the speech concerns lawful activity and is not misleading,
however, a court [must] ask whether the asserted governmental interest is substantial. If it is .... [the] court
[must determine] whether the regulation directly advances the governmental interest... and.., whether it is
not more extensive than is necessary to serve that interest. Each of these latter three inquiries must be
answered in the affirmative for the regulation to be found constitutional."); see Thompson v. Western States
Med. Ctr., 535 U.S. 357, 367 (2002)).
844. Id. at 165-68.
845. See supra note 1 and accompanying test.
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facts carefully, applied the five doctrines of contract construction and
interpretation, and explained their rulings. 4
On the down side, the Fifth Circuit continues to ignore states' settled
principles in far too many instances. This is especially true, when the Fifth
Circuit decides controversies involving a resident of Texas and a foreign
litigant.847 During the 2007-2008 session, the court of appeals created a rule
out of thin air and applied it, while ignoring an on-point Texas principle. 8
Even more troublesome, the Fifth Circuit completely ignored Texas law and
applied the laws of the Fifth Circuit and its panels.849 To be sure, correcting
these unsettling practices would make the decisions more predictable,
intelligible, and arguably, more fair.
846. See supra Parts I-IV.
847. See supra Part ll.C.3-4.
848. See supra Part IHL.B.3.
849. See supra Part n.C.3-4.
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